Using Baseball Reference multiyear park factors, the Brewers offense finished nearly 30 runs better than their league environment, and Baseball Prospectus park factors have the club performing even better; by True Average, the Brewers are tied with Houston as the fourth best offense in the MLB. According to Baseball Prospectus Batting Park Factor, the actual mix of parks the Brewers batted in was fourth toughest in baseball, meaning that the Brewers were likely to play in environments suppressing runs by approximately five percent.

Like 2018, the Brewers head into next season with a seemingly clear set of positions to improve, and seemingly clear prospects or internal development options to accomplish that goal.

• Orlando Arcia features prominently in calls for offensive improvement, as the elite gloveman suffered serious setbacks at the plate prior to his Triple-A demotions. Arcia’s glove makes roster decisions truly difficult, as the shortstop has impacted the game on the defensive end from the time he reached the MLB. If he bats anywhere near his second half line of .290 average / .320 on-base percentage / .396 slugging, the glove will play (for reference, the eighth batting order spot hit .229 / .304 / .357, so second half Arcia would easily clear that hurdle).

• Second base is a roster challenge, as Noah Nofz highlighted earlier today. It’s easy to dream on the future in terms of Keston Hiura’s potential, but it’s also worth remembering that the Brewers needed to improve center field for 2018 and still traded away their best development options there (Lewis Brinson, Monte Harrison). A trade of Hiura is not out of the question should Slingin’ Stearns get requisite return. The trouble is how the Brewers juggle additional roster elements and free agents there, as opposed to the development pains (or pay offs) of sticking with Hiura.

• Catcher is probably the most popular fan option for improving the club, because it offers the flashiest trade opportunity (J.T. Realmuto) and a couple of the best free agents in the 2019 class (e.g., Yasmani Grandal). Yet, it is worth emphasizing the strength of the Brewers’ fielding behind the dish in 2018, in order to frame offensive performance. Neither Manny Pina nor Erik Kratz were that bad at the plate in 2018, and both were exceptional defenders. Using Adjusted Fielding Runs Above Average, which is a fielding statistic adjusted to assess the nuances of throwing, blocking, and framing for catchers, Kratz (11.1, eighth best) and Pina (6.3, nineteenth best) produced plenty of defensive value for the Brewers. Of course, Grandal is the rare free agent catcher that can produce both excellent offensive and defensive value….

• Right field is a difficult position to assess because it’s become quite barren behind Domingo Santana for multiple reasons. First, midseason trades included Brett Phillips, who would have been an excellent candidate for a glove-first, power-speed fourth outfielder to help boost that corner position. Next, Christian Yelich does not produce good defensive value off of left field, which raises questions about Ryan Braun’s future role (in left field) and the value of keeping Yelich’s bat in the order at any defensive cost (September-level production rendered that question moot for the time being). Furthermore, there are not necessarily advanced outfield prospects that would be considered strong enough to knock Santana off of right field. All this either makes right field the perfect position for an external acquisition, or for staying put with Santana.

The trouble, of course, is that should the Brewers simultaneously develop Arcia and Hiura at the MLB level, and keep Kratz and Pina, this entire series of completely justifiable roster moves could produce an offensive black hole in the 6th / 7th / 8th batting spots when things are going rough (or, in Hiura’s case, just getting started). This is where the Brewers’ most important wager occurs: they must weigh the long-term development plays (both Arcia and Hiura have clear “role ceilings” that are better than average at the MLB level) against the need to contend in 2019 (and produce runs to do so). All of this is potentially compounded when one reasonably figures that Lorenzo Cain and Christian Yelich cannot possibly be expected to be as good as they were last season; obviously this does not mean that they cannot maintain performance or even improve, it just should not be viewed as a certain outcome.

Baseball Prospectus True Average is an effective statistic because it weighs and combines a more complete picture of offensive production than other metrics, and presents the result in an intuitive number similar to batting average. A player with a .260 TAv is an average player. Aspects included in TAv that are not included in some other metrics are situational hitting and errors, plus alternative weights on strike outs and bunts, among other elements. So, let’s use TAv to assess the Brewers offense: with the descriptions above in mind, how do the elements of the club compare to the MLB positional landscape? What is the positional landscape?

Not unlike pitching staffs, positional ranks across the MLB are split among groups of players for each team. The ideal of plugging in a starting player at each position was always just an ideal, as injuries and platoon strategies have been widespread since the early 20th century ballgame; now, MLB front offices may simply be even more willing to try bizarre positional formats (such as the Brewers’ positional flexibility) and substitution patterns (think 2018 L.A. Dodgers, here). Thus, the split between players with 300 (or more) plate appearances and those working below that threshold is quite large.

It should be noted that outside of the corner infield positions, there are no other positions on the diamond where the median player and the regular player are better than average according to TAv. This should be intuitive in some sense, underscoring the importance of teams finding players that can work at least 300 plate appearances in a season. Of course, the median playing time at each position should demonstrate the difficulty of assembling even a group of players that can work 300 PA at a position; often teams will need to rely on a group of players that fall short of even that mediocre playing time threshold. This uneven playing time environment, set against a foundation that establishes the importance of finding a batting order full of regular players, should demonstrate why and how teams can make wagers or trade-offs with their players (for example, the club can weigh Arcia’s shortstop defense against the value of piecing together a couple of other options at the position; that’s just one example).

With this background in mind, let’s compare major 2018 Brewers batters to the median playing time and regular TAv for their respective positions (as grouped by Baseball Prospectus. Note: I have no idea where Eric Thames went in these CSV):

Milwaukee effectively gambled on both Cain and Yelich, who were team leaders in production and playing time beyond the league median. Yet this dynamic top of the order duo hardly exhausted the positions at which the Brewers effectively stacked regulars. Travis Shaw, Ryan Braun, and Jesus Aguilar were each fantastic compared to their respective positional leaguewide performances; Hernan Perez and Manny Pina were not necessarily as far from “average” batting production as most fans think. Outside of regular workloads, Domingo Santana and Mike Moustakas turned out to be crucial depth players, albeit for different reasons. Retaining contractual rights to Aguilar, Braun, Cain, Shaw, and Yelich should be viewed as extremely positive news for the 2019 club, even with all the caveats about regressing performances, etc.

On this model, the benefits of “standing pat” in free agency and trade markets should have some appeal, as one can see that weighing the defense at catcher and shortstop, or simply waiting for Keston Hiura and(or) Mauricio Dubon to arrive at second base need not be viewed as a drag on the offense. In fact, Hernan Perez can probably cover second base in an effective manner to open the season, allowing the Brewers to free up cash and prospect resources to double down on their pitching staff. Right field becomes an interesting question, as Santana’s closing month produced a final True Average that held up against regular MLB right fielders.

Of course, one can expect that David Stearns will not simply stand pat this offseason. The point, then, is to understand that there is no linear narrative about the Brewers bats improving in 2019. This group of players surged to close 2018, made some crucial developmental strides (in the case of Arcia) and mechanical tweaks (in the case of Braun) that could bode well for future performances. There is no clear path to improving the offense without spending significant cash or prospect resources.

Depending on which moves David Stearns and company make this offseason, and how and where Travis Shaw fits into the equation, the middle of the infield figures to be an area of special interest. Young and intriguing players abound, with still more waiting in the wings. Highlighted below are a few of the players most likely to impact up the middle next season.

Major Leagues

Orlando Arcia, SS

Arcia arrived in 2016 shouldering high expectations. He was Milwaukee’s best prospect since Ryan Braun came along in 2007 and changed the history of the franchise. Arcia produced a very nice age-22 season in 2017, finishing with 3.4 Wins Above Replacement Player (WARP) and vaulting to the top of Milwaukee’s list of talents aged 25 and under, just ahead of Domingo Santana. Times have changed.

Arcia regressed to a .214 True Average (TAv) and 0.0 WARP in 2018, losing playing time to a handful of low-profile players and heading into the All-Star Break below the Mendoza line. After some time sorting out his swing in the minors, he roared back to life in the second half, clawing playing time back from the just-imported Jonathan Schoop and helping to lead the team through their playoff charge.

Arcia is still just 24 years old, is a ton of fun to watch on the infield, and has offered fans glimpses of his offensive potential over the last two years. He’ll be starting at shortstop next spring, perhaps with a somewhat shorter leash than he had at the start of 2018.

Travis Shaw, 2B

Shaw famously crossed over to the right side of the infield at the trade deadline, freeing up the hot corner for Mike Moustakas. He’s 6’4” and 230 pounds, but showed solid glove work and good instincts at the keystone, especially for someone learning on the fly. As lines between positions blur around the league, the big man could see more time at second base in 2019.

Shaw recorded 32 home runs in just under 500 at bats in 2018, marking his second year in a row reaching that milestone. He showed a nice approach at the plate, drawing 78 walks to offset his 108 strikeouts. He also topped the 4-WARP plateau for the second straight season, making him the kind of cheap, under-the-radar star that franchises like Milwaukee need in order to sustain success.

There may be more in the tank. Shaw is still in the midst of his physical prime, and recorded an average exit velocity in 2018 that was right in line with his career norms. Even so, his BABIP dipped 70 points from 2017. Some of this can be attributed to an uptick in fly balls. But if Shaw can add back a few points to his batting average, and perhaps decrease his reliance on pulling the ball in certain counts, 2019 could be the year that he breaks out as one of the better-rounded sluggers in the league.

Jonathan Schoop, 2B/SS

Schoop enjoyed a monster 2017 in Baltimore, accumulating 4.7 WARP and whacking 32 home runs while providing surprisingly good defense at second base. 2018 didn’t go as well, particularly after the trade that sent him to Milwaukee in exchange for Jonathan Villar (still hurts), Luis Ortiz, and Jean Carmona. That’s a bit of a haul, but Schoop was hot, and he’s been a special bat in the past. Milwaukee didn’t get that player; Schoop struggled to a .202/.246/.331 line in 46 games for the Brewers.

Schoop is controllable for 2019, though it’s less clear whether Milwaukee intends to offer him a contract. MLB Trade Rumors pegs his salary at $10.1 million in his final year of arbitration, a hefty sum for a small market team to spend on a player with plenty of question marks. Never a patient hitter, Schoop relies on the quality of his contact to generate value with the bat. Worryingly, his exit velocity, launch angle, hard hit percentage, and barrel percentage were all down in 2018, per Statcast; Schoop actually outperformed his Expected Weighted On-Base Average (xWOBA).

Losing three players for a few weeks of sub-replacement performance would hurt; so would paying $10 M for a player who could end up on the bench. 2019 will be a crucial year for Schoop, no matter whose jersey he ends up wearing.

Hernán Pérez, UTIL

Pérez, 28 next Opening Day, continued to slip a little after an exciting 2016 campaign. Even so, he provided average offense (.258 TAv) and credible defense at seven different positions. There’s value in that. Pérez didn’t manage quite as much power in 2018 as he did the previous two seasons, and his K/BB ratio is as unseemly as ever. He shouldn’t be anyone’s idea of a starting player on a playoff-caliber team at this point, but he’s a fine option to have around in case of injury or early-season ineffectiveness. Projected at a reasonable $2.7 million next year by MLB Trade Rumors, he’s a good guy to have around the back end of the roster.

Tyler Saladino, UTIL

Saladino made some noise upon his initial promotion to Milwaukee, batting .298 in the first half of the season. But he was injured in May, missed all of June, and looked fairly awful in July and September. So in the end, he wound up with a pretty Saladino-esque line of .246/.302/.398. He’s 29 years old, and is projected to make $1.0 million next year by MLB Trade Rumors. He had a nice year in 2016, running up 1.4 WARP in half a season with the White Sox. That’s looking like the peak of his big league career at this point.

Minor Leagues

Mauricio Dubon, 2B/SS

The 2018 season could have gone very differently for Mauricio Dubon. The young infielder tore through his first 27 games in Triple-A, batting .343/.348/.574 with some nice doubles power and not too many whiffs. Then he tore through his ACL, and missed the rest of the season. It was a case of bad timing for Dubon and the Brewers; Orlando Arcia and Eric Sogard were struggling with the big club, and Dubon might have been the first man up. Instead, he’ll aim to occupy that position in 2019.

Dubon makes a lot of contact, and routinely runs strikeout rates in the low-to-mid-teens. He’s quick on the base paths, though not a tremendous threat to steal. And he’s teased some intriguing power at various points in his minor league career, though it tends to come and go. Dubon is a capable defender at shortstop, though he fits better at second base long-term. One knock on his game: He doesn’t walk much. Even so, the floor here is something like Hernán Pérez, perhaps with less ability to roam the outfield grass (though it wouldn’t surprise me to see him shagging some extra fly balls in spring training). As for the ceiling? Well…

Keston Hiura, 2B

Keston Hiura is looking more and more like a blue-chip prospect at the keystone. There’s little remaining doubt about his bat, though he’s oddly susceptible to strikeouts for someone who projects as a Grade 60 or better hitter (on a scale where 50 is average). As many of you know, Hiura combined for a .293 batting average, 13 home runs, and 34 doubles in his first full minor league season, reaching Double-A along the way. Were it not for a minor thumb injury suffered in July, those numbers all may have been better; Hiura’s performance dipped considerably in late July and August. Currently, he’s smacking the ball around to the tune of a .333 average and 30 RBIs in the Arizona Fall League. It’s been said that the man can hit.

Happily, he’s answering questions about his work in the dirt, too. Through last season and into the AFL, Hiura has looked like an average defender at second, maybe a tick below. That’s a great outcome for someone who’s missed so many reps. If Hiura continues to progress at all defensively, he should be able to handle himself just fine at the keystone.

Hiura looks like a threat to hit .300 with 20-25 home runs and a mess of doubles. Even now, he could probably muster a decent-enough slash line against big league pitching. He’ll be up soon; how long the Brewers wait on a promotion may ultimately depend on how well whoever’s making the majority of big league starts is performing.

Free Agents

There are a number of interesting names on the free agent market that could help shore up Milwaukee’s infield depth. That’s particularly true if the Brewers buy into Travis Shaw at second and cast around for upgrades at third. Mike Moustakas is a natural target there, as he performed ably for the Brewers down the stretch and quietly offers average skills on both sides of the ball. He’ll likely get a multi-year deal this time out, but the commitment shouldn’t be too costly, in either dollars or years.

Jed Lowrie, Marwin Gonzalez, Josh Harrison, and Neil Walker could all help at either second or third base. Any of those names could sign for between two and four years, with Gonzalez probably representing the best and most expensive option. But even Josh Donaldson may not be out of reach, depending on how leery teams are of his age and injury history.

Should the Brewers feel that Hiura will be ready to make an impact by mid-season, they could be tempted to simply bridge the gap with a cheap one-year deal. The most logical name, in that case, may be Ian Kinsler’s (Kinsler was also mentioned as a possible target by Andrew Salzman in a piece earlier this month.) Kinsler doesn’t offer too much with the bat anymore, but he still provides solid defense. He turns 37 next year, and will likely settle for a one-year deal.

The common dismissal of Cain takes two forms, both of which are worth evaluating if we are to take the idea of “Value” seriously (or, they’re just plain fun to consider, if you like baseball):

• Lorenzo Cain is a great player, but he is not worthy of MVP discussions because he’s not a “traditional” candidate, as his candidacy depends on Wins Above Replacement (WAR) stats.

• Lorenzo Cain is a great player, but his value depends far too much on fielding statistics, which are quite uncertain and therefore cannot be relied upon for MVP debates (plus, a defensive candidacy also makes Cain a “new-school” candidate, and therefore much-less attractive than an old-school all-hit, no-field candidate like Yelich).

Both of these complaints are quite worthwhile, even where they exhibit ideological shortcomings about measuring baseball, for they tackle the issues of “concept validity” and “false certainty” for the so-called “analytics movement.” Concept validity is, roughly, the idea that when a descriptive or analytical measurement is constructed, it actually captures what it purports to measure. This is one of the most difficult analytical foundations to adhere to when measuring phenomena. In terms of baseball analysis, the common complaint that WAR stats do not measure value is actually a type of complaint about concept validity, even if some of the folks muttering that complaint would scoff about entering into a methodological argument. But it’s worth taking up that claim, to some extent, because if one can discern that WAR does not actually measure what it claims, there is a legitimate cause to examine its use in MVP debates. Additionally, it is possible that WAR measures exactly what it claims and yet still does not serve the task of determining Most Valuable Player, which shifts the debate to the concept validity of an MVP.

False certainty is a much easier claim to assess, especially in the context of WAR stats that have not uniformly reported margins of error, and therefore present an impression that each player is some well-defined distance away from every other player (for example, by Baseball Prospectus Wins Above Replacement Player, Christian Yelich is the best player in the NL at 6.52, approximately 0.20 “wins” better than Marlins catcher J.T. Realmuto and 0.78 “wins” better than teammate Cain). Baseball Prospectus does report uncertainty for many of their statistics, which will hopefully begin a trend of other websites doing the same, and an expansion of uncertainty reporting for the most commonly-used stats. This is simply an area for more work, and there are excellent analysts leading the call for including uncertainty in the publication of baseball stats.

What is curious, to my mind, is that Lorenzo Cain has faded in National League WARP standing (he’s now approximately seventh best among players with 500 PA), but that has not fully impacted his case for Most Valuable Player. As cited above, Cain’s rank for Batting Average, On-Base Percentage, and Stolen Bases are stellar, and if one moves away from those standard statistics, baserunning metrics also point to Cain as an elite player, and Fielding Runs Above Average (FRAA) places Cain better than the median NL player with 500 PA. The largest complaint one can make about Cain is his slugging percentage (which at .425 is notably better than average, anyway), and this is typically the argument that most fans and analysts are really making about Christian Yelich when they uphold his MVP candidacy: he is currently out-slugging all NL players thanks to his torrid second half.

It is worth emphasizing that if one views the MVP award as a “Best Hitter” award, and defines hitting solely on the basis of batting performance, Christian Yelich is a great candidate for MVP; his True Average (TAv) leads NL players with 500 PA (at .346), matching his top Batting Average and Slugging Percentage. But how close is Yelich to other offense-first candidates? Yelich is one of six National League players with 500+ PA and a TAv above .320, and to demonstrate uncertainty, here’s how close they are in key categories:

This is an excellent group of batters, including several (Yelich, Paul Goldschmidt, Freddie Freeman, and Anthony Rendon) that demonstrate excellence across the AVG / OBP / SLG spectrum. These are complete hitters (and that’s not to take away from Freeman with the glove, who trounces these other hitters in terms of FRAA), and in some cases Yelich will win because he got hot at a crucial time and edged out the others. That’s not a knock on his talent, just like losing out to Yelich would not be a knock on any of these other hitters.

Demonstrating the proximity of these players in terms of counting stats and overall batting ratios should enter some uncertainty in terms of using batting statistics to define an MVP candidate: basically, with this group of players, everyone is splitting hairs (and I’m glad I do not have an MVP ballot, for this reason).

Lorenzo Cain finishes ninth in TAv (.313) among NL batters with 500+ PA; to demonstrate the strength of that production, he’s shades worse than Bryce Harper (.318) and tied with teammate Jesus Aguilar (.313) for overall offensive prowess. Javier Baez has fallen to 13th on this list (.309), and to gauge his overall production, he’s roughly as good as Travis Shaw at the plate (.307!). Thus, it is worth noting that one must ask, “Is an MVP solely judged by batting performance?”, in order to consider guys like Cain and Baez in the MVP race. But this should hardly be viewed as a detrimental assessment of these players, and more of a crucial discussion about the concept validity of “MVP” and the uncertainty of the statistics involved. If this second tier of batters falls below the first, it’s not by much.

This meandering discussion takes leads to a necessary assessment of fielding statistics. What is particularly difficult about fielding statistics is that most fans and analysts have taken to the idea that since fielding statistics do not align across sources (such as FanGraphs, Baseball Reference, The Fielding Bible, MLB Advanced Media, and Baseball Prospectus), they are therefore not valid stats. This is another way of saying that, apparently, because different fielding statistics use different assumptions to assess fielding, they are not valid or dependable as a group (it should be noted that the validity and dependability of a statistic would then be assessed on its own merits of construction, data inputs, and methodological assumptions and corrections, not its ability to corroborate other measurements). Yet consider the difference between Batting Average, On-Base Percentage, and Slugging Percentage, for example; completely different players could rank in completely different ways for each of these stats, but none of those facts would invalidate the individual stat (this would be like saying, “because Slugging Percentage says Khris Davis is great but Batting Average says Khris Davis is not, we cannot trust Slugging Percentage as a stat”). In short, it is worth questioning the motivation and validity of commonly stated concerns about fielding statistics, and each fielding statistic should be assessed against its own internal construction and assumptions.

If batting performance is used as the gate for MVP discussions, and fielding statistics are used to provide comprehensive performance assessments, there are several ways that one can assess MVP candidates. For example, among NL non-catchers with 500+ PA, the only player in the Top Quarter of both TAv and FRAA is Freddie Freeman; J.T. Realmuto’s Adjusted FRAA rates him among the Top Third of all MLB catchers, which severely boosts the value of his excellent batting performance. If one ranks the top NL TAv performers by FRAA, the top five players are Freddie Freeman, Javier Baez, Jesus Aguilar (a seriously underrated defensive first baseman), Paul Goldschmidt, and Lorenzo Cain. Travis Shaw, Matt Carpenter, and Brandon Nimmo round out the top batting producers that are also average-or-better fielders.

This type of discussion narrows a list of “all-around” MVP candidates quite well, but it raises another series of problems that WAR purports to solve: how does one assess the excellence of Yelich’s batting performance against the overall package of Cain’s baserunning, fielding, and offensive production? To this observer, reducing this debate to a “new school” problem is ridiculous, simply because the pure baseball skills and role demonstrated by Cain would play in any era, as would Yelich’s classic high-AVG, high-SLG, high-RBI knock out punch at the plate.

This is perhaps what makes Cain/Yelich such a fun one-two punch for the Brewers, as they exhibit completely opposing and yet complementary skills on the diamond, without sacrificing aesthetically pleasing and productive traits like a .300 AVG. Viewing this complementary nature is one reason that narrowing an MVP discussion to Baez versus Yelich is maddening, as it is not entirely clear that Baez is the best of the “all-around” MVP candidates, and it is not clear that if one were to choose to isolate a single representative from the Brewers, Yelich resoundingly beats out Cain.

Add in a group of first basemen that excel with the glove, and a truly elite catcher, and this MVP race should be used as a proving ground for celebrating the uncertainty of concepts like “Value” while also working to assess their concept validity. So too is this an excellent opportunity to turn away from the false certainty provided by each type of baseball metric, and imagine constellations in which the assembly of each of these elements help to define why one player in this crowded NL MVP field is most deserving of the award. Insofar as I am not yet ready to abandon Cain-for-MVP arguments, it is worth emphasizing the conundrum of this crowded, talented pack.

Stearns just loudly answered that question this trade deadline.

What is fascinating about each of these trades is that they are fantastic in the sense of bolstering an MLB roster, in order to ensure that this stretch run features as few weaknesses as possible, while also potentially being over-pays in each case. Yet it should be stressed that these overpays are palatable for several reasons: the Brewers maintain a largely controllable roster that is also relatively inexpensive; the Brewers have a relatively large set of players that have been minor leaguers long enough to need potential 40-man roster protection entering 2019; and, perhaps most importantly, there is an incredible amount of role risk involved with each player. These trades should provide grounds for further analysis into when and how potential overpays are helpful to a team, and they should certainly provide further evidence that WARP/$ is not the sole determination of a trade’s potential value or impact.

Grading the System: 2016 || 2017

• Make no mistake about it, in terms of developing multiple quality pitches, command, and velocity, Luis Ortiz could potentially have the best pitching role for the Brewers system; there was a time, two years ago even, where it would not have been absurd for Ortiz to fight for a top tier pitching role in the prospect ranking cycle (and, really, it was not absurd). But Ortiz has been around forever in the advanced minors, it seems, without working full seasons. For example, the injury-fighting righty has 225 innings at Double-A without working 100 innings in a season, and with 68 innings at the 2018 deadline he could potentially miss 100 innings once again. If Ortiz can take his next step forward in the Orioles’ system, he is absolutely a more valuable asset, in terms of roster surplus, than Jonathan Schoop (and it is not close!!!), but that strong 60 Overall Future Potential (OFP) / 50 likely grade entering 2017 looks much more improbable. Ortiz is eligible for the Rule 5 draft for the 2019 season and almost certainly must be protected by the Orioles.

• Jean Carmona just made the jump stateside for the Brewers in 2018, and thus remains a full four levels away from the MLB. Additionally, Carmona might even be another year away from a clearly defined MLB potential role. In this regard, I do not envy the job of MLB scouts and analytics personnel, as it’s not entirely clear for me how I would price Carmona’s potential future value in terms of long-term systemic development.

• At BP Milwaukee, Kyle Lesniewski describe the roles and risks associated with both Kodi Medeiros and Wilber Perez. Medeiros could become an impact reliever at the MLB level, and it’s not unlikely that some observers still believe that he could start in some capacity, as there will always be hold outs for that sort of role. Given Medeiros’s delivery and command profile, however, as well as his fastball, Lesniewski outlines the difficulties that Medeiros may have for reaching even an impact reliever profile. Medeiros is eligible for the Rule 5 draft entering the 2019 season, and almost certainly must be protected by the White Sox, while Perez had yet to play stateside in the Brewers system.

• Finally, I already detailed the roles and surplus value for Brett Phillips and Jorge Lopez, so I will not go into too much detail here. However, I will add that of each of the prospects included in this midseason deals, Phillips is arguably the most likely to have MLB floor and ceiling roles that both surpass the value of the trade return (which is not a knock against Mike Moustakas, he simply might only be in Milwaukee for a couple of months). With a prospect such as Corey Ray coming on strong in Double-A Biloxi, not to mention the considerable development of Troy Stokes Jr. at the advanced level as well, Milwaukee cannot necessarily lose sleep over trading away a depth outfielder from their stacked group when they are fighting a close divisional deficit and leading the National League Wild Card race.

So, readers will witness a couple of recurring facts in these trades: the Brewers largely traded away players that must be protected for 2019 to avoid their loss via the Rule 5 draft, or players with little-to-no stateside development experience (and thus years to reach MLB), and/or players with roles that may be replicated within a year. One need not believe that a player like Stokes will surpass Phillips, in terms of overall ceiling, to see the value of the young prospect’s potential to fill an MLB depth position in 2019. Phillips himself may not have had an opportunity in 2019 to take such a role. The same logic might apply to Quintin Torres-Costa and Bubba Derby. This should not be construed to mean that these current system prospects are categorically better than Phillips / Medeiros / Lopez; in fact, I would have ranked each of that trio ahead of their potential 2019 depth replacements. But once again, since systemic development, contending windows, and player development cycles are now orbiting a club that is contending for consecutive seasons (and the foreseeable future, hopefully), if it costs system depth roles to improve MLB weaknesses, the Brewers have to eat the risk of losing those ceilings.

I like when MLB trades can simply be called good baseball moves. For all the rebuilding narratives in Baltimore, Kansas City, and Chicago, the White Sox, Royals, and Orioles front offices arguably made sensible trades with quality returns that both have long and short time horizons and development cycles. Milwaukee is working as a true contender without trading from their most elite potential prospect stash. This is good all around.

Stearns priced out these converging development cycles and adroitly moved the future role risk to address an offense that absolutely needed help for a serious contending run. Just the other day I wrote, “At worst, Travis Shaw has simply begun a potential shift over to the right side of the infield, where he might serve as a viable first base option for 2019 should the Brewers and Moustakas exercise his mutual option for 2019,” without thinking that a realistic move to first base for Shaw could occur as early as this week. Now, with Jonathan Schoop in the mix for second base and Jesus Aguilar slumping, Shaw becomes a strong side platoon option at 1B to form a serious infield unit:

This infield could open 2019 should Stearns consider keeping both Moustakas and Schoop, and now the talk can turn to development cycles once more. While the Brewers continue to season second baseman Keston Hiura at the most advanced levels of the minor leagues, Schoop basically serves as an upgrade over the Jonathan Villar gamble (gambling that he’ll return to his 2016 form), thus giving the Brewers a quality starting option while Hiura completes his minor league development. While Hiura’s bat is arguably ready for the MLB, and has been mentioned as a potential MLB option by Baseball Prospectus in their latest Top 50 list, the infielder may need more work in the field after missing significant fielding development time due to an extended elbow injury. Once Hiura is ready in 2019, a Schoop / Hiura mix simply extends the #TeamDepth mantra, and the same can arguably said for the remainder of the infield.

Entering 2018, the Brewers system took a step back in terms of organizational rankings, due to a series of developmental setbacks for key prospects, MLB graduations, and trades. I began to highlight this during last year’s “Grading the System” feature, but as one can never predict baseball, the development cycles and potential OFP assessments calibrated for Corey Ray, Keston Hiura answered a crucial risk question (can he play 2B?), and a veritable gang of pop-up pitchers continued to march upward in the system, potentially boosting and extending the no-name, depth-oriented pitching staff into 2019. Make no mistake about it, the system might continue to rank in the middle of the league in terms of overall quality, and the set of clear potential impact roles (true 60 OFP+ roles) may end with Keston Hiura and Corey Ray should Corbin Burnes exhaust his rookie standing through the end of 2018.

Yet, given the instant development of 2018 First Round draft pick Brice Turang, the Brewers could demonstrate that they indeed nabbed an Elite Prep prospect that fell due to prospect fatigue. Turang could quickly help to boost the top of the system as an MLB potential role falls into place. Moreover, given the Brewers’ expanded efforts in International signings, as well as the quality use of signing bonus allocations in each of the last two MLB drafts, the lower minors could continue to host a variety of players that suddenly surge onto the prospect scene. While this does not make the Brewers system different than many other MLB systems, it provides a road map to how the club can continue to develop talent while contending. One could argue that it’s absurd to suggest that the Brewers “rely” on someone like Turang falling in the MLB draft, but this is exactly the type of prospect perception and role foresight that the Brewers must have if they are going to succeed while drafting in the bottom half of each round.

Of course, the notable graduations from the system should not be undersold as well. Now there are so many starters, depth roles, and trades from the Brewers prospect stock that I added a new category this year:

Now, with these graduates in mind, what does a somewhat thinner, but still rather interesting Brewers system look like?

Prospect Key
Top 10 Consideration
Top 30 Consideration
[Just Interesting]

Of course, it is also worth emphasizing how the system has been….decimated in key areas. Given the quick development by advanced prospects acquired from the major 2015-2016 trades, as well as the huge trades entering 2018 and during the recent deadlines, the pool of potential impact prospects acquiring via trade has waned:

This is an important category to consider simply because Milwaukee demonstrated how adroit trades could quickly rebuild a system and reform an MLB roster. It will be worth watching to see if the Stearns continues to attempt to find Jonathan Villar and Keon Broxton types via trade now that the club is solidly contending. Of course, one could argue that Stearns is always trying to find this player (be it Oliver Drake, or Jesus Aguilar, or even Alec Asher), but that it simply the fact that these players will not always come via trade.

Thanks to the mechanical corrections, good health, and overall development of Corey Ray, as well as the surging role of Troy Stokes Jr., the development of draft prospects arguably has a better outlook entering 2019 than it did prior to 2018. Given the advancement of Corbin Burnes into a relief role, Brandon Woodruff and Taylor Williams into respective swingman and depth relief roles, and Brett Phillips into a fourth outfielder, it is clear that the Brewers front office is considering all possible role developments with each player (rather than following a cookie cutter model, or a model in which each prospect must immediately receive playing time in their clearest future role). It is arguable that this type of development strategy could maximize roles ranging from Stokes to Zack Brown, Jake Gatewood, and maybe even Lucas Erceg.

Meanwhile, Milwaukee signed a couple of additional potential impact International Amateur free agents this July, continuing an attempt to build up the low minors. Carlos Rodriguez and Larry Ernesto are already making some noise in the Dominican Summer League, while prospects like Jose Sibrian and Jesus Lujano have made the leap stateside.

Frankly, this Brewers system will not look as strong, in terms of potentially elite impacts roles, as the one that received ranking for 2018 at Baseball Prospectus. Yet, as new cycles of player development depth emerge in the low minors, and the Brewers continue their unique form of MLB roster construction (clearly using all 40 roster spots for MLB-adjacent roles and frequently shuffling those roles), Milwaukee could be an organizational well-suited to do more with less. For if 2017 fired the opening shot that the Brewers can contend simply based on giving high floor players a chance to work in the MLB, 2018 is advancing that ideal and carrying it to deeper logical, promotional, and transactional extensions.

Photo Credit: Gary A. Vasquez, USA Today Sports Images

Surplus Grade
At Baseball Prospectus Milwaukee, I have worked on a transactional Benefit-Cost Analysis system for assessing prospect-and-MLB trades. I use the term “Surplus” to denote the value of a player through trade, which includes the player’s on-field production plus their “scarcity” (which, in terms of MLB labor, translates into their contractual dollars plus control time). In the following table, I demonstrate one way of assessing surplus for these trades, which includes both options for Soria and Moustakas picked up for the 2019 season.

Recommended Background: Refining Surplus Pricing || Organizational Logic and Playoff Trades

It should be stressed that this is not viewed as a complete analysis of a transaction, but rather an analysis that paces current MLB player production and prospect roles against the history of MLB in order to assess their value; the hypothesis is that since MLB teams can (and do) trade prospects for MLB roles, a value metric can be found that places prospects and MLB players on the same scale.

Here’s how the trades look without options:

Any way one slices it, David Stearns is “going for it,” in terms of delivering trades that provide clear cut short-term MLB roster gains while surrendering long-term roster assets. On the face of it, Stearns has paid more than he is receiving; at worst, he paid a dollar to return one quarter. In the case of the Soria trade, the time horizons are acceptable, as it is unclear how quickly lefty Kodi Medeiros will reach the MLB (even from Double-A in 2018), let alone a relief role that sees the young southpaw form his tools into high leverage function (which would arguably be his highest realistic role); the same can be said for Perez, who has never played stateside ball and thus has a truly indeterminate role horizon.

In the case of the Moustakas trade, it’s tougher to make a case about role horizons, for both Phillips and Lopez have useful (if not flashy) roles for a 2018 contending ballclub and potentially better roles for the future. Phillips could morph into a multi-tool center fielder if his bat develops at the MLB level, but his defense, speed, and power remain strong enough that Phillips could also serve as a rare “impact Fourth Outfielder;” it’s impossible not to dream on Lopez’s fastball and curveball combo playing up as a reliever, and the MLB dream for the righty would be that if the command comes along he can scale relief roles from low- to high-leverage.

Related: What does the future hold for Jorge Lopez? || Medeiros & Perez 

It must be added that if it appears perplexing that the potential transactional surplus prices involved in the Moustakas do not equal one another, they need not. One can argue that from an organizational standpoint, reaching the playoffs is a push for additional revenue, as well as an operation that concerns on-field baseball production. At some point, Wins, Runs Scored, Runs Allowed, Overall Future Potential, etc., are turned into cash for an organization. In the case of the 2018 Brewers, these recent deals, especially the Moustakas trade, bolster the club’s Wild Card lead (currently up 2.5 games) and (dare I say it) give the club a better chance at competing with the division leading Lakeview Nine (the Cubs currently lead Milwaukee by 1.5 games for the National League Central crown). Once these playoff odds are bolstered, the organization can also price out their odds of playing deeper into the playoffs, and frankly, if the Brewers believe these types of deals can help their club reach the League Championship Series, it does not necessarily matter that their deadline deals were “too expensive.”

MLB Roster Profile
Thus far, it is clear that the Moustakas move accomplishes two key objectives for the MLB roster:

• First, the move improves an offense in need of consistent production by making it deeper through the addition of a solid prime-age veteran bat.

• Second, the move will test an efficient defense and organizational shifting philosophy by moving incumbent third baseman Travis Shaw to second base.

Moving Toward Contact
To the first point, Mike Moustakas developed into a solid, consistently better than average batter after his 2015 breakout. The left-handed bat is also a clear addition to the discipline-contact department for the Brewers offense, as Moustakas consistently strikes out at a better than average clip. Ostensibly, Moustakas adds power and contact to the batting order, and as many have noted, will test these traits in a ballpark that is much friendlier to left-handed batters than Kansas City’s park.

The following table includes Moustakas’s home run, walk, and strike out percentages, as well as his True Average (TAv) and Fielding Runs Above Average (FRAA), which are advanced metrics that assess underlying offensive and defensive elements to express production (.260 is average for TAv, and 0 is average for FRAA).

While Fielding Runs Above Average (FRAA) demonstrate some fluctuations in recent seasons for Moustakas, the third baseman performs at a consistently better than average rate with the glove as well as the bat, which should reduce some of the potential impact of the Brewers’ infield shuffle. Additionally, since Orlando Arcia is working to the left of Moustakas, theoretically some of the defensive pressure should be taken off of the third baseman.

Misusing Phillips?
One of the remaining questions for the MLB roster is whether Brett Phillips actually had a solid role for the club moving forward. Perhaps because of the left-handed batting bent of much of the Brewers positional group (Eric Thames, Christian Yelich, Shaw, and more recently Brad Miller, too), Phillips has remained out of favor for the club’s official “fourth outfield” spot, a spot that has recently belonged to the hot-and-cold Keon Broxton. Despite a .180 batting average, Broxton has walked and hit for power frequently enough to keep his glove on the roster, which is playing at around 2.4 FRAA (after a -8.2 FRAA campaign in 2017). From the right side of the plate, Broxton ostensibly offers more flexibility when manager Craig Counsell needs to spell Yelich or Thames in the outfield.

Related: Understanding Phillips

The trouble with the Broxton-Phillips wager is that Phillips arguably already surpasses this level of production even with his MLB floor, which he demonstrated in spectacular fashion toward the end of the 2017 season. In that brief performance, Phillips flashed his elite defensive tools (4.3 FRAA), while also presenting a strong batting average (.276), walk rate (nearly 10 percent), and power (seven extra base hits in 98 appearances). This type of production is what makes pricing out an MLB role for Phillips so difficult, because the left-handed batting defensive asset has enough questions about his offensive game to raise the possibility that pitchers will expose his shortcomings with more exposure. But the glove and arm are so good as to keep Phillips in a serious regular rotation if he falls out of a starting spot, and he could easily serve as an MLB outfielder with 300-to-400 valuable plate appearances, the type of ephemeral roster asset that most playoff teams dream of. The trouble with the Brewers trading Phillips is that his floor is arguably already reaching this role, which raises questions about why the club did not employ Phillips for more than 15 games in 2018.

Along with keeping right handed pitcher Brandon Woodruff in the shuttle crew between Milwaukee and Triple-A Colorado Springs, and shifting Corbin Burnes to relief for his MLB debut (when his top role, floor, and the club’s admitted 2019 plans have him slated as a starting pitcher), the club’s usage of Phillips should serve as a serious area for strategic questioning and analysis. Did the Brewers use Phillips to the best of his current ability, even given that they’re working with his MLB floor? The flip side of this argument would hold that since the Brewers do not have outfield space to test Phillips’s top role as a starting center fielder, trading him simply means that a “blocked” prospect will get his chance elsewhere; similarly, if you believe that Phillips will settle into the impact back-up role as well, that’s not a role that you mourn trading away to bolster an MLB roster weakness elsewhere.

Does Fielding Matter?
As for moving Shaw to second base, this is the type of value-seeking move that one would love to see from a loudly-announced, so-called “analytic” front office. The Brewers have one of the most efficient defensive units in the National League, even with the recent demotion of star defensive short stop Orlando Arcia and a display of less-than-stellar middle infield play of late; the club’s bread-and-butter has been stopping hits from falling in the outfield, either on flyballs or line drives, and coupled with the somewhat bizarre distribution of batted balls between pitching units (i.e., the key relievers are typically more groundball oriented, on the whole, than the starting pitchers), the Brewers defensive unit can withstand unexpected arrangements so long as the personnel shift for key game moments.

Additionally, moving Shaw to second base answers an interesting question about the extent to which fielding matters for an MLB club. This question was prominently raised when Arcia was demoted, as even a top tier glove in all of baseball could not hold that batting performance, and now the inverse equation can be applied to Shaw. By True Average, Shaw is one of the very best bats on the Brewers, and the club essentially has a .298 TAv second baseman at the deadline (that’s good enough for sixth best in the MLB among 2B with 100 PA); neither Brian Dozier nor Jonathan Schoop, the remaining rumored second base targets for the Brewers, can be counted on to match Shaw’s impact batting production. Furthermore, keeping Shaw at second base arguably gives the club the chance to continue their long play gamble on Jonathan Villar, who can slide into a meaningful depth role once he returns from the disabled list. The equation here is quite clever, as if the Brewers are going to gamble on Dozier or Schoop putting it together, they can also gamble on Villar, who has shown flashes of brilliance in 2018 and was batting .261 / .346 / .348 over the 20 games preceding his disabled list stint.

If Counsell can start a fielding unit that includes Moustakas and Shaw, and then use a fielding substitution when a key groundball reliever enters a close game (looking at Jeremy Jeffress here), ostensibly the manager has more options to get the offense going without sacrificing key late game defense. One can dream that if the Brewers succeed in the playoffs, this unorthodox defensive gamble lead the way. At worst, Travis Shaw has simply begun a potential shift over to the right side of the infield, where he might serve as a viable first base option for 2019 should the Brewers and Moustakas exercise his mutual option for 2019.

This is #TeamDepth exhibiting team flexibility across the offense, fielding, and contractual horizons, and even if the acquisition cost seems steep, the playoffs payoff is clear and (hopefully) immediate.

Photo Credit: Benny Sieu, USA Today Sports Images

This post was updated at 10:30 AM to include additional BPMilwaukee and Baseball Prospectus links and add Corey Ray as a top prospect.

Travis Shaw had a quiet weekend in Cincinnati. After battling through a wrist injury, he went 3-for-12, all singles, while walking five times and only striking out twice. The walk and strikeout numbers are emblematic of the step forward he has taken this season. Shaw has increased his walk rate to 13.6 percent. This is the fourth straight season he’s increased his walks, and if he can sustain this pace, it will be the first season of his career in which he’s walked in more than ten percent of his plate appearances. Also of note in that linked chart, his strikeout rate is down 18.1 percent. This would be his first season with a sub 20 percent strikeout rate. Shaw has always been dogged by his high strikeout numbers, so cutting his strikeout rate so dramatically in the highest strikeout environment in MLB history is particularly impressive.

Shaw has cut down his whiffs to a career low rate of 19.9 percent, which is the first time he’d finish a season with less than 20 percent. However, he’s swinging at about the same rate as 2017. There’s a negligible difference in his zone swing rate, but he has cut down his swings on pitches out of the zone from 29.6 percent to 26.7 percent. The dip in swings on balls probably doesn’t fully explain to walk rate spike, but the two are not a coincidence.

There’s a similar small profile change which may be the cause of the drop in strikeouts. Shaw’s contact rate has crept up to 80.1 percent, which would be a career high. While he’s making slightly less in zone contact, his contact rate out on pitches out of strike zone has jumped to 68.4 percent. Based on the previous three paragraphs, you will not be surprised to learn this is another career high.

The changes in his approach have produced a career high TAv of .295. However, Shaw’s numbers could be even better going forward. His BABIP has been .251, which is a career low, even when looking at his minor league numbers. His infield flay ball rate is a career high 16 percent. Since those are pretty much automatic outs, they’re definitely driving down his BABIP. Shaw has also lowered his launch angle and isn’t getting the barrel of his bat on the ball as much as last season. He has fewer areas where he’s generating power than in 2017.

The shape of his production has changed but Travis Shaw’s plate discipline numbers are a huge step forward and make him a better player than he was before. If he can pair together his newfound patience and selectivity with some better contact and a healthy wrist, he could have a monster second half for the Brewers.

On Saturday, Craig Counsell called on the day’s starting catcher, Erik Kratz to pitch the eighth inning for Milwaukee. Kratz made it through the full inning, allowing two runs, one of which was unearned, on hits and a walk with one strikeout. He’s now made three appearances on the mound, with his last two coming back in 2016 for both the Astros and Pirates. Kratz’s average fastball was 79.9mph, though he did get in one at 84.3 mph.

None of Kratz’s other fastballs got over 82.5 mph, so his maximum speed was definitely an outlier, which unfortunately means his velocity has dropped in the two years between appearances. He also maxed out higher back then. Kratz pitched primarily off his fastball, using a changeup and curveball sparingly in the appearance.

While Kratz struck out Eugenio Suarez on a curveball which barely tucked into the top corner of the strike zone, that called strike may have been a product of the score of the game as opposed to the quality of the pitch. Batters didn’t swing and miss at a single pitch and didn’t seem to be inclined to swing at anything. Then again, he clearly didn’t have a feel for the strike zone. He was wild, and it was not effective.

This is the second time that Counsell has used a position player to pitch this season. The tactic is being utilized now more than ever as mangers see it as an effective strategy to save valuable arms from unnecessary pitches, save a tired and short staff, and maybe toss a little fun into games that are all but over. If Counsell utilizes this strategy again this season and selects Kratz to take the mound, Kratz needs to do a better job finding the strike zone. While the inning moved along smoothly enough, the goal should be to get the ball over the plate and have the batters swinging at everything. Kratz needs to work on that.

The Brewers have a full slate of games at home this week. Minnesota arrives first for three games, then Atlanta plays four at Miller Park. The Twins ranked 23^rd in team TAv and DRA, which accounts for why they rank in the bottom third of MLB in both runs scored and runs allowed. The Braves swept the Cardinals over the weekend and now have the best record in the National League. They rank fifth in both TAv and DRA, so the weekend series will be a good test for the Brewers.

Photo Credit: Aaron Doster, USA Today Sports Images

Baseball Prospectus: Milwaukee Brewers Team Audit

Make no mistake about it, Brewers fans and analysts, this is a trap. It’s so easy to polish off phenomenal expectations at a time like this, and rejoice that the Brewers get to play an apparently easier stretch of schedule entering the break. But the team is experiencing some injuries of attrition in the field, just as the offense has finally produced a stretch of 30 games averaging better than 2018 NL / Miller Park runs scored (more on that later). The rotation has done a fantastic job, as has the elite bullpen, which are only getting attention due to a couple of recent blow-ups and blown leads….mostly occurring in games where the batters still cannot get it together.

So in honor of this schedule, which is certainly a trap, let’s have some fun with 21 statistics that are neither here, there, nor anywhere for what will certainly Attrition Central for #TeamDepth. If the Brewers can escape this stretch of play with a 9-12 record, that’s probably correction enough for the run differentials and a sign that the war of attrition did not go terribly wrong.

Ten
Ryan Braun is having a somewhat tough year balancing some new fielding assignments, relatively part time play, nagging injuries once again, and hard-hit batted balls with relatively bad luck. But it’s not all bad for the face of the franchise: in 9.7 percent of his plate appearances, Braun has hit for extra bases (12 doubles, one triple, and eight home runs). By comparison, the average National League bat hits for extra bases in approximately 7.6 percent of plate appearances.

Twelve
For the season, much has been made of the Brewers batters’ ten shutouts. In fact, this is quite an important number for Milwaukee batters, as the total Runs Scored “zero” has appeared more frequently than all but one run total: two runs.

For the 2018 campaign, the Brewers have scored two runs more frequently than any other outcome by the offense. What’s worse is that this number is not really accompanied by very good run totals, either; five runs is very nice, and it’s good to see that number tied with “0” for second place, but after that both of “3” and “1” are below average run totals.

Sixteen
For all the criticisms that Brewers baserunners have faced for their aggressive style over the years, it seems that the exceptional baserunning performance of Milwaukee has mostly escaped fan consciousness. Undoubtedly this is due in part to the fact that the Brewers are not scoring runs at an average clip. But, according to Baseball Prospectus Baserunning Runs, the Brewers are the third best team in the MLB in terms of baserunning production. Translating this to stolen bases, Lorenzo Cain leads the team with 16 steals in 19 attempts, ahead of Jonathan Villar (10 / 12), Christian Yelich (9 / 10) and Ryan Braun (7 / 9). In fact, Milwaukee is the second best team in the National League in terms of stolen bases (58 of 71 attempts). Run, run, run!

Twenty
Only the New York Mets have attempted fewer sacrifice bunt attempts than the Brewers in 2018. Milwaukee has attempted 20 bunts thus far, with successful sacrifices 14 times; this is good for a success rate that is higher than the league average. Ironically, for the lack of runs scored, Milwaukee is not only a great base running team, but they are also posting average or better situational hitting statistics according to Baseball Reference. This occurs across categories: sacrifice bunts, productive outs, baserunners scored, and advancing baserunners (with less than two outs at third base and zero outs at second base). The problem for the Brewers is simply that they do not get enough batters on base frequently enough…

Thirteen
….and when the Brewers do get baserunners on, their tendency to hit ground balls results in the highest percentage of ground ball double plays in the National League (13 percent of GIDP opportunities). This is notably worse than the NL average of double plays produced in ten percent of opportunities. So much for strike outs being a bad thing!

Four
One wonders if the defensive flexibility of the ballclub might actually explain some of the troubles the club has in terms of scoring runs…the Brewers only have four players with more than 50 starts at one position (Lorenzo Cain and Travis Shaw lead as the most regular regulars with 70 starts, followed by Villar (55) and Arcia (53) in the middle infield). Jesus Aguilar does not even have 50 starts at first base this year; Christian Yelich’s most regular position is left field…for 32 games, and catcher and right field have also been impacted in the games started department (probably due to the respective performances of Manny Pina and Domingo Santana more than strategy).

I was certainly in the camp that expected defensive flexibility to be a strength for these Brewers, and I certainly do not think it is a downright liability given the performance of the fielders. But given the performance of the offense, I think it is worth questioning whether flexible defensive roles have an impact on batting performance for these players.

Nine
Why are the Brewers pitchers so good? Their groundball percentage is fading to the middle of the pack, minimizing their ability to produce double plays as well. However, Milwaukee arms excel at limiting fly balls, and their 9.46 percent pop-up rate is the best in the MLB according to Baseball Prospectus.

Five
For all the rumblings about the Brewers relief pitching hitting their regression to the mean, it’s worth noting that the pitchers are not terribly far above average in some stats to begin with. For instance, the Brewers rank fifth in the National League with 32 percent of their Inherited Runners Scored, despite inheriting fewer runners than the league average (100 versus 106 for the typical NL team). This is an indication of how the club is quite good with inherited runners scored, but not necessarily perched atop the league.

4.3 at 23
It’s too bad that the Brewers pitchers are not yielding more ground balls, because Orlando Arcia remains one of the best shortstops in baseball despite his lack of playing time. Arcia has the fewest games played of any SS in the Top 10 for Fielding Runs Above Average. Yet, the 23-year old glove-first fielder ranks sixth in FRAA with his 4.3 mark. Another statistic worth remembering: at 23, Arcia is tied for Carlos Correa as the youngest elite defensive shortstop, and among shortstops with at least 60 games only Ahmed Rosario of the Mets is younger (but he’s nowhere near as good defensively). If you like more straightforward statistics, according to Baseball Reference Arcia remains one of the very best MLB shortstops with 10 Defensive Runs Saved; only Freddy Galvis and Addison Russell are better in the NL.

Second Best at .336
Jesus Aguilar is having a fantastic season, boasting a .336 True Average (TAv) and 1.4 FRAA. That offensive performance is second only to Freddie Freeman among first basemen with 60 or more games played.

One
For their fantastic pitching staff, the Brewers only have one player in the top ten percent of all MLB, in terms of Wins Above Replacement Player (WARP). That player is lefty high leverage reliever Josh Hader, ranked as 40th (!) with 1.54 WARP. No full-time reliever ranks higher, and only one pitcher better than Hader is younger (Jack Flaherty).

Ten
Many Brewers fans are suggesting that the club needs an ace in their pitching rotation. When I host chats on BPMilwaukee Twitter (@BPMilwaukee), the most common questions since the off season typically concern the quality of the MLB rotation. Throwing out the extremely advanced stats, let’s look at games started and ERA+ (a contextual assessment of Earned Runs Average). Here we are, half way through the season, and only ten clubs have at least three starters with 10 GS and an ERA at or above league average: the Red Sox, Cubs, Cleveland, Tigers, Astros, Angels, Mets, Cardinals, Nationals, and Brewers.

Seventeen / 40 Percent
If you’re interested in an ace, though, using the colloquial definition of someone who can lead a rotation in terms of performance and starts, who would be better than Jhoulys Chacin? Sorting all MLB starting pitchers by games started and ERA+, Chacin meets the strongest definition of good performance in a heavy workload.

Of course, including advanced contextual statistics, it is worth questioning whether the club will see some course correction from the starting pitchers. Here, Junior Guerra’s 4.69 DRA is the best among Brewers starters with at least 60 innings pitched. That’s good for 71st in the MLB. Yet, once Guerra is working between the lines, his splitter remains one of the best in the game at inducing swings-and-misses; thus far Guerra is yielding nearly 40 percent whiffs-per-swing on the split (only slightly lagging his 2016 performance that put that pitch on the map).

Thirteen / Forty-Three
Overall, the Brewers pitching rotation forms quite a strong unit: the club’s starting pitchers have 13 Runs Prevented as a group. This performance helps the team maximize a phenomenal bullpen, as the Brewers can frequently keep the game close. With a bullpen that has prevented 43 runs, the starting pitchers are often handing close games to relief pitchers that are ready to help convert those games into wins.

Six
When is a better than average offense not really that good? Over the last 30 games for the Brewers, it turns out! Those big ticket runs totals against Philadelphia have gone a long way toward improving Milwaukee’s season long offensive figures….

….but for all that, over the last 30 games the most frequently Runs Scored total for the Brewers has declined from the season leading 2 RS. Twenty percent of the Brewers’ games since they returned from Minnesota have ended with 1 RS for Milwaukee. If you missed seeing 2 RS, do not worry, for that remained the second most frequent run total over that time.

Seventeenth in Right
Domingo Santana is a tough player to figure out right now. If someone had told Brewers fans that the right fielder would have -2.6 FRAA roughly halfway through the season, most would have expected that he would be in the running for one of the most valuable right fielders in the MLB. Alas, in True Average (TAv), Santana’s mark of .259 (i.e., roughly league average) ranks 17th of 24 MLB RF with 60 or more games played.

Fourteen
Perhaps Lorenzo Cain is able to produce so many stolen bases in part because he’s on first base so frequently: the Brewers Center Fielder is drawing walks in 13.8 percent of his plate appearances!

Nineteen (Two)
Without park adjustment, across the 2018 MLB the Brewers’ offense currently ranks 19th in terms of Runs Scored. Their pitching staff currently ranks 2nd in terms of Runs Allowed.

Photo Credit: Jeff Hanisch, USA Today Sports Images

The first Deserved Run Average (DRA) statistics are available for the 2018 season, although they should be published with a grain of salt because the corresponding Run Elements are not yet posted on Baseball Prospectus. As always, the statistic was improved over the offseason, and a new article about the improvements is forthcoming at Baseball Prospectus (keep your eyes out for it, probably next week). In the mean time, as the U.S. Census says, let’s Compare With Caution!

So, obviously since DRA are available, it’s time to cue the time honored #WhyDoesDRAHateMyTeam? twice over, as both the Brewers and Cubs probable starters for this series have….suspect underlying performances thus far:

In the full extent of the Brewers pitching staff, the recent pitching surge that is basically keeping the club on a Playoff Contending pace can be called into question by both DRA and contextual Fielding Independent Pitching (cFIP) statistics. Below is a table of Runs Prevented estimates, using (1) Baseball Reference three-year park factors for Miller Park, (2) Deserved Run Average, and (3) cFIP averages scaled to the aforementioned park environment. For more on Runs Prevented, read this.

Milwaukee’s pitching staff is still expected to prevent runs at an above average rate for the season (probably a +14 RA season), but that’s quite a long distance from their current exceptional performance. What’s going on? Well, the early inefficiencies in the field have been nicely wrapped up, and now the Brewers couple one of the top ground ball pitching staffs in the MLB with one of the most efficient ground ball defenses in the MLB. In fact, only Cleveland is better thus far. In many ways, this should not be surprising, as one could have surmised that the offseason pitching acquisitions were largely designed to feed ground balls to an excellent ground ball defense. So here we are: Milwaukee is in an odd place for underlying run elements, as the pitching staff on the whole is not expected to be a strike out machine, and Miller Park will likely encourage walks and home runs from opposing bats. Given these elements, one might expect that the Brewers outperforming their peripheral numbers will be a story all year.

Entering Chicago, what is especially exciting is that the Brewers bats are heating up. One might readily attribute that performance to the return of Christian Yelich to the Brewers batting order, in order to form a killer 1-2 punch with Lorenzo Cain. Indeed, according to Baseball Reference the Brewers boast average lead off production (including the all-important .333 On Base Percentage [OBP]), and notably better than average production from the second spot (118 OPS+, including .342 OBP). But, the remainder of the Brewers order is starting to thaw out, which is allowing the club to produce runs throughout the batting order. These production types range from singles machine Jonathan Villar to mashers like Travis Shaw and Eric Thames.

Thus far, a few question marks remain across the diamond, specifically regarding right fielder Domingo Santana. Despite concerns about a lack of playing time for Santana after the Brewers acquired Cain and Yelich, the right fielder has played in 23 of the club’s 25 games thus far, essentially working as a starter (Santana has the third most PA among position players). But, Santana has yet to get going, basically producing at the same level as Orlando Arcia without the prime defensive position and production (Arcia at least has 2.3 Fielding Runs Above Average to his name, and serves a crucial function as one of the ground ball efficiency fielders for the Brewers infield). Arcia can be hidden at the bottom of the batting order for time immemorial so long as the glove continues to stick; to that end, Baseball Prospectus ranks Arcia as the third best fielding short stop in the MLB thus far in 2018 (after ranking fourth best in 2017). Santana remains one of the worst right fielders in baseball, which is fine when the bat carries the profile; one wonders with Jesus Aguilar smoking the ball around the ballpark whether the Brewers will continue to employ Braun / Cain / Yelich outfielders for the time being.

Entering Wrigley Field, the Brewers have their work cut out for them. The club is playing great baseball, even with the caveat that they’re playing poor teams. But that’s always a catch-22 for MLB clubs: if good teams fail to beat the bad teams, fans rail against them (“The Brewers play down to their competition!”), but if good teams whip bad teams, fans move to some other narrative (“The Brewers can beat bad teams but can they beat good teams?”). So, the excellent Brewers pitching staff squares off against the phenomenal Cubs bats, a true strength-versus-strength match-up. Milwaukee arms will attempt to coax Cubs bats to keep the ball on the ground and hopefully get some help from a Chicago that has yet to thaw out in 2018. Meanwhile, the scuffling Cubs arms are nowhere as good as many expected thus far, and they face a Brewers offense that is finally participating throughout the batting order. It’s never to early to begin testing assumptions, but it’s worth remembering that very little hangs on this series, save for the underrated good guys taking on the Evil Empire.

Photo Credit: Denny Medley, USA Today Sports Images

One positive to take away from the weekend is that Junior Guerra may be back. Guerra was a disaster in the first half of the season, unable to get on track after suffering an injury in his first start of the season. He then spent August in the minors before being recalled in the September roster expansion. Since his initial relief performance where he allowed two runs in an inning of work, Guerra has been solid. Across five appearances and 4.3 innings, Guerra has only allowed one run, on a solo home run, with no other hits, one walk and nine strikeouts.

Looking at this potential resurgence, there are a few tweaks Guerra has made to improve his performance. First, he’s effectively junked his sinker. He used the pitch 9.39 percent of offerings in 2016, and increased that to 16.74 percent through August 1 of this season. By barely throwing the sinker and even lowering his usage rate on his fourseam fastball, Guerra has become a pitcher who now throws a majority of breaking/offspeed pitches, with a majority of those non fastballs becoming splitters.

Small sample size needs to be mentioned when looking at results of individual pitches in a month’s worth of relief appearances, but Guerra’s stuff has been untouchable: No hits and only one walk against the slider and splitter, while all three of his hits allowed have come off the sinker and fourseam fastball. Results against those pitches are more in line with his breakout 2016, rather than his start to the season.

It seems that this shift may also be allowing his fourseamer to play up. His whiff percentage on both the splitter and fourseam fastball are up dramatically when compared to both earlier this season and 2016. It’s worth noting that even when he struggled to begin the season, his whiff rates were still in line with 2016, so this step forward with higher whiffs is actually a level we haven’t seen yet. Accordingly, the fourseam fastball is now his first pitch of choice a majority of the time, while the splitter is his two strike weapon.

If Guerra is moved back into the rotation, regression is to be expected. His pitch mix is fine if his three pitches are as effective as they’ve been this September, but he’s likely to see a velocity dip. All of his pitches were 1-2 MPH slower when he was starting in Milwaukee to start the season. While they’ve ticked back up a bit, short relief appearance bursts are different than being expected to throw for five to six innings in an outing. We could get a sneak peek next Saturday. If the series against the Cardinals still holds postseason implications for the Brewers, Manager Craig Counsell may decide that throwing Aaron Wilkerson in a must win game is not feasible. If so, Guerra could be a candidate to navigate through the lineup the first time.

In their lone win of the series, Travis Shaw hit a walk off home run in extra innings to propel Milwaukee to a victory. The home run came on a curveball up and away for Shaw, after Wade Davis had already thrown a first pitch curveball to Shaw which was out of the zone (even further up and away). It was a good location to try and catch Shaw, and he’s shown a willingness to chase pitches in that area, and has a healthy whiff rate in that zone.

Going with the curve was a high risk/high reward choice. While Shaw is only hitting .200 against curveballs this season, he is slugging .415 against the pitch. Maybe Davis was tired after being worked hard last week, but the pitch choice seems like a mistake in that spot, and Shaw made him pay.

Up Next: It is the final week of the season and the Brewers are still playing important games. No matter what happens, the Brewers have had a great season and have a foundation to take another step forward next year. But before we look ahead, there are six games left. Milwaukee completes their home slate for the regular season with three games against Cincinnati. The Reds were just swept by the Red Sox and have lost six straight games. Afterwards, the Brewers travel to St. Louis to play the Cardinals, who could do everyone a favor by taking some games from the Cubs. Colorado will be home all week, with three games against the marlins, then three against the Dodgers, who will likely be in cruise control as they glide into the playoffs.

Photo Credit: Benny Sieu, USAToday Sports Images

So while the exciting pennant and playoff-chase baseball we’re experiencing is ahead of schedule, that doesn’t exclude us from looking at the bigger picture and thinking about what it will take for the Brewers to take the next step in its build. And, look, crazy things happen in postseason baseball. For all we know, the Brewers are already there and wondering about the Brewers’ long-term championship prospects will look silly at the end of October. It wouldn’t be the first time.

Among the Brewer hitters, something sticks out on their Baseball Prospectus team page. The depth, for sure, is notable and has been a strength of the team, especially on their most recent run. But for a team that is playing over its preseason projections and getting upper-range production from those same projections, it’s remarkably void of one standout star performance.

Let’s define a “star” performance as 5.0 BWARP or more for a season. It’s a decently high bar to clear, as only 17.1 teams on average have had a player clear that bar each year over the past 10 years.

On the other hand, 90 percent of World Series teams over that same time span have rostered at least one player worth more than 5.0 wins above replacement.

It’s not news that good teams have good players. There’s certainly something to be said, though, for a team getting a high-level performance out of one or two players that can erase deficiencies elsewhere on the roster. Indeed, a 5-win performance out of centerfield, for example, would net the Brewers an extra 3.5 wins this season, which is exactly the number of games out of first place the team found itself in entering play on Wednesday.

Of course, 5-win players don’t exactly grow on trees, either. The good news is that the list above has players that probably weren’t projected to be 5-win players, but simply outplayed their projections and had great years. For the current team, Travis Shaw is the closest to the 5-win mark with 4.1 BWARP entering play on Wednesday. As a 27-year old, there’s room for him to continue the improvements he’s made coming into this year, though nothing is guaranteed.

Looking down the list of Brewers players this season, Orlando Arcia comes in next with 3.1 BWARP. With his fourth-best among shortstops fielding runs above average (FRAA) at 6.6 and solid .260 TAv, it’s hard to expect or project too much more going forward, especially if defense peaks early, but it’s certainly still possible to see that “star” level of performance in the future.

And with all due respect to the #ryanbraunforever crowd, it can’t be Ryan Braun literally forever. His .296 TAv demonstrates his bat has still been productive when in the lineup, but as he continues to age and needs maintenance days, if not DL stints moving forward, it would take a full rebound season to get back to his star-level days.

So while there’s cold water to throw over any player reaching 5.0 WARP in a given year (non-Mike Trout division), those are three players that could reach that level. And that’s without mentioning strides that may be made by the young players currently on the roster or are that knocking on the door of the big leagues, or even the next wave of players that will come in the next two years.

Yes, the Brewers need a “star” player to reach the World Series, but that player may already be on the roster. Or, you know, maybe there’s a cost-controlled, free agent player out there somewhere that could be worth 5-plus WARP next year.

Photo Credit: Charles LeClaire, USAToday Sports Images