After the 2020 season, franchise cornerstone Ryan Braun will shift from a guaranteed contract to a $4.0 million buyout of a mutual option. But, even if Braun leaves the team for 2021, the club is hardly at an end of an era. Seventeen players with likely roles for the 2018 club remain under contract as the clock strikes 2021:

Granted, some of these players might not be expected to stick with the club for this extended period of time. There are always trades, in the first place, which could knock some of these players off this list. Additionally, role depreciation could also knock others off the roster (here Jesus Aguilar, Jett Bandy, Keon Broxton, and Junior Guerra figure most prominently). Someone’s career could always derail in an unexpected way, as well, be it via injury or mechanical issues. But the basic point is that if the majority of these players have solidified MLB roles for 2018, they also build an outline for a 2021 club.

Imagine the Brewers pick up Ryan Braun’s option for 2021:

It’s easy to dream on prospects reaching the MLB and filling out this roster, especially given David Stearns’s recent comment that the club’s pitching depth is one reason the club soured on free agency options. But, even the development of prospects is not the point here; the point is that the last two offseasons have helped to open a path for a 2017-2018 offseason that improves the club for the short- and long-terms.

What is new about this? The current window opening for the Brewers is much more similar to the 1978-1982 Brewers than the most recent Brewers contender. In 2008, for example, the Brewers featured a well-controlled core of prime bats without much of a pitching staff structure extending beyond Yovani Gallardo. The 2011 and 2014 Brewers showcased different looks, contending as various contractual windows closed for the team. Once again, there was never enough congruence between the batting and pitching cores. This is what is new about the 2018 Brewers: they exhibit a core club that can compete in a mediocre National League, while also building for the future with an extensive window. Granted, there will be injuries, trades, and depreciation to knock out some of this depth, but the overall look of the club is one that is completely new to the Brewers.

If fans are angry about the starting pitching, perhaps they can be excused, for watching a Brewers club whose strength is pitching instead of batting (this is new territory for the organization!); if fans are angry about the lack of impact moves after acquiring Cain and Yelich, perhaps they can be excused, for watching a Brewers club that is ready to open a true three year window (and likely five year window) is also new territory. 2018 is a new frontier for the organization.

Yet, here I am to tell you that maybe we should take something from spring training.  This spring, the Brewers rank 17th in stolen bases, with 18.  In the three years since Craig Counsell became manager (he took over at the beginning of May in 2015), however, the club is tied for first in all of baseball.  They, Cincinnati, and Arizona are essentially in their own tier; the Brewers and Reds have stolen 393 bases since 2015, the Diamondbacks have stolen 372, and the fourth-place Astros are all the way back at 321.

We already knew the Brewers had a tendency to run a lot.  In 2016, Jonathan Villar famously led MLB in steals despite getting thrown out five more times than anyone else.  Under Counsell, they have been aggressive on the basepaths, and there was no particular reason to think this would stop this season.  Both Lorenzo Cain and Christian Yelich can run, and they would have been likely to rack up steals in 2018 given the apparent organizational mandate that stolen bases were a positive.

The tendency towards running did also manifest in past spring trainings.  Because Counsell took over after Opening Day in 2015, we only have two springs of data to analyze.  In 2016, though, the Brewers ranked eighth in steals, and in 2017 they were seventh.  Seventh and eighth are not first, but they are at least in the top third of the league; it reflects the club’s desire to be among the more aggressive on the basepaths.  The fact that they rank 17th thus far in 2018, though, does not indicate a similar goal.

One might think that the difference between this spring and the last two is just success rate, and perhaps the Brewers are running just as much but are less successful.  There is a kernel of truth to that; this spring, the Brewers rank 11th in attempts (instead of 17th in steals).  But in previous years, they also ran more indiscriminately.  In 2017, they were tied for third in spring training stolen base attempts, and in 2016, they were sixth.  There is a clear decline this year, both in efficiency and overall attempts.

It is obviously too early to know what to make of this change.  Because of the small sample size of spring training in general, the difference here could be as simple as who gets on base when.  Perhaps speedsters have been getting on base behind other players, or perhaps the game situation hasn’t dictated a steal.

Perhaps, though, the organization has decided to shift its approach to stealing bases.  Yelich and Cain have just one attempt each, and Villar has only three.  Only Keon Broxton has been running with any regularity.  The sample size difficulties make drawing any performance-based conclusions difficult, but this could be indicative of a philosophical change.  Teams generally spend spring training getting into shape for the regular season, so it would seem unusual that a team known for stealing a lot of bases would suddenly spend the spring not doing just that.  At the very least, this gives us something to watch for in 2018.

Photo Credit: Joe Camporeale, USAToday Sports Images

• There are some teams that nearly reach this ideal; in recent Brewers lore, the runs prevention and workload combination of Shaun Marcum / Yovani Gallardo / Randy Wolf / Zack Greinke / and Chris Narveson with Marco Estrada as the lone “replacement” is about as good a true pitching rotation as one can find. They prevented 14 runs, which is quite close to the 2017 Brewers rotational performance of 10 runs prevented.

• Other ideals exist with the 2014 Nationals (Roark / Zimmermann / Fister / Strasburg / Gonzalez and two short-term replacements; 95 runs prevented), or the 2016 Cubs (Lester / Hendricks / Arrieta / Lackey / Hammel plus one short-term replacement and five emergency (one GS) starters; they prevented 122 runs).

• But, let it be known that the ideal fails, too; the 2016 Cardinals rotation of Martinez / Garcia / Wainwright / Leake / Wacha and two short-term replacements was 25 runs below average (worse than the 2016 Brewers rotation, even!);

• The famous 2010 Giants won the World Series with about as true a five-man rotation as one can find, but Cain / Vogelsong / Bumgarner / Zito / Lincecum were 22 runs below average for the Champions (exactly as good as the 2016 Brewers rotation. Indeed, what does a Championship Rotation look like?).

Related Reading:
Depth Beats Attrition
83: 2018 PECOTA Projection
Fluctuation Race: Brewers and Cubs Rotations
Aces Don’t Exist: Rotation Spots
Aces Do Not Exist

As I wrote on Friday, this MLB environment is one in which teams employ over 300 starting pitching spots to complete the season. There ostensibly is only a pitching rotation for a couple of teams, with the remainder of the league simply finding ways to patch-up injuries or string together a low rotation that does not get too badly shelled on any given turn.

The Brewers have gleefully embraced the “replacement” rotation years under both Doug Melvin and David Stearns; Melvin’s 2012 rotation featuring Gallardo / Greinke / Fiers / Estrada / Marcum / Wolf plus four short-term replacements and an emergency starter was twice as good as the “established” 2011 rotation; this ragtag gang prevented 28 runs. Last year, David Stearns improved the rotation significantly, despite starting only Anderson / Nelson / Davies / Garza as regulars and using seven long- or short-term replacements and two emergency starters. This group was just about as good as the 2011 rotation; they prevented 11 runs.

In a sense, rotational queries are aesthetic queries. Do you prefer to steadily churn through a “set” group of five pitchers and take the results, come what may? This method can be dangerous as even relatively similar groups of pitchers can vary significantly from year to year. Take the 2015-to-2016 Cardinals, who made minimal rotational changes, and declined by 81 runs from their excellent 2015 core (excluding John Lackey, who left via free agency). One could complain that the Lance Lynn injury skews that, but his total loss for the season was not anything near that of Jaime Garcia or Michael Wacha’s year-to-year variation. The 2017 Cubs rotational decline has been well-documented, but it’s worth emphasizing that they made minimal personnel changes (in terms of starters) and declined by nearly 100 runs as a group compared to 2016. The Nationals, Mets, and Giants (other “consistent personnel rotations” also demonstrate wild variance between seasons).

Preventing runs is difficult even when a team employs five regular starters.

All this frames the lessons of the 2017 Brewers. Last year the club gambled on a set of mechanical and pitching approach adjustments, as well as a group of well-refined replacements, some declining veterans and in-house arms, and an interesting set of n’er-do-wells to effectively match the production of that ideal of Marcum / Gallardo / Wolf / Greinke / Narveson.

If anything, David Stearns effectively applied the lessons of the 2012 Brewers rotation in as effective a way as possible; it’s worth noting that those lessons failed in 2013 when Melvin went back to well, but it’s also worth noting the “solid rotational group” that was reassembled for 2014 also failed to improve. A Lohse / Peralta / Gallardo / Garza main group with swingmen Fiers and Estrada and MLB graduate Jimmy Nelson looks (in theory) like a much more stable group than either the 2012 or 2013 rotations; that 2014 group prevented three runs when all was said and done.

Enter the 2018 Brewers rotation, who could conceivably appear as the very best rotation of the last decade in Milwaukee (I suppose that’s not terribly tough when that decade includes 2009, 2010, 2013, or even 2015 and 2016 rotations, but well, improvements have to start somewhere!). The core group, entering the season, likely includes post-adjustment, post-breakout Chase Anderson, steady-as-they-come Zach Davies, underrated rotational depth man Jhoulys Chacin, and MLB graduate Brandon Woodruff. That group gives the rotation considerable merit prior to considering any additional depth options, as these four prevented 40 runs in 556 innings in 2017.

What is especially intriguing about the 2018 rotation is the pre-established depth entering the year. I’ve written about this at length here, so I will not rehash it, but basically, the club features Wade Miley as a potential minor-league contract “walk-on” (Miley has never posted a below replacement WARP); another mechanical & strategic adjustment candidate in Yovani Gallardo; and standard depth and potential injury returns from the 2017 rotation. For scouting, strategic, and performance characteristics, see “Trust the Rotation” and “How the Brewers Beat the Cubs.”

Here’s where I think most of the cognitive dissonance lies with Brewers fans: Brewers fans are idealizing the rotational turns of a club like the 2011 Brewers, where five set starters work the full season, ebb-and-flow, but ultimately produce value by virtue of their regular turns in the rotation. Granted, in terms of Deserved Runs Average (DRA) alone, Milwaukee’s main group of pitching depth entering the 2018 season should be at least average to begin with. Fans often forget that the current MLB could require withstanding a 4.70 RA/G to 4.80 RA/G environment in Miller Park / National League. A group DRA of 4.77 is quite solid if you’re playing 4.70 RA/G to 4.80 RA/G baseball. It’s not even a bad level of production if you’re playing 4.60 RA/G baseball.

What fans are missing, however, is that compared to their roles across the league, the Brewers’ depth pitchers are better than their professional colleagues. The PECOTA replacement depth assessment especially underscores this rotational strength. This is a difficult point to convey to fans and analysts alike, because most people assume the Brewers will be bad because instead of signing Lance Lynn or Yu Darvish to pitch against folks like Kyle Hendricks or Jose Quintana, etc., the Brewers will be running Brent Suter or Miley or Junior Guerra or somebody to the mound. There are two problematic assumptions here:

• That any of the Brewers depth starters will work regularly enough as starting pitchers to be assessed as a “standard 25-to-35 GS starter.” Instead of this assumption, fans and analysts ought to think of Miley / Guerra / Suter / etc. working in “bursts” across the season; they might reasonably, as a group, average out to a few starts here or a few starts there, but they hardly should be considered “full SP” roles

• That additional MLB competitors will not be using replacement starters. This is tough to consider, because no one knows the future. So obviously it’s easier to make an argument using a pitcher one expects to be a regular, quality contributor (let’s stick with Quintana and Hendricks here) than trying to project replacements. But, rotational mismatch works both ways, and it’s worth asking how the Brewers’ depth pitchers square against other depth roles across the MLB.

Thankfully, PECOTA keeps a vast database of potential replacements; 653 starting pitchers appear in the Baseball Prospectus March 2, 2018 pitching projection worksheet. What is fascinating about this assembly of projections is that while the projection system features double the arms than those likely used by MLB squads, the proportional alignment of these arms across rotational roles roughly matches the actual distribution of pitching roles in 2017. So, in terms of assessing the quality of pitching roles within one immediate MLB environment (juiced ball, fly ball revolution, etc.), there’s an immediate correspondence or complementary aspect between PECOTA’s projections and what might reasonably be expected to occur based on immediate experience.

I created two PECOTA rotational models. The first “rotates” through PECOTA projections in 30 player sequences, in order to estimate the number of rotational spots that exist in PECOTA. Since the system is used to project system depth as well as established MLB players, there are 10 rotational spots as well as a Replacement and an Emergency group in 2018 PECOTA:

Since this table is quite abstract, I then designed another model in which 2018 PECOTA data are distributed in a manner similar to the 2017 MLB rotation:

Here is a model that assesses the Brewers’ primary system depth against the potential MLB roles and replacements. The last two columns judge each pitcher’s runs prevented against both the 2018 PECOTA rotational spot and the comparable 2017 rotation spot (based on Games Started, as a “true” rotational measurement).

Finally, to assess another range of rotational roles, here is how the Brewers fare against the PECOTA full depth system (1-to-10 spots, plus Replacements and Emergency starters). These sets of columns provide the “Best” and “Lowest” rotational roles assigned by the PECOTA rotation, and then the runs prevented versus each role:

These figures tracking runs prevented by role are highly abstract, so I suggest reading them in the following way:

• While the Brewers’ overall rotation may have an “average” outlook, once replacement rotations begin to appear in the 2018 MLB, the Milwaukee replacements will have a runs prevented advantage of at least 30 runs (assessed against other teams’ replacements).

• All things being equal, the top four Brewers rotational pitchers are average compared to the major primary rotation roles, meaning that the additional low rotation role mismatches could help the team outperform their Runs Scored / Runs Allowed by approximately three-to-five wins.

• An alternate implication is that when the Brewers’ top four pitchers face other teams’ replacements, the Brewers will have a larger positive “role mismatch” than their opponents’ primary starters will have against Milwaukee replacements.

Assessed against other depth roles in the MLB, the Brewers 2018 rotation holds up quite nicely. The top of the rotation, even with considerable projected “decline” compared to 2017, remain average across the first four turns of the rotation. That Anderson, Woodruff, Davies, and Chacin indeed might reasonably be expected to work at least 102 starts is quite a solid proportion, and clearly leaves open space to assume injuries during the 162-game slog will occur.

Moving to the replacement and emergency starter candidates, however, the Brewers rotation begins to shine: frankly, over the course of their projected innings pitched, the Brewers depth are notably better than other replacement arms projected throughout the MLB. This should not necessarily be surprising, for where other clubs may have fewer tested options waiting in the wings, the Brewers have two 1,000+ IP veterans (Gallardo, Miley), and previously solid run preventers (2016 Guerra, 2016-2017 Suter). That’s before reaching the more inexperienced prospect depth, as well as potential injury returns (it’s not necessarily worth considering Nelson’s return, if for no other reason than to not establish false hopes or pressure), or even answering any questions about Josh Hader’s eventual MLB role (even he could “start” a game given the right match-up).

This type of speculative analysis should begin to show how the rotations of attrition may play out in 2018. It should accompany concrete scouting and strategic analysis of pitching profiles and performance pedigree. Thus far, it appears that the Brewers have indeed assembled rotational depth that is ready to be deployed in flexible roles (Suter as swingman; Guerra as a potential reliever / swingman; Miley as minor league option, “next-man-up”). Moreover, in terms of DRA alone, these pitchers ultimately have production levels that match #3 / #4 starters based on the actual distribution of pitching talent in the MLB. One should not get into exercises of “wishful thinking” about this rotation because this Brewers rotation does not need wishful thinking to work; however, role-by-role, these arms are better than replacement arms to a degree that one wonders which of these arms might be able to step into a more extended role should serious injuries or ineffectiveness take a toll during the season.

At worst, this 2018 Brewers rotation should be a group of arms that can hold games steady in waiting for the strong back-end bullpen to take over. At best, this 2018 Brewers rotation is simply hiding in plain sight, an unassuming depth club that is ready by design to replace starters. Once the wheels of attrition begin churning across the MLB, this is the type of rotation that can shine in fits and starts, around the margins of the team, in assuming ways.

Photo Credit: Joe Camporeale, USAToday Sports Images

Given that second base is a question mark right now, it stands to reason that the club may have to dip into the minors at some point this year for help at the position. The first player that jumps to mind is top middle infield prospect Mauricio Dubon, who made it all the way up to Colorado Springs last season after being acquired in the December 2016 Tyler Thornburg trade with Boston. Dubon is an interesting prospect, skilled at both shortstop and second base with a high-contact approach at the plate. And while Dubon will almost certainly get a chance to play in Milwaukee in the near future, PECOTA seems to believe another player probably deserves a shot at the big leagues before him:

Enter utilityman Nate Orf.

Orf has been considered a “non-prospect” since beginning his professional career, which shouldn’t come as much of a surprise – the diminutive 5’9″ Missourian was signed as an undrafted free agent by the Brewers back in the summer of 2013 as a 23 year old out of Baylor University. Orf doesn’t have much of a track record for power (15 home runs in 545 minor league games) but since turning pro all he’s done is hit. Employing a selective approach at the plate has allowed Orf to keep his strikeout rate below 15% at every stop he’s made while climbing the minor league ladder, and he’s the owner of a career .289 batting average. Often times we’ll a high-contact hitter like that shirk walks against minor league pitchers, but not Orf; he’s also drawn a free pass in nearly 11 percent of his plate appearances in the minors. Overall, he owns a career .289/.385/.401 slash in five seasons within Milwaukee’s minor league system.

Orf logged some time in AAA in 2016 but spent all of 2017 with the Sky Sox and produced arguably the finest season of his career. As pointed out by my colleague Steven Jewell at Brew Crew Ball, joining the fly-ball revolution may be exactly what Orf needed to take the next step at the plate. Orf slashed nearly 10 percent off of his ground ball rate in 2017 and nearly all of that change went to an increase in fly balls. He hit fly balls at a 47.9 percent rate last season. That helped Orf to nearly double his previous career high in isolated power, with his .187 ISO far outdistancing the .101 he produced all the way back in rookie ball in 2013. He clubbed 32 doubles, 11 triples, and nine home runs on his way to slashing .320/.397/.507 in 125 games for Colorado Springs. Even when factoring in the hitter-friendly environment of both Security Service Field and the Pacific Coast League as a whole, Orf posted a .288 TAv and was one of only two Brewers prospects that posted a wRC+ greater than 130 (the now-departed Monte Harrison was the other).

Following the conclusion of his highly successful 2017 campaign, Orf headed to Venezuela and batted .337 in 29 games for Tiburones de La Guaira (as a teammate of Junior Guerra!) even as he battled some stomach issues and lost 15 lbs during the season. He earned a non-roster invite to major league camp for the first time this spring and has continued to impress in the early going. Thus far in 12 Cactus League appearances, Orf has hit .333/.481/.534 with a double and a home run.

Dubon has the more notable prospect pedigree, but PECOTA doesn’t seem to believe he’ll make much of an impact this season. Dubon’s 50th percentile projections say he’ll only receive 62 plate appearances at the highest level in 2018 and bat .246/.295/.351 for a TAv of .235. Orf, on the other hand, is forecasted to bat .244/.332/.382 across 250 trips to the plate for a TAv of .244. His ability to capably play all over the diamond helps him in the eyes of PECOTA as well (he played all nine positions in a game once at Class-A Advanced in 2014, and accrued 7.9 FRAA between 2B, 3B, LF, and RF in 2017). Overall, he’s projected to contribute 0.7 WARP in a part-time capacity.

This will be Nate Orf’s age-28 season and his sixth as a minor leaguer for the Brewers. The profile likely plays best in a bench/utility role, but perhaps 2018 could finally be the year that he gets a shot at playing in the MLB.

The trouble seems to be that this roster does not align with some theory about MLB roster building, in which a club simply signs the nine best position players and five best starting pitchers they can find and then gets to work. Even if fans or analysts concede that there will be injuries during a season, they do not seem to align that concession with the actual brutality of 162-game conditions. For example, those four roster spots for Braun, Cain, Santana, and Yelich sure look rough, until one views the number of teams that typically work with multiple outfielders for 100+ Games. In 2017, here’s a list of teams with three outfielders that started 100 games:

That’s it: six MLB teams, six MLB teams managed to field an outfield with three outfielders that started 100 (or more) games. In fact, if you read that table carefully, you will see that any definition of a “full time outfield” that expects three outfielders to work 130 (or more) games is extremely unrealistic; only two MLB teams managed to start three outfielders in at least 130 games. Looking at the last five years, one could argue that this is an anomaly, or the beginning of a trend; here are the number of teams that have started three outfielders in 100 or more games in recent seasons: 2017 (6), 2016 (4), 2015 (6), 2014 (8), and 2013 (10).

The same analysis works with each infield position and catcher in 2017. Ten teams started one catcher for at least 100 games. If you’re worried about the second base logjam, half of the 2017 MLB teams found a starter for 100 or more games. That number increases slightly to 17 for third basemen, and increases again to 19 shortstops with at least 100 games started. Even the “easy” position of first base saw 23 teams start one player for 100 or more games.

There are two ways to view these data: first, one can argue that since regular, dependable starting players are so rare, finding a suitable starter for each position as a roster strategy is of the utmost importance. On the contrarian side, one can run with the market failure: if the evidence of a 162-game season suggests that injuries will deplete a roster and alternative strategies exist (such as heavy platooning or rotational systems), a team can focus on designing a roster that can withstand those issues. This is perhaps one reason the Brewers succeeded in 2017: they started 11 outfielders, four catchers, three first basemen, five second basemen, four third basemen, and two shortstops. Given that several of these starts belong to Hernan Perez, Nick Franklin, Jonathan Villar, and Eric Sogard, that should underscore the significance of positional flexibility for the Brewers roster: many players can be deployed across the roster at will.

This is why I have said, and will continue to say, keep all the outfielders. With options remaining for Keon Broxton and Brett Phillips, and Braun, Cain, Santana, and Yelich at the MLB level, the Brewers have a chance to field an extremely deep and talented team in 2018. Consider, for instance, that the full second outfield is Hernan Perez, Keon Broxton, and Brett Phillips left-to-right; perhaps one would not want to start that outfield for the full season, but if the Brewers are in an extreme injury bind, this is absolutely a playable group.

Moving to the pitching rotation, the same roster building trouble exists: 80 percent of the league cannot find three pitchers to start 30 or more games.

Notice that this list is not exhaustive of playoff teams, either; seven of the 2017 playoff teams reached that level without three pitchers starting at least 30 games. So, yes, this Brewers rotation is what a playoff rotation can look like.

Lest you think I’m cherry-picking, if one expands the selection to teams that were able to start four pitchers for at least 25 games, well, nine MLB teams were able to do that in 2017. Interestingly enough, this second group of teams does not include each team listed in the table above, meaning that even some of these teams with three 30+ GS pitchers were searching for starts in the fourth slot.

Worse yet, it appears that fans and analysts suffer from an idealized notion of the quality of a pitching rotation. In reality, once one falls below 25 games started, the quality of these pitchers plummets, even in a league where 4.70 runs averaged per nine innings (RA/9) is acceptable or average.

In case you’re also concerned about Zach Davies, Chase Anderson, Jhoulys Chacin, and Brandon Woodruff leading the rotation, here are the mythical “top rotation starters”:

These numbers work out to approximately eight runs prevented for the pitchers starting 30 (or more) games, while the 25-to-29 games started group works out to an average of five runs prevented. In this regard, even this threshold of runs prevention is quite reasonable for Davies and Anderson, and even Chacin. Woodruff remains untested, but the basic idea is that this group of “regular starting pitchers” is not terribly far ahead of the Brewers’ fourth starter (and by this point, most teams are not receiving 25-to-29 games started, anyway.

I do not know any other conclusion to this analysis than to state that there is no such thing as a pitching rotation outside of the “standard routine that a team will use for their current group of pitchers who start games.” Here is an area where Brewers manager Craig Counsell could be ahead of the game in admonishing Milwaukee beat writers about calling pitchers “starters” or “relievers”; Counsell is quite astute to observe that he needs to get 27 outs, and he needs a pitching staff that can get 27 outs and prevent runs while so doing. That could mean that the first turn of the season is Zach Davies, Chase Anderson, Jhoulys Chacin, Brandon Woodruff, and Wade Miley, but the second turn could substitute in Brent Suter or Junior Guerra if the match-up is right. I’d bet that even Josh Hader sees a “start” when the match-up is right (say, “neutralizing Cubs left-handed bats”).

Stop asking “Is Junior Guerra or Brent Suter good enough to beat the Cubs?” or “Is Davies / Woodruff / Anderson / Chacin / Miley / Suter / Gallardo / etc. good enough to beat the Cubs?” Stop saying, “But Brent Suter cannot make it more than a couple times through the batting order.” Start saying, “Brent Suter, as a starter, needs to be better than 5.37 to 5.45 runs allowed per nine innings,” or “Wade Miley can work April and needs to be better than 5.70 to 5.93 runs allowed per nine innings.” If the Brewers reach these thresholds, they will be as good as the teams who employed 254 low rotation or replacement starting pitchers in 2017. What is more likely, it seems, is that the Brewers front office, coaching staff, and field management have found a group of pitchers that they believe can quietly shave runs off the back end of the rotation, the replacement games, and throwaways during the grind.

Much like “pitching wins championships except for when hitting wins championships,” the Brewers have correctly gauged that one does not need to reach the playoffs by being a better team than their best possible competitor. Instead, the team needs to be better than the league’s trends, and the league averages. Injuries and roster building strategies suggest that there will not be 130 or more starts from three outfielders, or 30 or more starts from three pitchers, and so the Brewers stand in seas of depth.

The 2018 Milwaukee Brewers need to win a war of attrition, they need to win the grind of 162, they need to win the mundane days of June as well as the thrilling days of September. One way to accomplish this objective is by designing a team that is camouflaged to attrition, injuries, and the grind. In this regard, these Brewers will be hiding in plain sight.

Photo Credit: Orlando Ramirez, USAToday Sports Images

Related:
Tyler Webb’s Quiet Upside

Twenty-seven-year-old Tyler Webb is trying to get that eighth and final bullpen spot.

Webb was the trade return from the New York Yankees in the Garrett Cooper deal last July 13th. In 33  Class-AAA innings prior to the trade, Webb had the best stretch of his young career. Over that stretch, he struck out 12.7 batters per nine innings while walking just three batters total. His groundball rate also crept above 50 percent for the first time in his minor league career. His opponents’ BABIP (.366) was his only real blemish.

Webb’s fortunes changed upon arrival in Colorado Springs. The lefty’s strikeouts per nine dipped below ten (9.2) and his walks per nine shot up to 3.8. Batters continued to hit for a high BABIP (.362). After his success in the Yankees system during the first half, he second half of 2017 ended up being the worst stretch of his minor league career. Webb posted a 6.06 FIP along with a 6.48 ERA.

Last season’s debut stretch with the Brewers will hold Webb back, but it should be noted he was pitching his home games in Colorado Springs, which is notoriously one of the most hitter-friendly parks in professional baseball. Additionally, it’s only 16.7 innings of bad pitching being considered here.

Webb isn’t coming out of nowhere, either. From 2014 to 2016, he posted a FIP at or below 3.74 for the Yankees Class-AAA Scranton/Wilkes-Barre. He posted a K/9 above 9.7 in each season while never walking more than 3.1 per nine innings. There’s evidence that shows Webb’s troubling second half of 2017 was a blip on an otherwise stellar track record.

A lack of velocity on his fastball makes scouts wary about his future prospects. In 2017, Webb’s average fastball velocity was under 92 MPH, which is down from the 93 MPH+ fastball he flashed in 2015. Webb’s two other pitches, his slider, and changeup hover around 80 MPH. It’s hard for scouts and analysts to be convinced of a pitcher with Webb’s velocity in 2018. At the same time, his strikeout rate shows he can still dominate without the velocity.

Webb would provide another southpaw arm out of a bullpen that will employ just two left-handers, Hader and Logan. Hader won’t be employed in matchup situations, he’s going to the Brewers’ long-man. Logan, although a successful lefty specialist throughout his career, pitched in just 21 innings last season. There will come a point this bullpen will need another lefty to face the Anthony Rizzo’s and Joey Votto’s of the National League Central.

With all the hoopla surrounding the Brewers outfield and the confusion about how the rotation and second base will shake out, the bullpen is being overlooked. Webb is one of many interesting arms getting a look this Spring Training. If he pitches anything like he did prior to July of last season, his name should be penciled into a roster spot later this month.

Photo Credit: Orlando Ramirez, USAToday Sports Images

That type of season is valuable, even if 1.4 wins over what is essentially a full season for Aguilar seems uninspiring.  He was a good pinch hitting option, as his OPS while pinch hitting was .768. Aguilar provided a solid backup or platoon option for when Eric Thames was hurt or unavailable.  Additionally, he was valuable from a roster-building perspective because he was earning the major league minimum salary.  In fact, despite debuting in 2014, Aguilar lost his rookie eligibility just last year.

On the surface, then, he seems like the kind of player who a club would love to have.  He is a productive and cost-controlled bat, and he makes Craig Counsell’s job easier because there are no questions about who the best pinch hitting option is.  The question is more complicated, though, because Aguilar’s limited versatility raises questions about his viability on this roster.

In a perfect world (for him), Aguilar’s role on the 2018 Brewers looks a lot like last season.  He plays first base two or three times per week, and he fills in on a full-time basis when Thames inevitably misses some time with an injury.  He is the bench bat who the Brewers look to in their highest-leverage situations, and he provides similar value.  This is not a far-fetched scenario, as Aguilar has already proven he can do it.

But the 2018 Brewers are not the 2017 Brewers.  The additions of Lorenzo Cain and Christian Yelich have given the club more offensive talent in the outfield, and Ryan Braun has begun to get some playing time at first base this spring.  As Ron Washington taught all of us, first base is not as easy as it seems; but if the Braun-to-first-base experiment proves successful, then presumably Braun would be Thames’ platoon partner so that Domingo Santana and Keon Broxton can each get into the lineup against lefties.  And with Braun at first base in those games, Aguilar is left without a path to the starting lineup.

Aguilar’s defensive limitations come into play here as well.  In his 102 big league games, he has played just three innings at a defensive position other than first base (2.0 innings at third in 2014 and 1.0 inning at third last season).  In the minor leagues, he played nearly 7,000 innings at first base and just 173 elsewhere.  He is a first baseman/designated hitter in a league that doesn’t have a designated hitter, so his lineup utility is limited.  He can either start at first base or he can pinch hit; he cannot really be used any other way.

In eras past, this would not matter as much as it does today.  Olmedo Saenz made a career out of pinch hitting, as he had more games as a pinch hitter than at any other single position.  But bullpens have expanded since Saenz last appeared in the big leagues in 2007, and teams are less likely to carry purely offensive options.  This puts a premium on defensive versatility, as teams are looking for players that can play multiple positions so that one player can spell three or four instead of having dedicated backups at each position.  The Brewers themselves acknowledged the value of versatility with their signing of Eric Sogard and continued employment of Hernan Perez.  Neither player is particularly inspiring, but they can both hit just enough and can fill in suitably at several positions.  Perez allows Counsell to use the same person as a backup at second base, third base, shortstop, and each outfield spot.  This allows the Brewers the flexibility to carry the additional reliever they have said they plan on rostering this season.

An eight-man bullpen means there are four bench spots open (thirteen pitchers plus the eight offensive starters), and one of those will go to a backup catcher.  Another will go to a backup shortstop (presumably whichever of Hernan Perez or Jonathan Villar does not get the bulk of the second base playing time), and another will go to either Domingo Santana or Keon Broxton (depending on trades).  This leaves just one bench spot open for Aguilar to fight over with another infielder, such as Sogard or Mauricio Dubon, or with another outfielder, such as Brett Phillips or Broxton/Santana if neither is traded.  There could be one additional spot available if the Brewers don’t keep a fifth starter on the 25-man roster at all times, but any long stretch of games without an off-day will require that fifth starter to be on the roster consistently.

Much of this roster crunch was present last year, but Aguilar remained on the roster.  Braun’s experiment at first base changes the calculus, though.  If Braun can be the short side of a first base platoon, then Aguilar is redundant on this roster because he cannot play any other position.  And because Aguilar is out of options (he spent three years in the minors with Cleveland), the Brewers cannot stash him in the minor leagues and wait to see if/when Thames or Braun gets hurt.  Instead, the Brewers would have to keep him on the big league roster all season.

Aguilar had a fantastic season with the Brewers last year, and he was certainly a key part of their surprising success.  But the club has continued to improve its roster, and there simply doesn’t seem to be a place for Aguilar anymore.  And because there simply isn’t a trade market for journeyman first base platoon options, he is a candidate to be cut at the end of spring training.  While we may have fond memories of his contributions last season, the additions of more talented players have made him expendable on the current roster.

Photo Credit: Orlando Ramirez, USAToday Sports Images

The Brewers have 13 position players in camp with a legitimate shot at making the Opening Day roster, excluding catchers. Likely, one of the outfielders and one of the infielders below will find themselves cut. Regardless, observe the ridiculous amount of positional coverage this club boasts:

Position-by-position, it breaks down like this:

I would assume that one of Keon Broxton and Brett Phillips will be cut by April, and I think Jesus Aguilar is facing an uphill battle as well. But regardless, the Brewers will feature five outfielders capable of playing every position, a few infielders capable of covering the outfield, and three competent multi-position middle infielders beyond Gold Glove-level shortstop Orlando Arcia. That’s an embarrassment of riches, and I’m excited to see what David Stearns, Craig Counsell and the rest can squeeze out of these possibilities.

It’s possible this team will be running out different lineups every day. Ryan Braun will probably require regular rest. Eric Thames had gigantic platoon splits, with a .918 OPS against righties and just a .658 mark against southpaws. Hernan Perez can play just about anywhere, but has possibly the least consistent bat of the entire roster. As you run down the roster, you can find flaws and strengths with every name on the list. But with the way these players can fit together, there should be a right combination for all situations.

Check out just how well this team could exploit the platoon advantage:

With multiple options of each hand at each position other than the least valuable (first base), the Brewers shouldn’t have to worry at all about opposing LOOGYs or ROOGYs. Righties hit 12 percent better with the platoon advantage, and for lefties it was a lofty 22 percent. The Brewers should be able to enjoy the platoon advantage a majority of the time with this lineup, and particularly in high-leverage at-bats.

Milwaukee batters had the platoon advantage just over half the time in 2017. If the Brewers can add another 450 or so plate appearances with the platoon advantage in 2018, they should be able to squeeze out an extra 10 runs (approximately one win). Either the Brewers can make that happen with their bevy of options, or some of the hitters stay so hot you can’t take their bats out of the lineup. And no matter what, the bench will have strong late-game options.

This lineup will take a bit of managing, but the Brewers haven’t just assembled a solid roster, they’ve gathered a bunch of pieces that fit very well together. Those are the kind of advantages they’ll need to exploit in order to truly compete with teams like the Cubs and the Dodgers in the National League. With the right touch, this Brewers squad could produce well beyond what they appear capable of on first glance.

Photo Credit: Orlando Ramirez, USAToday Sports Images

It’s easy to jump on that train of thought. Villar struggled last year, Sogard faded badly down the stretch, and Walker departed in pursuit of greener pastures. On the other hand, Walker is 32 years old and the resources required to sign him could probably be better allocated towards bolstering the starting quintet. Sogard is a fine, if expendable, bench type, and a healthy Villar has the potential to be a difference-maker on both sides of the ball.

“Healthy” here being the operative word.

What you have to remember about Villar’s 2017 is this: On June 9, he dove hard for a ball in the hole, bounced off the grass, and was subsequently carted off the field with a back strain. His absence opened the door for Sogard, and, well, you know the rest of the story.

To be fair, Villar had scarcely been setting the league aflame before the injury, hitting just .213/.283/.342 with a sky-high strikeout rate of 30.6 percent. But news emerged last week that even this performance was marred by ill health. Following the World Baseball Classic, Villar battled a tight right shoulder through the early stretches of 2017. That could help explain, for example, why one of the fastest players in baseball was only able to muster a .294 BABIP before he hit the DL. Even so, he ran a healthy 8.9 percent walk rate and a 72.3 percent contact rate, not hugely far from the 11.6 and 75.2 rates he posted in his breakout 2016.

After Villar returned to Milwaukee on June 27, his batting average and BABIP the rest of the way ticked back up to where you’d expect them to be. The second baseman hit .275 and .373, respectively, compared to .285 and .373 in 2016. But he lost control of the strike zone, perhaps due to the sporadic playing time he received upon his return. His walk rate plummeted to an uncharacteristic 4.3 percent post-injury, as Villar swung and missed more often and his contact rate plunged to 69.4 percent. He’s always been an aggressive player with more than his share of strikeouts, but his career 9.1 walk rate indicates that something was wrong post-injury, be it lingering effects of his injury or an inability to settle in as a part-time player.

This winter, Villar set about righting that wrong, taking video cues from plate-discipline-demigod Joey Votto with him to winter ball in the Dominican Republic. Expect to see Villar altering his two-strike approach this season, perhaps choking up on the bat to shorten his stroke. It worked for him in the Dominican Winter League, where he hit over .300 (albeit with limited power) and posted identical strikeout and walk rates of 11.8 percent over 76 plate appearances. It’s a tiny sample, to be sure, but it represents some progress for a player whose return to form could elevate the Milwaukee lineup to world-class. The booming ground-rule double with which he welcomed Shohei Ohtani to the major leagues is a little something more to dream on.

As Opening Day draws nearer, remember this: Even if he doesn’t repeat his monster 2016, Villar offers the Brewers a killer combination of youth and upside. This is a player who mashed 19 home runs and stole 62 bases as recently as 2016. I’ve already made the case that Villar could one day hit for even more power. 2018 will be his age-27 campaign, so there’s every reason to believe that he has plenty left in his legs. Give the man health and regular playing time, and Brewers fans may yet wish he’d signed that $20 million extension before last year.

Photo Credit: Matt Kartozian, USA Today Sports Images

That’s fine for a number of reasons. First of all, while the Brewrs’ rotation is far from great, the addition of Jhoulys Chacin and the assumed summer return of Jimmy Nelson can add a solid base behind Zach Davies and Chase Anderson. And second of all, after nearly a decade and change of Doug Melvin in Milwaukee’s front office, we should know better than to assume Brewers general managers are telling the truth to the media. And finally, while the Brewers are looking to contend in 2018, their best days are still assumed to be a year or two away, and the Brewers don’t want to overcommit in this market.

But thanks to the promise showed by last season’s team, contention is looking more and more like a near-term dream as opposed to a long-term one. With pitchers like Jake Arrieta, Jeremy Hellickson and Alex Cobb still available this season, I think the Brewers need to consider striking again. Financial flexibility may seem like a valuable asset, but take a look at the market of free agent pitchers slated to hit the market in 2019, per MLB Trade Rumors (2019 season age in parenthesis):