Stearns just loudly answered that question this trade deadline.

What is fascinating about each of these trades is that they are fantastic in the sense of bolstering an MLB roster, in order to ensure that this stretch run features as few weaknesses as possible, while also potentially being over-pays in each case. Yet it should be stressed that these overpays are palatable for several reasons: the Brewers maintain a largely controllable roster that is also relatively inexpensive; the Brewers have a relatively large set of players that have been minor leaguers long enough to need potential 40-man roster protection entering 2019; and, perhaps most importantly, there is an incredible amount of role risk involved with each player. These trades should provide grounds for further analysis into when and how potential overpays are helpful to a team, and they should certainly provide further evidence that WARP/$ is not the sole determination of a trade’s potential value or impact.

Grading the System: 2016 || 2017

• Make no mistake about it, in terms of developing multiple quality pitches, command, and velocity, Luis Ortiz could potentially have the best pitching role for the Brewers system; there was a time, two years ago even, where it would not have been absurd for Ortiz to fight for a top tier pitching role in the prospect ranking cycle (and, really, it was not absurd). But Ortiz has been around forever in the advanced minors, it seems, without working full seasons. For example, the injury-fighting righty has 225 innings at Double-A without working 100 innings in a season, and with 68 innings at the 2018 deadline he could potentially miss 100 innings once again. If Ortiz can take his next step forward in the Orioles’ system, he is absolutely a more valuable asset, in terms of roster surplus, than Jonathan Schoop (and it is not close!!!), but that strong 60 Overall Future Potential (OFP) / 50 likely grade entering 2017 looks much more improbable. Ortiz is eligible for the Rule 5 draft for the 2019 season and almost certainly must be protected by the Orioles.

• Jean Carmona just made the jump stateside for the Brewers in 2018, and thus remains a full four levels away from the MLB. Additionally, Carmona might even be another year away from a clearly defined MLB potential role. In this regard, I do not envy the job of MLB scouts and analytics personnel, as it’s not entirely clear for me how I would price Carmona’s potential future value in terms of long-term systemic development.

• At BP Milwaukee, Kyle Lesniewski describe the roles and risks associated with both Kodi Medeiros and Wilber Perez. Medeiros could become an impact reliever at the MLB level, and it’s not unlikely that some observers still believe that he could start in some capacity, as there will always be hold outs for that sort of role. Given Medeiros’s delivery and command profile, however, as well as his fastball, Lesniewski outlines the difficulties that Medeiros may have for reaching even an impact reliever profile. Medeiros is eligible for the Rule 5 draft entering the 2019 season, and almost certainly must be protected by the White Sox, while Perez had yet to play stateside in the Brewers system.

• Finally, I already detailed the roles and surplus value for Brett Phillips and Jorge Lopez, so I will not go into too much detail here. However, I will add that of each of the prospects included in this midseason deals, Phillips is arguably the most likely to have MLB floor and ceiling roles that both surpass the value of the trade return (which is not a knock against Mike Moustakas, he simply might only be in Milwaukee for a couple of months). With a prospect such as Corey Ray coming on strong in Double-A Biloxi, not to mention the considerable development of Troy Stokes Jr. at the advanced level as well, Milwaukee cannot necessarily lose sleep over trading away a depth outfielder from their stacked group when they are fighting a close divisional deficit and leading the National League Wild Card race.

So, readers will witness a couple of recurring facts in these trades: the Brewers largely traded away players that must be protected for 2019 to avoid their loss via the Rule 5 draft, or players with little-to-no stateside development experience (and thus years to reach MLB), and/or players with roles that may be replicated within a year. One need not believe that a player like Stokes will surpass Phillips, in terms of overall ceiling, to see the value of the young prospect’s potential to fill an MLB depth position in 2019. Phillips himself may not have had an opportunity in 2019 to take such a role. The same logic might apply to Quintin Torres-Costa and Bubba Derby. This should not be construed to mean that these current system prospects are categorically better than Phillips / Medeiros / Lopez; in fact, I would have ranked each of that trio ahead of their potential 2019 depth replacements. But once again, since systemic development, contending windows, and player development cycles are now orbiting a club that is contending for consecutive seasons (and the foreseeable future, hopefully), if it costs system depth roles to improve MLB weaknesses, the Brewers have to eat the risk of losing those ceilings.

I like when MLB trades can simply be called good baseball moves. For all the rebuilding narratives in Baltimore, Kansas City, and Chicago, the White Sox, Royals, and Orioles front offices arguably made sensible trades with quality returns that both have long and short time horizons and development cycles. Milwaukee is working as a true contender without trading from their most elite potential prospect stash. This is good all around.

Stearns priced out these converging development cycles and adroitly moved the future role risk to address an offense that absolutely needed help for a serious contending run. Just the other day I wrote, “At worst, Travis Shaw has simply begun a potential shift over to the right side of the infield, where he might serve as a viable first base option for 2019 should the Brewers and Moustakas exercise his mutual option for 2019,” without thinking that a realistic move to first base for Shaw could occur as early as this week. Now, with Jonathan Schoop in the mix for second base and Jesus Aguilar slumping, Shaw becomes a strong side platoon option at 1B to form a serious infield unit:

This infield could open 2019 should Stearns consider keeping both Moustakas and Schoop, and now the talk can turn to development cycles once more. While the Brewers continue to season second baseman Keston Hiura at the most advanced levels of the minor leagues, Schoop basically serves as an upgrade over the Jonathan Villar gamble (gambling that he’ll return to his 2016 form), thus giving the Brewers a quality starting option while Hiura completes his minor league development. While Hiura’s bat is arguably ready for the MLB, and has been mentioned as a potential MLB option by Baseball Prospectus in their latest Top 50 list, the infielder may need more work in the field after missing significant fielding development time due to an extended elbow injury. Once Hiura is ready in 2019, a Schoop / Hiura mix simply extends the #TeamDepth mantra, and the same can arguably said for the remainder of the infield.

Entering 2018, the Brewers system took a step back in terms of organizational rankings, due to a series of developmental setbacks for key prospects, MLB graduations, and trades. I began to highlight this during last year’s “Grading the System” feature, but as one can never predict baseball, the development cycles and potential OFP assessments calibrated for Corey Ray, Keston Hiura answered a crucial risk question (can he play 2B?), and a veritable gang of pop-up pitchers continued to march upward in the system, potentially boosting and extending the no-name, depth-oriented pitching staff into 2019. Make no mistake about it, the system might continue to rank in the middle of the league in terms of overall quality, and the set of clear potential impact roles (true 60 OFP+ roles) may end with Keston Hiura and Corey Ray should Corbin Burnes exhaust his rookie standing through the end of 2018.

Yet, given the instant development of 2018 First Round draft pick Brice Turang, the Brewers could demonstrate that they indeed nabbed an Elite Prep prospect that fell due to prospect fatigue. Turang could quickly help to boost the top of the system as an MLB potential role falls into place. Moreover, given the Brewers’ expanded efforts in International signings, as well as the quality use of signing bonus allocations in each of the last two MLB drafts, the lower minors could continue to host a variety of players that suddenly surge onto the prospect scene. While this does not make the Brewers system different than many other MLB systems, it provides a road map to how the club can continue to develop talent while contending. One could argue that it’s absurd to suggest that the Brewers “rely” on someone like Turang falling in the MLB draft, but this is exactly the type of prospect perception and role foresight that the Brewers must have if they are going to succeed while drafting in the bottom half of each round.

Of course, the notable graduations from the system should not be undersold as well. Now there are so many starters, depth roles, and trades from the Brewers prospect stock that I added a new category this year:

Now, with these graduates in mind, what does a somewhat thinner, but still rather interesting Brewers system look like?

Prospect Key
Top 10 Consideration
Top 30 Consideration
[Just Interesting]

Of course, it is also worth emphasizing how the system has been….decimated in key areas. Given the quick development by advanced prospects acquired from the major 2015-2016 trades, as well as the huge trades entering 2018 and during the recent deadlines, the pool of potential impact prospects acquiring via trade has waned:

This is an important category to consider simply because Milwaukee demonstrated how adroit trades could quickly rebuild a system and reform an MLB roster. It will be worth watching to see if the Stearns continues to attempt to find Jonathan Villar and Keon Broxton types via trade now that the club is solidly contending. Of course, one could argue that Stearns is always trying to find this player (be it Oliver Drake, or Jesus Aguilar, or even Alec Asher), but that it simply the fact that these players will not always come via trade.

Thanks to the mechanical corrections, good health, and overall development of Corey Ray, as well as the surging role of Troy Stokes Jr., the development of draft prospects arguably has a better outlook entering 2019 than it did prior to 2018. Given the advancement of Corbin Burnes into a relief role, Brandon Woodruff and Taylor Williams into respective swingman and depth relief roles, and Brett Phillips into a fourth outfielder, it is clear that the Brewers front office is considering all possible role developments with each player (rather than following a cookie cutter model, or a model in which each prospect must immediately receive playing time in their clearest future role). It is arguable that this type of development strategy could maximize roles ranging from Stokes to Zack Brown, Jake Gatewood, and maybe even Lucas Erceg.

Meanwhile, Milwaukee signed a couple of additional potential impact International Amateur free agents this July, continuing an attempt to build up the low minors. Carlos Rodriguez and Larry Ernesto are already making some noise in the Dominican Summer League, while prospects like Jose Sibrian and Jesus Lujano have made the leap stateside.

Frankly, this Brewers system will not look as strong, in terms of potentially elite impacts roles, as the one that received ranking for 2018 at Baseball Prospectus. Yet, as new cycles of player development depth emerge in the low minors, and the Brewers continue their unique form of MLB roster construction (clearly using all 40 roster spots for MLB-adjacent roles and frequently shuffling those roles), Milwaukee could be an organizational well-suited to do more with less. For if 2017 fired the opening shot that the Brewers can contend simply based on giving high floor players a chance to work in the MLB, 2018 is advancing that ideal and carrying it to deeper logical, promotional, and transactional extensions.

Photo Credit: Gary A. Vasquez, USA Today Sports Images

That ends today, when righty Freddy Peralta takes the mound in a spot start for the Brewers. Peralta is listed at 5’11”, 175 pounds, and quickly gained a reputation among the trio of Lind starters for a potential MLB role. In 2016, Peralta surged through Class-A Wisconsin, striking out 77 batters in 60 innings, while maintaining a relatively solid command profile. What is particularly interesting about Peralta is that the prospect allowed 35 percent ground ball rate in 2016, which ticked up to 51 percent when he was promoted to Advanced-A Brevard County before falling again in 2017. Thus far in 2018, Peralta made a strong transition to the difficult pitching confines of Triple-A Colorado Springs, bumping his ground ball rate up to 54 percent to go along with that big strike out rate (this time it’s 46 strike outs in 34.7 IP thus far). But now prospect analysts and fans can surmise Peralta’s groundball approach from his scouting profile: the righty is a moving fastball specialist, and one wonders if his repeated mechanical development and arsenal adjustments is allowing him to keep the ball on the ground at a more steady rate.

Freddy Peralta is a potential back-end rotation starter, but in Milwaukee that does not necessarily mean what it says, for two reasons. In the first case, one must emphasize that potential scouting roles, even those scouted in the advance minors, are not the be-all, end-all of player development; in fact, the David Stearns Brewers should demonstrate specifically how player development windows are much longer than the A-to-A+-to-AA-and-AAA progression. Zach Davies is a fantastic comparison for Peralta here, both in terms of advanced minors role (Davies was scouted as a high-floor back-end rotation arm prior to his debut), and diminutive arsenal development at the MLB level. Davies, the back-end sinker/change up pitcher, entered 2018 having prevented approximately 15 runs through 388.7 innings, which is quite strong at the back end. This does not necessarily mean that Peralta is a guaranteed rotational success (in fact, his scouting floor might ultimately place him in the bullpen, which is not necessarily a bad thing), but it is at the very least a hint that Milwaukee is a place where player development can extend to the MLB in an extremely positive manner.

Second, Freddy Peralta, along with Davies, Brent Suter, Junior Guerra, Jacob Barnes, Jeremy Jeffress, Oliver Drake, and even Chase Anderson, is one of the faces of the Brewers current pitching-first, depth-based strategy. The organization has been built around acquiring pitchers with very specific, and quite intriguing, profiles in the age of fireballing velocity around the MLB: the Brewers are a generally a slow-throwing bunch, and when they’re not a slow-throwing bunch, they are typically focused on change-up / curveball / cutter / splitter arsenals. Perhaps this is a feature that will become clearer over time with more player acquisitions, but thus far it seems unmistakable that Stearns and pitching coach Derek Johnson prefer a very particular type of profile to feed ground balls to the extremely efficient groundball defense.

This offseason, Freddy Peralta was featured as one of the Top 20 prospects in the system by Baseball Prospectus. Scott Delp wrote:

“One reason for the lack of hype is that Peralta has no show-stopping pitches. The fastball tops out at just 92, but he cuts it, runs it, sinks it, and can move it all around the zone. The changes in speed and movement allow him to keep hitters off balance. He is especially good at locating up in the zone to put hitters away. He also has a potentially plus slider with good late bite that he throws 84-86. He is looking for a reliable third pitch and can flash average with both a curve and change, but neither pitch has any consistency right now.”

Delp also added an essay to the end of the list, arguing that Peralta should be in the Top Ten, writing “Then there is profile bias. Certain players can get less notice because they are lacking the profile that we feel is necessary for true success.” Peralta fits this mold, as Delp noted:

“The conventional wisdom says that guys without a big fastball and without the classic pitcher’s body can only have success by either having a lot of deception in their deliveries or by having elite command. Peralta’s command is just a bit above average and, while he throws slightly across his body which gives him some deception, his results mostly come from his ability to change speeds and looks with his fastball and to mix his other pitches to keep hitters off balance.”

Peralta’s size and profile, in this sense, scream relief risk, and maybe a potential impact relief role or impact swingman role (like a righty Suter), for the future. But there’s a glimpse in a moving fastball arsenal that perhaps Peralta could stick in a back-end rotational role should his command continue to develop at the MLB (and, I’d add, that he continues his positive ground ball rate progression). Suddenly, though, Milwaukee is also becoming such a good pitching environment that one can squint at guys like Peralta and sense that maybe this is the best system in which for Peralta to work.

For Brewers fans wondering why the club did not acquire a pitcher such as Lance Lynn, Alex Cobb, Jeremy Hellickson, or Jake Arrieta during the offseason, and instead opted to work with Wade Miley and Jhoulys Chacin as the major rotational acquisitions, the Freddy Peralta promotion should serve as one particular answer. The Brewers are already exercising their depth, with Wade Miley injured, Brent Suter and Brandon Woodruff as swingmen, and Junior Guerra excelling. Moreover, though, the Brewers have correctly assessed a league filled with pitching attrition, and today the club will become the fourth National League team to work with eight starting pitchers thus far. Through roughly a quarter of the season, only one NL team (Colorado) has used five starters, and overall teams have used 102 pitchers to fill their rotation spots.

Milwaukee has designed their rotation to work with their advanced minors depth, and if fans are exciting about Freddy Peralta working, they should think about Corbin Burnes potentially taking the next rotational availability when needed. But that’s just one of many possibilities, as even newly-recalled Alec Asher fits the Stearns-Johnson Pitcher Factory profile as a relatively low velocity, sinker / cutter / change / curve hurler. Before too long, Milwaukee will probably have ten starting pitchers in the mix at the MLB level in 2018, and that’s before one even considers Jimmy Nelson’s position with the club. The rotation is quite serviceable with this approach (approximately -6 runs prevented thus far), and the mix-and-match rotational profile is basically serving as early innings damage mitigation prior to handing the ball off to an elite bullpen (24 runs prevented!). So, Peralta enters a successful pitching staff and an organization that seems perfectly suited for his continued development: here the hope is that the righty gets to showcase his best stuff today, and make the next decision regarding a spot start or an extended call-up a little tougher amidst all the future competition from Miley, Guerra, Nelson, and Burnes.

On the other side of the deal, only one of the teenagers had made it out of rookie league ball. Maybe they could pitch; maybe they couldn’t. Nobody quite knew.

David Stearns and his team had a hunch though, so they pulled the trigger on a deal that was all the more gutsy for the fact that it came just two months into the young GM’s Milwaukee tenure. Adam Lind took his stick to Seattle, and the youth movement quietly dispersed among the Brewers’ minor league affiliates.

The move garnered mixed reviews. There were the casual fans who liked Lind’s stats and were agog that no member of the return had ever graced an organizational top prospect list. There were the newly-minted Stearns acolytes who preached process over production and saw the move as a bold step towards a brighter, faraway future. Even the BP Milwaukee staff couldn’t quite decide. Jack Moore, while recognizing that the mediocre Lind was “a better baseball player for the spectator than he is for the general manager,” concluded that the trade was “one of those times” that “rebuilding just feels like getting robbed.” JP Breen, meanwhile, viewed the transaction as “an attempt to acquire quantity and quality,” and “a conscious attempt at acquiring high-end prospects—just a year or two before they become high-end prospects.”

That was the fun of this trade. Nobody knew what to make of it at the time, and nobody really would until considerable time had passed.

Two years later, the shadowy shapes of a narrative are starting to emerge.

We’ll start with Lind. In 2016, Lind batted .239 for the Mariners with 20 home runs, a free-falling walk rate, and a .240 TAv. He was worth -0.8 WARP. Suffice it to say that this is not a high bar for Stearns and company to clear. Then again, Stearns’ hurdlers are the kind of prospects who very, very rarely pan out.

Carlos Herrera, the youngest of the group at just over 20, has enjoyed a steady, if unspectacular, climb up the organizational rungs. He pitched the 2016 season in the Arizona League, soaking up 50 innings and plenty of sun en route to a 4.50 ERA / 4.48 DRA campaign. He fanned 49 and walked 12. He started 2017 in Helena, where batters brutalized him to the tune of a 7.49 DRA. But Milwaukee liked his strikeouts (11.1 per nine) and potential, so they bumped him to Appleton mid-season. He recorded a 3.79 ERA for the Timber Rattlers in 38 innings. But somewhere along his journey from Montana, he lost half his strikeouts and doubled his walks, so his 4.97 DRA tells a different story.

Still, Herrera is an interesting arm, if also a slender one. At 6’2” and 150 pounds, he has some trouble filling out his uniform. But he sits in the low-90s, slings the ball from a low, three-quarters slot, and can cut and sink his fastball and spin a decent curve. If he fills out and develops his lagging changeup, he could worm his way into the mid-to-back end of a Milwaukee rotation one day. Failing that, it’s not altogether difficult to envision a home in the bullpen. First, he’ll need to rediscover the command that allowed him to strike out 26 batters and walk only five in Helena. The lanky righty does have a few believers; per BP’s Jeffrey Paternostro, “there’s something about Herrera, man.”

On the opposite end of the age spectrum lies Daniel Missaki, a six-foot righty who turned heads in rookie ball in 2013 and 2014 and held his own in the Midwest League in 2015 before snapping a ligament and succumbing to Tommy John. It’s been a rough road for Missaki since: he missed all of 2016 recovering, and a second Tommy John surgery wiped out last season. He has yet to throw a pitch for a Brewers affiliate. Before the rash of injuries, Missaki drew praise for his strong command, which he complemented with lively fastball and surprising secondaries; his changeup, in particular, turned heads. Missaki still has youth on his side, but the balky elbow seriously clouds his future.

That leaves Freddy Peralta as the goldilocks prospect, at 20 years and five months old. Peralta doesn’t have a conventional starter’s build, standing at 5’11” and tipping the scales at 175 pounds. He also lacks premium velocity on his fastball. But the pitch dances all over the strike zone and pairs well with what could turn into an excellent mid-80s slider. Peralta can go slower, too pulling the string on a decent changeup and trying to spin in a curve every now and then, though the latter pitch trails the former. It’s a decent profile that could easily work in the ‘pen, even if his size keeps him from the starting five.

And then there are the results. Last season, Peralta posterized opposing hitters with rare impunity. He started the year in the Carolina League, where a sorry string of regretful batters struck out 78 times in 56.3 innings. A high helping of walks tempered expectations, but the kid only allowed 6.2 hits per nine innings and was bumped to Biloxi in June after posting a 3.49 DRA. He was even better at AA, tossing 63.7 frames of 2.15 DRA ball with 91 strikeouts and 31 walks (while facing batters that were, on average, three years his senior). Even if he’s never more than a mid-rotation MLB arm, he put on an electrifying show in 2017.

It may still too early to draw firm conclusions about the Adam Lind trade. But we could be calling it the Freddy Peralta trade pretty soon, and Carlos Herrera may not be too far behind. (We can talk about Daniel Missaki whenever he’s next able to throw a pitch.) Right now, David Stearns’s bold move is looking very, very shrewd.

This is a fascinating development for a franchise that has not been known for pitching, and fans and analysts may have to get used to this scenario: the arms are ahead of the bats across the system. In 2017, while consecutive first round draft picks Corey Ray and Trent Clark backpedaled, pop-up pitcher Corbin Burnes posted a phenomenal year and saw his stuff tick ahead after noted mechanical adjustments in his delivery. But the pitching development hardly ends with Burnes, who exemplifies the current stock of middle-to-back end rotation starting pitching prospects that grade out as thoroughly solid quality within that role; reports cooled on Cody Ponce, but he had a ho hum innings building season, as did Luis Ortiz at Class-AA; Freddy Peralta was chasing Burnes for most impactful pitching season within the minors; his trademate Carlos Herrera took a big step forward in full season ball; and behind these quality depth options, Trey Supak, Josh Pennington, and others still had quite fine seasons.

Related Reading:
2017 Brewers Minors: Bats

There is a type of depth with these pitchers that simply cannot be matched by the current bats in the Brewers system. Currently, the bats feature multiple risk factors, especially in terms of developing hit tools. This profile not only suits graduates Lewis Brinson and Brett Phillips, but also the aforementioned Clark and Ray, among others. Perhaps the selection of Keston Hiura in the 2017 draft is most important to counteract this risky trend, although Hiura simply reapplies that risk in a different area of the game. If the Brewers bats currently fit the profile of “could be big tools impact” / “might not make it out of a bench role,” the arms are quite the opposite, with no true top-end pitching prospect in the system. It’s a beautiful thing: not one ace. But among those non-aces, perhaps a number of starters that could prove as “boring” as Zach Davies, or have question marks answered like Chase Anderson or even Jimmy Nelson.

One gets the sense that these Brewers arms could be plugged in the rotation any which way, which should be considered an exciting affair given the recent hype of pitching coach Derek Johnson’s blank-slate, situational-personal coaching approach. It should also be mentioned that in an era of velocity, the top Milwaukee arms are hardly flamethrowers, which adds an interesting question about whether the Brewers are exploiting undervalued aspects of the game (I know that’s a played out question by now, but still…), or simply whether the Brewers have found a profile of arm that fits their system or organizational approach.

To accompany the statistical index of 2017 Brewers minor league bats, I have prepared an index of statistics for the 2017 arms in the affiliated ranks. To provide basic consistency with the survey range for the bats, I translated the initial scale of 50 batting PA to 16.7 pitching IP for assessing seasons. This largely produced a similar number of players across leagues, which also means that league median statistic figures should have a solid range to reflect statistical context.

I choose the method of indexing statistics because it is relatively straightforward in terms of user interface: every metric can be measured against a “constant” or comparison variable, such as “Player Total Average (TAv)” versus “League TAv.” In an index, 1.00 can basically be read as “average,” for it means that a player’s metric perfectly matches the comparison metric. For example, righty Eric Hanhold played his age-23 season at Class-Advanced A Carolina, where the median age was also 23; his index is therefore 1.00 for that statistic.

It should be noted that I calculated the index in a different way for pitching prospects in order to remain consistent with the batting index. This means that an overall index greater than 1.00 suggests that a pitcher’s OPS-allowed was better than the average contextual indicators in the league, and that an index below 1.00 means that pitcher was below average given the context of the league. In order to provide additional context to an index that only weighs age, park factor, and opposing OPS alongside OPS-allowed, I added a Deserved Run Average (DRA) index so that readers can compare outcomes and reflect on the validity of the OPS-allowed index.

This index is slightly different than the batting index, since there are different OPS values for pitchers and their opponents (for example, a batter is facing tougher opposition if the opposing OPS is lower; for pitchers, tougher opposition means higher OPS from opponents). For this reason:

+1.00 Age Index means “younger” than league average age.

+1.00 oppOPS Index means better than average opponents (compared to the league).

+1.00 Park Index means hitter’s park.

This index should not be read as a significant, be-all / end-all assessment of pitching performance. Instead, it should be read alongside other statistics and scouting reports as an indicator of the context in which the pitcher performed, as well as how their advanced performance (via DRA) compared to the league.

A few observations:

• Like the batting index, the “non-prospects” immediately dominate this pitching index. Trey Supak has been a deep cut since the Brewers acquired the projection-upside play in the Jason Rogers trade, and the righty worked what finally would be his first full season….at age 21. Taylor Jungmann is hardly even old for Class-AAA Colorado Springs as an organizational depth option. Quiet relief prospect Bubba Derby, a member of the Khris Davis trade, worked a season that matches the “contextual” aspects of Corbin Burnes or Supak (his trademate Jacob Nottingham also had a fine season on the batting index). Freddy Peralta looks like loads of fun, bringing numerous fastball and off-speed / breaking ball offerings and a funky delivery to keep hitters off balance. In this case, the command aspects (and delivery repetition due to a crossfire set-up) of the scouting report should be read alongside the index to round out future role and expectations, but it is undeniable that Peralta placed himself on the radar of quality organizational depth (at worst) in 2017.

• Cody Ponce had quite an interesting year in terms of DRA deviating from his other contextual factors. In terms of OPS, age, and park factors, Ponce scored well in both Carolina and Biloxi. Yet, the righty’s DRA did not stack up against either league, with DRA index of 0.86 and 0.97 in both assignments, respectively. The big righty is making his way up the organizational ladder, however, and it’s tough not to dream on that cutter or fastball at least helping Ponce secure a solid bullpen role of some sort.

• BP scouting team member James Fisher provided a detailed description of Jordan Yamamoto for last season’s midseason prospect feature, noting that delivery refinements and stuff progression drove the righty’s stock. Yamamoto continued to build on that 2016 notice with an excellent 2017 campaign, arguably putting together the most interesting pitching season in the organization (Burnes received the hype, but Yamamoto could have defined a role).The righty was extremely young for the Carolina League, and if the progression continues, the youngster could be primed to expand on a 140+ IP floor during his age-22 season at Class-AA Biloxi. It is worth noting that Yamamoto did not face tough competition in Carolina, although the funky park factors and his age did mightily correct for that indicator. If you’re skeptical about the index, DRA likes Yamamoto even more.

• Additional potential 2018 pop-ups / projection guys who posted better than average contextual index and DRA scores: Zack Brown, Josh Pennington, Braden Webb, and Thomas Jankins. Keep an eye on: Parker Berberet (!!!), Luis Ortiz, Jorge Lopez, Matt Ramsey, and Jon Perrin.

So where does one move from here?

Related Reading
Part 2: Familia / Feliciano / Ramirez
Part 1: Cooper / Gatewood / Hiura
Prospective 2018

Following the introductory words to the first installment of Midseason 3 Up 3 Down, one could conceive of the Brewers’ farm system as a system of tiers based on percentile and role. This is what is tough about ranking prospects: it is easy to be excited about many minor leaguers, but it is difficult to pin down specific role preferences for future value in a ranking. For example, catcher Mario Feliciano could easily take five years to reach his MLB debut, especially if he retains his defensive position behind the dish. But he could also be one of the most valuable future roles for the system, despite that length of development (potential starting catchers don’t grow on trees). Compare Feliciano to my favorite pitcher, Cody Ponce, or an intriguing utility/depth player like Ryan Cordell. Cordell has a much more certain path to the MLB (he’ll probably arrive within a year if he’s truly on the 40-man roster as an MLB asset) and a much clearer role (Cordell’s defensive flexibility and batting profile almost assure he’ll slide in to create another Hernan Perez). It’s incredibly fun to imagine a bench including Cordell, Perez, Jonathan Villar, and Mauricio Dubon, both due to positional flexibility and the ideal that each of these players could step in for an extended absence and probably hold their own. Ponce might be spinning wheels a bit in 2017, but he remains a quality pitching prospect for the Brewers with a relatively clear path to the MLB (there can never be enough quality pitching depth within a system).

While both Ponce and Cordell are closer to the MLB and have much clearer roles to boot, Feliciano is probably the better Overall Future Potential (OFP) pick for the system. This is just one such comparison, but comparisons like this could be made across the Milwaukee system.

Splitting the system into tiers, it’s crucial to note that a player without a potentially elite or better than average role is not necessarily a bad prospect, especially if they are ticketed for MLB as a depth option. The fact of the matter is, very few prospects will become 70 OFP star profiles (like Carlos Correa, for example), or 60 OFP first-division potential profiles (like Orlando Arcia). Here’s how that reality might look in the Brewers’ system:

Aside from focusing on potential MLB roles, there ought to be a set of classifications that recognizes prospects working in relatively clear organizational depth positions, and prospects that are clearly projection plays. Consider the 2017 MLB Draft, in which the Brewers made considerable gambles with their picks in order to secure long development plays. Caden Lemons is my favorite example of this, a 6’6″ pitcher with considerable room to grow into his frame and therefore become a future power pitcher projection; of course, there is a scenario in which Lemons does not make it to Advanced Affiliates, or suffers an injury through what will almost certainly be a five year development period. This adds risk to Lemons’s profile, and although his MLB ceiling is not yet known, one can recognize future potential in the projection gamble.

There are plenty of prospects excluded from this list, so it should not be taken as a ranking; Franly Mallen, Phil Bickford, Blake Lillis, Jose Sibrian, Joantgel Segovia, Quintin Torres-Costa, and Jordan Yamamoto are just some of the players I excluded from this list. By this point, we’re so far into the system that one can see how a ranking system loses it’s efficacy. Outside of front offices with proprietary modeling systems for scouting and statistical information, I’m not certain there is value in fans knowing who is the #24 prospect or who is the #38 prospect in the Brewers system.

For this installment, BPMilwaukee Editorial Staff (Nicholas Zettel and Kyle Lesniewski) were joined by Craig Goldstein (Baseball Prospectus Prospect Team).

3 UP (and one bonus!)
CF Monte Harrison, Advanced A Carolina (picked by Craig Goldstein): Two freak injuries sidelined Monte Harrison in both 2015 and 2016, dampening the 60 OFP first division center fielder tag in the 2015 Baseball Prospectus Top Ten. Although the 2016 Baseball Prospectus list dropped Harrison to an excellent defensive right fielder role, the prospect’s injury issues have not kept the Brewers from giving him development time in center field. As Harrison advances through the system in center field, a more realistic potential MLB ceiling at that position should materialize. Now that Harrison is healthy, his transition from elite athlete to elite athlete as ballplayer is translating into highly regarded bat speed, leading to a hit tool that solves some of the puzzles that materialized even in his first Top Ten Brewers list. Perhaps the best part is (besides Harrison remaining healthy thus far and having a chance to truly form his ballgame) that even though it feels like Harrison has been around forever, he’s still only in his age-21 season and is younger than 80 percent of the 2017 Carolina League.

Goldstein on Harrison: Long on tools and short on [development] time, Harrison’s mostly healthy season has finally yielded bountiful results.

RHP Corbin Burnes, AA Biloxi (picked by Craig Goldstein): Corbin Burnes exemplifies the split between how fans follow the minor leagues and how scouts follow the minor leagues. The righty has posted phenomenal statistics since the Brewers selected him in the 4th round of the 2016 draft. Reports throughout the breakout 2017 campaign for Burnes have underscored the fastball and slider combination for the 6’3″ righty, while also raising questions about additional off-speed offerings (which would round out a starter’s profile) and delivery (which some suggest may be too high effort to repeat as a starter). Yet, here we are, with Burnes giving Brewers box score hawks fireworks every fifth day, which is unfortunately turning the righty into perhaps the system’s biggest hype case. I say unfortunately because it is clear that Burnes has an MLB ceiling, and it is clear that he needs work to get there (for example, Burnes might reach 150 innings in 2017, which means that the righty may need another year of seasoning in order to build up that true mid rotation workload). Burnes may be one of the best arguments in favor of turning prospect coverage fully away from statistics and toward scouting grades and reports, as there is a good chance those Brewers box score hawks hyping up “could Burnes be the next ace?” will be the first to turn on him should he reach the MLB at his realistic ceiling. None of this should take away from the righty, and obviously actual MLB runs prevention performances from year to year feature strong performances from non-aces (see Chase Anderson and Jimmy Nelson in 2017, and Zach Davies and Junior Guerra in 2016, as just two sets of examples). In this sense, even scouting roles and actual MLB performances diverge. A better line would be that “aces don’t exist,” and allow Burnes the developmental space necessary to turn him into the valuable MLB pitcher that he can be for the Brewers.

Goldstein on Burnes: I’m not convinced he’s not a reliever in the end, but the fastball/slider combo is legit. Waiting on that third pitch.

C Jacob Nottingham, AA Biloxi (picked by Kyle Lesniewski): Nottingham, the centerpiece of the trade that sent Khrush Davis to the Athletics, was one of the more disappointing prospects in the system last season, and an ice cold start to 2017 only further dampened his stock. But the 22 year old appears to have finally started to put things together over the last several weeks. He’s hitting .352/.426/.593 over his last four week’s worth of games, bringing his season-long slash line to .253/.349/.407 with three home runs, which translates to a nifty .279 TAv in the pitcher-friendly Southern League. Nottingham’s bat was supposed to be what carried him to the big leagues, but his defense has been much improved since joining the org as well. A 43 percent caught stealing rate, +3.3 framing runs, and decent blocking numbers (along with a huge reduction in passed balls) should help quell some of the “can he stick at catcher?” concerns.

RHP Carlos Herrera, Rookie Helena (picked by Nicholas Zettel): When the Brewers traded Adam Lind to the Mariners, David Stearns orchestrated a nifty return that amounted to a complete gamble in his new front office’s abilities to develop low minors arms into players that could reach their MLB ceilings (or simply reach the MLB for that matter) and a tiered acquisition approach that ensured each level of the minors would be populated with projection arms. Now, the fruits of that trade suggest Freddy Peralta is the best asset, having recently been promoted to Class-AA Biloxi in his age-21 season. But, Carlos Herrera was perhaps the most projection-worthy starter on the day of that Lind deal, and it is arguable that that fact has not changed even as Peralta climbs through the minors. Herrera is notably taller than Peralta, which adds intrigue to early reports of velocity and ability to spin breaking pitches. One would almost expect that should the righty continue to ascend into a true starting rotation ceiling, he will not resemble the 6’2″, 150 lb., low-90s arm that made it over to Milwaukee on trade day. Of course it’s a long way from “6’2″ with low-90s fastball and spin” to “filled out starter’s frame with a fastball that reaches or sits in the mid-90s and an average or better off-speed offering,” but there are little checkpoints along the way (like a commanding 20 K / 3 BB / 3 HR in his first 16 innings in Helena).

3 DOWN
LHP Nathan Kirby, Injury Rehabilitation (picked by Nicholas Zettel): This should not be viewed as piling on to the lefty, who has experienced tough luck since Milwaukee selected him as a supplemental first round pick in 2015. After undergoing Tommy John surgery, Kirby had an additional elbow procedure completed in 2017, which shortens his potential workload to the end of August (maybe) and developmental ball (also maybe). When drafted, Kirby was viewed as a two-headed beast, one that could potentially flash three above average pitches or serve as a polished, high floor rotational depth guy, or one that could have his ceiling derailed by command and delivery issues. Now, neither of those aspects of the gamble seem pertinent as the Brewers face another long injury rehabilitation in their pitching ranks (see most notably, Taylor Williams, Devin Williams, Daniel Missaki, and Adrian Houser). This was a system where, after 2016, one might have said with confidence that the lower tier pitching ceilings and projection plays were more impactful than the batting profiles, but it’s tough to double down on that statement given the injured impact profiles. If Kirby must wait until 2018 to gain innings once again, the southpaw will be in his age-24 season with 12.7 professional innings under his belt. It is difficult to see a starting profile emerging from this developmental pattern, but injured southpaws have proven to be ageless in the past, meaning it’s time to brush up on bios and profiles like Al Leiter (who like Kirby was listed as a 6’2″, 200 lb. lefty).

OF Trent Clark, Advanced A Carolina (picked by Craig Goldstein): In this iteration of the development cycle, the good becomes the problematic: that strong hit tool that earned rave reviews for Ray Montgomery’s first draft, clearly signalling a shift away from the gambles of the 2014 draft, that strong hit tool that was profiled as leading the way for a center field prospect, is now facing more scouting scrutiny in the prospect’s second  year in full-season ball. It is worth noting that behind Gilbert Lara, Clark is facing the harshest aging curve among regular minor league players in Milwaukee’s system. In the worst case scenario, perhaps Clark repeats at Advanced A Carolina to begin 2018, which could have the benefit of smoothing that curve, giving Clark more chances to sharpen that hit tool, and find separation with the system’s other highly regarded outfielders (which could have the benefit of allowing Clark to solidify that center field role rather than that ‘tweener OFP). Establishing something of a Brinson / Keon Broxton (MLB) | Phillips / Reed (AAA) | Harrison / Ray (AA) | Clark (A+) center field pipeline would provide quite an organizational structure in the middle of the diamond.

Goldstein on Clark: He looked lost at the plate in my viewing, and has been playing LF when Ray is healthy and playing, which puts even more pressure on a bat that was going to be average-dependent in the first place.

RHP Jorge Lopez, AA Biloxi (picked by Kyle Lesniewski): It wasn’t too long ago that Lopez was considered to be the top pitching prospect that Milwaukee had, winning the org’s minor league pitcher of the year after posting a 2.26 ERA in the Southern League in 2015. Last year in Colorado Springs was a disaster, though, and Lopez was returned to AA to begin the 2017 season. His 5.04 ERA in 69.2 innings appears rather underwhelming, though both FIP (3.41) and DRA (4.29) were a bit more bullish on Lopez’s work with the Shuckers this year. An improved K/BB rate after lowering his arm slot apparently wasn’t enough to convince Brewers’ brass he could stick in the rotation. From farm director Tom Flanagan on Jorge’s recent role change, via Adam McCalvy’s most recent mailbag.”The starting rotation at Biloxi is filled with some pitchers that have really thrown well, and Jorge hasn’t been able to show the consistency that we wanted to see in that role….Jorge has all the weapons to become a successful Major League starting pitcher, and we are not closing any doors on that. But by moving Jorge to the ‘pen, and getting him on the mound more often, we feel it will be helpful step in his development.” Lopez was just recently recalled to and demoted from the big leagues, and his profile suggests that he should have the chance to become an impact reliever. Still, that result would be a far cry from the “future #2 or #3 starter” labels that were being slapped on Lopez after his outstanding season two years ago.

Of course, Melvin didn’t always struggle in this facet of management. The first five years of his tenure (2003-2007) saw the Brewers draft Ryan Braun, Yovani Gallardo, Rickie Weeks, and Jonathan Lucroy, among others. Those players combined with Prince Fielder and Corey Hart, J.J. Hardy, and Bill Hall — whom the team had selected in the pre-Melvin seasons — to form a strong nucleus that helped the club make playoff runs in 2008 and 2011.

After that, however, the prospect well dried up — such that, for five years running, the Brewers have placed in the bottom five of BP’s organizational rankings:

[Note: These rankings began in 2008.]

With the aforementioned core heading to the Major Leagues, Milwaukee sorely needed to replenish its system. Melvin responded with the opposite due to the club’s competitive window. In deals for CC Sabathia, Zack Greinke, and Shaun Marcum, he sent away Matt LaPorta, Zack Jackson, Rob Bryson, Michael Brantley, Lorenzo Cain, Jake Odorizzi, Alcides Escobar, Jeremy Jeffess, and Brett Lawrie. Some of those players didn’t end up accomplishing much, but the prosperity of some of them — particularly Brantley and Cain, each of whom has played at a borderline-MVP level in the past couple years — have made many fans regret the trades retrospectively.

Inadequate drafting compounded the woes of those deals. Jack noted in his piece that the club’s picks from later years haven’t yet amounted to much. Over the past few years, teams such as the Rangers have managed to maintain a solid minor-league system despite swinging big trades, and they’ve done so by constantly restocking their affiliates through the draft and international free agency. Part of that is good scouting, too, while part of that is a willingness to spend money. Melvin’s Brewers partook in the former half of the equation while neglecting the latter half, though, and it has come back to haunt them.

With that said, Milwaukee has made recent strides. BP’s writeup of the farm system stated that it possessed “talent to makes several teams quite jealous” — a massive improvement from its standing over the past several seasons. After spending the first half of the decade in the minor-league cellar, the 2015 Brewers have taken the necessary steps to move back up to the top half.

Part of this, in fairness, happened before this year. In August, Julien Assouline analyzed the team’s drafts under Melvin, who had perhaps not received the credit he deserved. Some of Melvin’s strengths there stem from the early years, but even in the later part of his run with the Brewers, they fared moderately well. Derek Harvey commented that the club’s drafts from 2009 to 2014, under late scouting director Bruce Seid, provided them with numerous quality players that presently stock their system. Indeed, of the top-20 current Milwaukee prospects, eight — Jorge Lopez, Devin Williams, Monte Harrison, Tyrone Taylor, Jake Gatewood, Kodi Medeiros, Yadiel Rivera, and Michael Reed — came from drafts during that span, while Orlando Arcia and Gilbert Lara signed with the team as amateur free agents in that period.

Still, an improvement of this magnitude, and in this short a span, suggests something different in the past twelve months. Part of the difference stems from the 2015 draft, which has (to this point) yielded incredible rewards. Four of those top-20 prospects came to the team in June: Trent Clark, Cody Ponce, Demi Orimoloye, and Nathan Kirby. Clark stands out as the best of the bunch, but all four have intriguing upside and could continue to blossom further. New scouting director Ray Montgomery, as Harvey observed, seems to have taken off.

The team’s decision to finally rebuild has helped with that. July saw them deal away established starters Aramis Ramirez, Gerardo Parra, and Jonathan Broxton, as well as (relative) stars Carlos Gomez and Mike Fiers. Those trades — which, as J.P. Breen correctly posited, meant the team had recognized that its window has closed — brought back a great deal of prospects. Yhonathan Barrios, Zach Davies, Malik Collymore, Domingo Santana, Brett Phillips, Josh Hader, and Adrian Houser now occupy various levels of the Milwaukee system; Phillips, Davies, Houser, and Hader ranked in the top 20, while Santana has already begun to contribute at The Show. Together with Marcos Diplan, an intriguing top-20 farmhand whom the team acquired in last January’s Yovani Gallardo swap, they amount to a formidable group.

Overall, David Stearns inherited a solid amount of prospects when he became the GM in August. Surveying the trove a couple weeks before Melvin stepped down, Derek Harvey concluded that the system had gone from the bottom to the upper half of the league — a prediction that, as stated previously, we’ve likely seen come true. Stearns didn’t stop there, though. In his four-odd months atop the organization, he’s made several trades to bolster the minor- and major-league depth, further improving the system as a whole.

The first two transactions came in mid-November. Stearns swapped Cy Sneed for the Astros’ Jonathan Villar, then followed that up by shipping Francisco Rodriguez to the Tigers in exchange for Javier Betancourt and a player to be named later (catcher Manny Pina). Seth Victor described Villar at the time as “a good acquisition for a team that needs middle infield depth and flexibility,” a player who won’t make a noticeable difference yet should still provide some value. Betancourt — who rounded out the top 20 — is, in Chris Crawford’s estimation, “a high-floor prospect with a fairly well-defined ceiling.” In other words, he could become a Villar-type player a few years down the road.

After BP published its top-20 list, Stearns has made a few more moves, evidently in an effort to muck up the rankings. First came the Adam Lind trade, which brought back three young pitchers: Carlos Herrera, Daniel Missaki, and Freddy Peralta. While I can certainly see the logic in Jack’s distaste for the deal — Lind gave us something to cheer for in this dreadful 2015 season, and those players always hurt to lose — I ultimately come down on the side of J.P., who expressed cautious optimism regarding it.

Not long after that, three more prospects came to Milwaukee. The day following Lind’s departure, the Red Sox sold Garin Cecchini to the Brewers for cash considerations. BP’s Bryan Grosnick called the deal “[t]he definition of ‘buying low,'” as a disastrous 2015 had caused Cecchini’s stock to plummet. Likewise, the players Milwaukee snagged in the Rule 5 draft — Colin Walsh from the Athletics and Zack Jones from the Twins — don’t carry elite pedigrees, or much upside, for that matter.

These deals nevertheless give the Brewers plenty of options for 2016 and beyond, as J.P. outlined a few weeks ago. (Plus, the quantity acquired from these transactions only increased thereafter, when the Brewers sent Jason Rogers to the Pirates, receiving Keon Broxton and Trey Supak in return.) Overall, the solid 2015 draft, along with Stearns’s willingness to trade anything not nailed down, has translated to a complete turnaround in Milwaukee’s minor-league system.

What does this mean for 2016? Well, as J.P. pointed out, the Brewers have more routes they can take at the Major League level; although few of those will likely lead to wins, the results should give the team some clarity for 2017. More immediately, it means the Triple-A Sky Sox will presumably play better in 2016. Michael Schwarz explained how that affiliate would progress with legitimate prospects filling its roster. The biggest takeaway here, though, is general optimism. Years and years of no future, at long last, appear to have come to an end. Now, more so than at any point in recent memory, there could be hope on the Milwaukee horizon.

With that being said, new general manager David Stearns didn’t necessarily negotiate a poor return for a player who hit .277/.360/.460 in 2015 with 20 homers. The trade is just more difficult to understand because the assets in question are unknown quantities. Hell, even many within the scouting community have never heard of these players or have never seen them in person. As such, the long-term gain is too abstract to evaluate with any sense of certainty.

The Brewers obviously like the three pitchers they received in the deal. Right-hander Carlos Herrera (who just turned 18) spent last season in the Dominican Summer League, posting a 3.26 ERA with a solid strikeout-to-walk ratio (5.62 K/BB). He throws in the high-80s and low-90s with some projectability. A couple scouts told me that he’s the real prize in this deal, even if he’s a bit of a mystery. Daniel Missaki is another right-handed hurler (only 19 years old) who is best known for his time with the Brazilian national team. He’s currently rehabbing from Tommy John surgery, but reportedly has good feel for multiple pitches. Finally, Freddy Peralta (also 19) popped up on the prospect radar in 2014 when his velocity ticked upward into the mid-90s. The heater regressed this past season, though, and his 4.11 ERA won’t capture one’s attention. Still, the 8.38 strikeout-to-walk ratio is tremendous and eases some of the concern about his ugly run prevention.

David Stearns told Tom Haudricourt of the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, “Whenever you acquire players that are farther away, there is more variance….So, in a deal like this, we’re really targeting that variability to find an impact-type pitcher, even if it’s multiple years down the road.” This means that Herrera, Missaki or Peralta could flame out before Double-A or they could become useful Major League arms. And given the fact that we’re perhaps talking about another three-to-five years until the muddled picture becomes somewhat clear, this trade cannot possibly resonate with the vast majority of Brewers fans. It requires patience with absolutely no guarantee of any return on that investment.

That’s why the Adam Lind trade is best understood through its process, what acquiring three no-name teenagers can tell us about David Stearns and his overall strategy for the club.

It appears that Stearns is carrying over a key piece of the Houston Astros’ rebuilding playbook, in which a club cannot be afraid of targeting extremely young pitchers in the low minors — especially in return for non-elite Major League assets. The Astros, for example, got David Paulino for Jose Veras and Francis Martes as the “throw-in” in the Jarred Cosart deal. Both of those formerly no-name prospects are now two of the hottest prospects in the Astros’ farm system. It’s a conscious approach that Evan Drellich of the Houston Chronicle profiled in September. This Lind trade is an example of David Stearns trusting his scouting department, trying to bring unknown prospects into the Brewers’ system before they have a chance to mature and have a breakout season. Because after that hypothetical breakout, the Brewers would no longer be able to afford the asking price. The ultimate buy-low strategy, if you will.

Of course, this type of strategy puts a premium on scouting and player evaluation. They have to get it right enough to make it worthwhile. Fortunately, recent success in drafts leads one to believe that the Brewers’ scouting department has quality members who are capable of getting the job done well. Ray Montgomery and his staff have been aces over the past couple years.

All of this doesn’t mean Stearns and the Brewers will consistently eschew big-league players or guys in the upper minors. This simply indicates that the Brewers will not rely on Doug Melvin’s strategy of targeting players who have already found success in the Double-A level or above. Stearns already has seen this type of strategy work in Houston and appears to be transitioning it over to Milwaukee.

It is also important to recognize that quantity should not be ignored during a rebuilding process. The Milwaukee Brewers must stuff the farm system with as much talent as possible and across the minor-league spectrum. This isn’t just to spread out one’s hypothetical competitive window, nor is it some kind of “throw dozens of prospects at the wall and see who sticks” argument. Instead, I’m acknowledging the fact that Milwaukee needs excess minor-league talent. It’s not enough to have the next core of homegrown players in the minors. An organization must also have the depth necessary to trade for more Major League players. Just as the Chicago Cubs, Houston Astros, and Toronto Blue Jays are all beginning to flex their prospect muscles to maximize their windows of contention (which are of varying sizes), the Milwaukee Brewers must have the prospect depth to both develop a core and supplement it.

In the end, this Adam Lind deal should be understood as an attempt to acquire quantity and quality. The latter is more abstract and won’t pay dividends for perhaps a half-decade, but it is clearly a conscious attempt at acquiring high-end prospects — just a year or two before they become high-end prospects. This is just more evidence that David Stearns and his staff are willing to be creative and patient, a highly desirable combination during a full-scale rebuilding process. Brewers fans should be happy, regardless of how the three young pitchers turn out.