The story of the Brewers’ remarkable winning streak that has carried them into the playoffs and now a League Championship Series matchup with the Dodgers has been the dominance and run-prevention of the bullpen. With a matchup looming against a much stronger team offensively than the Rockies (the Dodgers finished the season fifth in MLB in runs scored per game and first in True Average), not to mention a longer series and therefore more outs to “get,” it’s fair to ask how sustainable the heavy bullpen usage looks to be for the rest of the postseason.

Usage
Inning limits seem to be an inexact science at best, given what we know publicly.  There may be a slight effect in terms of injury prevention when drastic inning increases are managed by teams. But beyond injuries, suffice it to say that given the toll pitching takes on the human body (with the caveat that every pitcher is different), generally pitchers approaching substantial workload increases are more likely to fatigue. This makes sense on an intuitive level.

Among likely Brewers to make the NLCS roster as non-starting “out getters,” most of the pitchers seem to be in relatively good shape with regard to their innings in the previous season and well within their career highs, with a maximum of 14 games left in the season. Knebel, Burnes, and Woodruff in particular are encouraging in terms of how many innings they may have left over last year’s totals. Freddy Peralta has already pitched over 20 innings more than his 2017 season and might be managed more carefully, especially if the Brewers see him as a starter moving forward.

The real danger zone may be with Jeremy Jeffress, who, despite sitting out a few games to manage minor injuries toward the end of the season, is 11 innings above what he pitched last year. That may not or may not be a factor moving forward, but it is [checks math] a higher workload. As such, there could be fewer opportunities for Jeffress to cover multiple innings. Combined with his recent minor injuries that made him unavailable in Game 163, and his performance so far in October, it’s worth keeping an eye on the next area of the pitching staff to consider for the aggressive bullpenning Brewers.

Fatigue
This is where there is a small area of concern for Jeffress’ availability moving forward to the degree he has been used so far this season.

Source: BrooksBaseball.net

The one-mile per hour difference on Jeffress’ four-seam fastball might not be anything, and in fact comes with a major caveat of a sample size of just 15 times that he’s thrown it in October. But coupled with the recent minor injuries and increased workload, it certainly stands out among the other Brewer relievers, who are mostly throwing harder in October than they have in the season overall.

As a unit it seems like the Brewer bullpen isn’t suffering from any fatigue just yet in October. Somewhat unbelievably, Josh Hader is actually up two ticks on his fastball, and the young and promising duo of Burnes and “secret weapon” Woodruff are also up pretty significantly. Basically, if Craig Counsell is looking just at in-game performance or the metrics that might imply fatigue among his relievers, there’s seemingly little to raise a red flag.

Schedule
This is where the bullpen strategy gets a little tricky. During a 7-game series, how will the Brewers manage their run-prevention strength with also needing to cover more innings overall?

Playing a strictly “bullpen game” as the Brewers did in Game 1 of the Division Series is still workable but may be a bit more difficult to pull off when there are just simply more outs to cover. For example, if after Jhoulys Chacin and Wade Miley pitch Games One and Two, and Counsell decides to bullpen Game Three, he could find himself without Woodruff and Burnes for games Four and Five, leaving a shorthanded staff presumably with Gio Gonzalez and/or Zach Davies toeing the rubber to start Game Four. Perhaps a Game One bullpen game is in the cards again, as it would allow the Brewers to put their best pitcher, Johnny Wholestaff, up against Clayton Kershaw, and then have Chacin go for Game Two. That would allow the bullpen to get some extra rest for the travel off-day to Los Angeles before Game Three.

My head hurts.

At any rate, there are more decisions to consider in a longer series that has 3 games in a row, and it will also likely limit the number of relievers the Brewers are willing to burn for multiple innings at a time.

The bullpen overall looks to be in good shape given their usage so far in the season and at least by velocity, there doesn’t seem to be much drop off in production, either. The Brewers will, however, need some kind of help from their bats or a third starter especially in the middle 3 games of the series in Los Angeles if they want to maximize meaningful innings for their best run-preventing weapon.

Only a few short weeks ago, there was a legitimate question of over who was the MVP of the Brewers, as both Christian Yelich and Lorenzo Cain had strong cases. An unfortunately timed injury to Cain slowed his pace, while Yelich has only increased his production throughout the season. Since the All-Star break, Yelich is slashing .352 batting average /.417 on-base percentage /.709 slugging percentage, and he is now third amongst National League position players in Batting Wins Above Replacement Player (BWARP). Yelich has made a few changes to his approach which made this breakout possible.

Comparing pre- and post-All-Star break performance, Yelich is facing the same basic arsenal and attack plan from pitchers. As noted when I looked at his performance immediately after the All-Star break, pitchers want to attack Yelich low and away. That plan hasn’t changed over the past few months. The only notable difference in attack has been a slight uptick in fastballs. This season Yelich has seen his highest percentage of fastballs since 2015. In the first half, he saw 58.6 percent fastballs, which was up a tick from 2017, but in line with 2016 and well below the approach his first few years in MLB. However, since mid-July pitchers have thrown fastballs almost 62 percent of their pitches. Yelich hasn’t seen such a high proportion of fastballs in several years. In fact, he’s seeing 69.2 percent fastballs in September, as pitchers have almost given up on throwing him breaking balls. If that rate holds, it’d be the most fastballs he’s seen in a month of games since August 2015.

Yelich’s whiff numbers look virtually identical before and after the break. Looking at his zone profiles, he is whiffing less frequently, both above and below the strike zone when compared with earlier in the season, although he appears to only be swinging less on high pitches. One area where he appears to be locked in is breaking pitches. Yelich had been swinging at around 40 percent of breaking balls he faced, which is slightly higher than his career numbers, but not dramatically out of line. Yelich has swung at 56 percent of those pitches recently, which is completely out of character with his career.

However, Yelich is completely locked in on breaking balls at the moment. He’s killing every breaking pitch that is a strike. Those numbers are compounded by his slugging against all other pitches. Since the All-Star break, you cannot throw Christian Yelich a strike. Pitchers are aiming low, but when they miss, he smashes the ball. They are loath to pitch up in the zone, because he’ll hit mistakes there as well and whiffs at even fewer of those pitches.

The only weakness in Yelich’s game recently has been when pitchers throw sinkers. In his career he slugs .491 against the pitch, his second best number. He bested that number in the first half, but the pitch has caused some trouble in the second half of the season. Pitchers have done a good job keeping the pitch in tougher to square areas. Yelich is swinging and missing at sinkers, even when they’re thrown in his hot zones. When he does make contact, he’s hitting a lot of ground balls, which depresses his batting average against and slugging percentage.

Based on these numbers, if a team wants to get Yelich out, all it needs a sinker specialist who can place the ball low and away and not leave one over the plate. This is an exploitable weakness, and definitely something to watch when scouting potential playoff opponents. However, if a pitcher misses his spot, Yelich will hit it. If a pitcher throws anything other than a sinker, Yelich will hit it as well. If he continues his torrid pace through the next week, there is a real chance that he becomes the fourth Most Valuable Player as a Brewer.

Corey Knebel had a rough start to the season. Injuries and ineffective performance actually led to a demotion in late August to try and sort the righty out. Since he returned to Milwaukee, Knebel has thrown 10.3 innings and allowed two hits and two walks while striking out eighteen batters.

Knebel is throwing fewer fastballs in September after elevating his fastball rate earlier in the season. In his successful 2017, he threw approximately 72 percent fastballs, with the rest of his pitches curveballs. He was over 73 percent fastballs before September but is at approximately 67 percent in September, which is actually his lowest fastball usage rate over the last two seasons. The percentage differences here are all fairly small, but when a pitcher only has two pitches, and one of those pitches is hittable, then any predictability can be perilous.

Earlier in the season, Knebel’s velocity was done. In 2017, he averaged nearly 98 mph on his fastball and his velocity increased every month of the season. His April fastball velocity was around .5 mph slower this season, but unlike 2017, it has stayed relatively flat throughout the year. It also has less vertical and horizontal movement when compared with 2017 and has lost a little motion as the season has progressed.

It looks like Knebel made some mechanical changes while in the minors to try and shore up his arsenal. His vertical release point started close to this low point from 2017 and dropped through August to a new low. He has raised it in September, though he still does release the ball, specifically his fastball, at a lower point than in 2017. Knebel also appears to have moved closer to the third base side of the rubber, his furthest position in two years.

All of these tweaks have led to great results from both of this pitches. Since his return, both hits have come against his fastball, but batters haven[t had much chance against either of his pitches. The twenty seven percent whiff rate against his fastball is his best month. After laying off his fastball more early in the season, he’s inducing more swings in September.

Even though it looks like we’re seeing the 2017 Corey Knebel in September, Craig Counsell has not reinserted him into the closer role. Only 2.7 of his innings have come in the 8^th inning or later. His aLI (Average Leverage Index), a statistic that considers the game situation in which a pitcher is working, is .79 since September 1; anything below 1.0 is considered low pressure. For reference purposes, his aLI in 2017 was 2.11 and it was 1.69 before his demotion. Considering the strength of the bullpen, Knebel isn’t needed to anchor the late innings. Notwithstanding his struggles, Knebel’s 2.90 DRA is still fifth on the team. A month ago, it was questionable whether Knebel would make the postseason roster, but his recent performance shows that he can still contribute, even if in a less important role in the bullpen.

Milwaukee begins a huge three game series tonight in St. Louis. The team can clinch a playoff berth, as well as place themselves in a strong position to host the Wild Card game. The teams are 8-8 against each other in 2018, with all but three of those games occurring in the first half of the season. The Cardinals are coming in hot. They won five of their six games last week against the Braves and Giants. They’ve outplayed their expected record by 5.2 games, which is 1^st in the National League and 3^rd in MLB.

New Runs Prevented Workbook || Runs Prevented Primer

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1KBQ19VcMZ4g7oW1jkGiYwxCadqjw3rYXkqN200f4lHc/edit?usp=sharing

This is not even some “to-be-expected” regression, as even if one wishes to look at Deserved Runs Average (DRA) throughout the season as a “true” measure of the Brewers talent (which should be cautioned), the Brewers would have been expected to allow anywhere between 23 and 30 fewer second half runs than they actually have allowed.

This is unforeseen and catastrophic.

The blame can be spread around to everyone, from the post-forearm injury Junior Guerra (10 IP, 9 runs on July 24 & 29), injured reliever Matt Albers (1.7 IP, 10 R), former? closer Corey Knebel (9.3 IP, 8 R entering Sunday), and even rookie rotation depth Freddy Peralta (19 IP, 17 R since the break). Worse yet, there is a sense of adding insult to injury, as newly acquired Joakim Soria hit the disabled list promptly after surrendering a grand slam home run in a devastating loss to San Diego, and quietly effective Taylor Williams hit the disabled list with an elbow injury. While fans will feel less sympathy for Matt Albers, who had a couple of different bouts of ineffectiveness surrounded by separate disabled list stints, the veteran righty was crucial to early season success (25 IP, 4 R through the end of May) and each day his injury status and effectiveness is not answered is a day that manager Craig Counsell must carefully ration Jeremy Jeffress and Josh Hader with little back-up. The same goes for Williams, and now Soria; while Jacob Barnes was previously an impact reliever and boasts solid peripherals and a 2.99 Deserved Run Average (DRA), his runs prevention performance in 2018 has not been to the level of that injured trio, and now it’s Barnes, Corbin Burnes, and Jordan Lyles trying to nail down the quietly effective support roles.

It’s as simple as this: the Brewers’ bullpen has two truly fantastic options in Jeffress and Hader, and those options will be great regardless of their surrounding cast. For the purposes of contending, however, this duo is amplified when Stearns’s excellent depth picks (Albers, Williams, even Corbin Burnes), closer (Knebel), and additional acquisitions (Soria) are performing well. Jeffress and Hader cannot do it themselves.

Injuries have also trimmed the rotation, as Brent Suter’s torn elbow ligament and Zach Davies’s back ailments have limited the Brewers’ effective rotational depth. Using Baseball Reference Three Year Park factors, both Suter and Davies combined for 18 Runs Prevented over 273 innings in 2017, offering excellent middle and replacement rotation depth. That level of impact depth performance will not be matched by the duo in 2018. Additionally, even if one could have argued that the club might not have expected Jimmy Nelson to return from his shoulder injury in 2018, having that materialize as a likely injury-scenario reality in 2018 is quite another ballgame. Consider this as Freddy Peralta meets a likely innings limit, Chase Anderson continues an uneven season, and Brandon Woodruff finds himself without a rotational role: #TeamDepth is now basically #TeamNecessity in terms of rotation building.

There’s no need to state it any other way: as much as one would like to criticize the Brewers pitching staff, and GM David Stearns for his failure to build a staff, the club is now to the point where injuries are diminishing even his strongest moves. The Soria trade looms loudest here, as the Brewers grabbed a legitimate high leverage, veteran reliever at the trade deadline and did not get six innings from his right arm before he hit the DL with a groin injury; Albers and Williams could be fan whipping posts when they were ineffective, but the Albers free agency deal looked like a brilliant low-cost gamble early in the season while Williams seemed poised to catapult himself into the high leverage workload discussion (Williams worked a 17.3 IP, 5 R stretch, Holding three leads, from June until the All Star Break).

Citing injuries to the pitching staff is not an “excuse” for the poor performance.

It would have been enough to deal with this group of recent injuries and setbacks, but the Brewers also simultaneously were gifted with a set of role reversions on the pitching staff. Corey Knebel’s descent from excellent closer in 2017 cost the Brewers a chance at a truly elite relief corps; according to Baseball Reference Three Year Park Factors, Knebel prevented nearly 25 runs in 2017. Even a 50 percent regression from that performance level would fit nicely with Jeffress and Hader, who have both been consistent Top 25 pitchers in the 2018 MLB. Add in the aforementioned struggles of Peralta, Barnes, and a bit of stalled usage from the shuttled Houser (he’s only worked two MLB appearances from July onward), and Counsell’s strategic options are looking much more thin while they are also being exasperated by some ineffective starts.

Beyond these role question marks, it is worth questioning the timing of the inclusion of Jorge Lopez in the Mike Moustakas trade. Since Lopez has served the season as an up-and-down member of the Triple-A / MLB “shuttle team” relief squad, discussions of the quality of Lopez’s performance were largely nonexistent at the trade deadline (I’m also guilty of this charge). But, it is worth emphasizing that as a back-roster depth strategy, the “shuttle team” prevented runs at a solid clip, especially when one considers the nature of this replacement role and the likely quality of other replacement pitchers to be acquired in their place.

In fact, these shuttle relievers combined to produce near-average aggregate performance for the Brewers, which leads one to question why Stearns traded Lopez and simultaneously decided to keep Brandon Woodruff at the Triple-A level to serve as replacement starting pitching depth. With Lopez in the Royals system and Woodruff now serving as starting pitching depth, the revolving door relief strategy is effectively dead at what could be the worst time of the season. Given that Woodruff boats a 3.55 DRA at the MLB level to accompany a 52 percent ground ball rate, while also demonstrating an average DRA at Colorado Springs with a consistent ground ball rate there, it is worth questioning why Stearns has not simply replaced Peralta with Woodruff (on the one hand) or simply promoted Woodruff to a steady MLB relief role (on the other hand). According to Brooks Baseball, the relief role is agreeing with Woodruff, who is throwing a sizzling 95-to-96 MPH fastball with more armside run than his 2017 variation, complete with steady change up and slider usage (both with more whiffs than in 2017, too).

This is not a bottomless pit (yet). That the Brewers remain the 12th best pitching staff in the MLB, within one standard deviation of the 10th spot, and sixth best pitching staff in the National League, should demonstrate just how good the club has been for most of the year. Indeed, this pitching staff has fallen off, and it’s important to underscore that it’s not simply “regression,” but a bad combination of regression, injuries, and strategic missteps at the worst possible time. But there could be a quick way out of this issue for the club:

• Get Zach Davies healthy, without any further setbacks, and use him to replace Freddy Peralta in the rotation.

• Develop an MLB role for Brandon Woodruff; preferably this would be a rotational role to spell another ineffective starter down the stretch (or add a sixth man for September), but even a well-defined one-inning bullpen role could be extremely helpful at the moment.

• Re-evaluate depth roles for Ariel Hernandez, Jordan Lyles, Alec Asher, and Aaron Wilkerson, and make any necessary waiver trades to boost the pitching staff. E.g., is Jordan Lyles the right arm to work in the shadow of the successful Triple-A shuttle crew? Is now the best time to make a potential long-term development play for Ariel Hernandez?

• Reconsider Adrian Houser’s shuttle role in favor of a regular one-inning role.

With the assumption that some combination of Soria, Albers, and Williams can get healthy for the stretch run, and that some of the “role regression” pitchers can make adjustments at the MLB level once again, this is a pitching staff that can improve quickly and regain its flexible frontier of roles and runs prevention that were celebrated in April and May. With Zach Davies healthy, a waiver trade acquisition (or two), and potentially prominent roles for two righties that can rush it up there (Woodruff and Houser), this pitching staff can rebound. Now we wait and watch.

Now the 2018 Brewers are on pace to challenge the 1988 Brewers for the best pitching staff in franchise history. As it stands, the Brewers could basically pitch average baseball for the remainder of the season and finish with the third best staff in franchise history; as the table above shows, Milwaukee has already surpassed their 2017 Runs Prevented total this season.

The purpose of this post is not to present a normative argument about whether or not the Brewers should be expected to produce the best pitching season in franchise history. Evidence abounds in all directions. First and foremost, at the time of this writing, the trade deadline has yet to pass, which means that the Brewers could further improve their pitching; second, the latest average Runs Prevented table demonstrates that the Milwaukee hurlers are already approximately 12 runs from their May 31 pace, meaning that the club has slowed slightly in their elite Runs Prevention; additionally, key injuries and subsequent ineffectiveness (ranging from Brent Suter and Zach Davies to Matt Albers and, of course, Jimmy Nelson) also impact projections of runs prevention. Alternately, Chase Anderson has prevented approximately seven runs since the beginning of June, and is beginning to look like a rotation leader at the same time the club traded for Joakim Soria and recalled Corbin Burnes to bolster the bullpen. If anything, this swirling set of evidence might allow one to believe that the pitching staff will at least remain steady.

Rather, I am going to investigate the pitching staff structure for a few of the best franchise pitching staffs listed in the table above. The purpose here will be fun, first and foremost, as almost everyone can name the key Brewers batters and supporting casts of the club’s great offensive performances (ten of the top 13 runs production seasons come from the 1978-1983 and 2009-2012 roster cores), but the great pitching staffs beyond Teddy Higuera, Ben Sheets, and CC Sabathia remain underappreciated or perhaps even unknown. Furthermore, by comparing the structures of these great staffs, one can get an idea of how pitching roster construction has evolved over time. For example, the 2018 Brewers may very well end up producing the greatest bullpen in franchise history, but how does their rotation compare? On the other hand, one might expect the classic 1980s clubs to be rotation-first, in terms of value.

Defensive Efficiency
Prior to investigating Baseball Prospectus pitching profiles of these classic Brewers pitching clubs, it is worth emphasizing that most of the top Brewers pitching teams were also typically very good fielding teams relative to their respective leagues.

Indeed, the table above demonstrates that the 2018 Brewers shares the top of these fielding profiles with the 1992 club, which were the most efficient fielding unit on the Junior Circuit. Here, I am using defensive efficiency to assess fielding because it is a basic number that calculates the extent to which a fielding unit converts outs. The outliers here are the 2005, 2011, and 2017 Brewers clubs, which prevented runs despite mediocre fielding performances (they prevented approximately 26, 47, and 47 runs, respectively, despite their middle of the road fielding).

Roster Construction
Teddy Higuera had quite a career for the Milwaukee Brewers, posting single season WARP totals above 4.0 in three of nine seasons. Higuera’s best year in Milwaukee occurred during the 1988 season, in which the southpaw worked nearly 230 innings while striking out 192 batters to only 59 walks. Using Deserved Run Average (DRA), a statistic that scales pitching performance to numerous contextual components, Higuera was better in 1988 than in any other season in Milwaukee, and those results total nearly 7.0 WARP.

Yet the 1988 club was also a crossing of two eras in Milwaukee, where the fading glory of Harvey’s Wallbangers (who never got the consistent ace they deserved in Higuera) would congeal into a roster core that could never quite get Robin Yount and Paul Molitor into the playoffs with a second generation of talent. Behind Higuera, the 1988 squad featured four prominent contributors age-25 or younger in Juan Nieves (23), Don August (24), Chris Bosio (25), and Bill Wegman (25), ostensibly giving the Brewers a stable pitching rotation around which their next contending seasons could follow. Yet injuries, ineffectiveness, and inconsistencies derailed this group, leaving 1988 their best performance. Of these youngsters, Bosio was en route to beginning a stretch of several quality pitching seasons, and in fact the righty was more valuable each of 1989, 1991, and 1992 (compared to 1988).

Chuck Crim deserves mention, of course, because the 26-year old rubber arm worked more than 100 innings over 70 appearances. Not only did the righty work 42 multiple inning appearances according to Baseball Reference, but he also inherited 68 runners. In terms of percentage points, Crim’s strand rate was eight points better than the league average, meaning that aside from his own exceptional runs allowed total, Crim added several Runs Prevented simply by stranding runners that occupied bases when he entered ballgames; this performance foreshadowed Brian Shouse’s efforts for the excellent 2008 pitching staff (60 IR / 20 scored), as well as Jeremy Jeffress and Dan Jennings (62 IR / 14 scored (!!!) entering Sunday) in 2018. This excellent performance is reflected in Crim’s leads converted statistics, as the righty successfully produced nine saves and 13 holds, against only two blown save or hold opportunities.

The Crim mention is a perfect transition to the 2017 pitching staff, which featured a few excellent starting pitching performances boosted by an even better bullpen. Thus appears Jacob Barnes in the club’s top performers for 2017, as the hard near-cutter / slider reliever is not only a throwback to the bread-and-butter 1980s reliever (enter Crim, a favorite media comp for Barnes, too), but also one of the only 2017 Brewers pitchers to accumulate more than 1.0 WARP. What is interesting about the 2017 pitching staff also foreshadowing the strengths of the 2018 staff, and that is the sheer depth of the pitching operations. Eventually, the pitching-by-depth gamble unraveled as the club faced injuries and a rotating cast of fifth starter ineffectiveness down the stretch. But along with the more popular impact relievers of Corey Knebel and Josh Hader, Barnes was one of the key reasons for the club’s success in 2017 and, like Crim and Hader, another deep round MLB draft success story.

By the way, let it be said that for any other critiques of the Brewers current GM, David Stearns sure can build a runs prevention unit. Despite being in his third season as GM, and ostensibly leading the club through a rebuilding phase, Stearns already boasts two of the 17 average or better pitching staffs in franchise history. Interestingly enough, for all the grief President Doug Melvin gets about his apparent inability to assemble a pitching staff, the highly regarded Harry Dalton also had the same issue. While Sal Bando is not highly regarded by most Brewers fans, the GM sure could build a pitching staff, and Bando (more than Melvin or Dalton) is Stearns’s target for building quality pitching; Dalton and Melvin are obviously the targets for beating postseason appearances.

Comparing Jimmy Nelson, Chase Anderson, and Zach Davies, who was an excellent Runs Prevented starter in 2017 even if his WARP did not look great, to the 1988 squad should underscore the difficulty of building a consistent rotation. Producing a great starting rotation certainly does not come close to guaranteeing pitching success in the following season, when injuries, mechanical adjustments, and inconsistencies that were absent in the “great year” can creep up in the following campaign. Once again, though, the Brewers have a group of truly controllable, quality starting pitching arms (as they did in the late-1980s), but it is worth raising questions about the scouting profiles and future prospects of these arms following the mechanical adjustments and injuries that have plagued 2018. The book is not closed, however, as Chase Anderson has shown over his last ten starts (59.7 IP, 3.02 ERA, four quality starts); if all goes well, Anderson’s contract extension would be well-justified if he comes anywhere near Chris Bosio’s best four years in Milwaukee.

2008 needs no introduction, as the Brewers media and Twitter recently celebrated the tenth anniversary of the CC Sabathia trade. Of course, as Sabathia rightfully carries the reputation as the arm that saved that season, it is always worth emphasizing that Ben Sheets was phenomenal in 2008 as well. Sheets managed a 3.13 DRA and 5.3 WARP across 31 starts, including an electrifying 1-0 complete game effort over the Padres while pitching through a torn elbow ligament. In terms of pitchers putting their careers on the line for Milwaukee, it’s tough to top Sabathia and Sheets, as both pitchers risked millions of dollars on the 2008-2009 free agency market to will the Brewers to their first playoff appearance in a generation; Sheets lost the bet for future millions, while Sabathia cashed on an uncanny performance.

But oh, ode to Manny Parra, Dave Bush, and Carlos Villanueva, the sometimes frustrating but often dependable low rotation and swingman crew for the mid-00s Milwaukee teams. Bush was worth approximately 10 WARP to the Brewers over his 2006-2008 seasons, with 2006 being the high mark; Villanueva and Parra each had their best Milwaukee years in 2008, which is not a bad thing to occur during a playoff race. This trio of pitchers seems quite comparable to many of the 2018 Brewers group, for this trio either had unassuming stuff, or serious profile questions or command concerns when the stuff was there. While one will be quick to point out that the 2018 Brewers do not (yet) have their Sabathia, nor do they have their Sheets, one can find semblances of the Bush, Parra, and Villanueva trio in profiles such as Junior Guerra, Jhoulys Chacin, Wade Miley, and/or Freddy Peralta. This is not an insult: the 2008 trio have never truly received enough credit for their respective roles in carrying the rotation early in the season, nor for their overall value.

Finally, if 1988 was the best franchise pitching season, 1992 exemplified the turn of generations once more, as Jamie Navarro and Cal Eldred were set to join Bosio and Wegman atop the pitching staff. This time, Wegman bested Bosio in terms of value, but both pitchers were quite strong, producing nearly 10 WARP for those 1992 Brewers. Eldred and Navarro also acquitted themselves well, although they would reprise the injuries, inconsistencies, and ineffectiveness that has served as a theme throughout these pitching profiles.

In 1992, one can suddenly see the eras shift, as baseball’s strategic tides moved toward relief pitching prominence, and these Brewers had a deep and fantastic bullpen. Fetters, Holmes, and Orosco were not even the most prominent relievers on the staff (see Plesac, Dan; Henry, Doug; and Austin, Jim). What is stunning about this group is that despite their excellent and deep composition, the Brewers were near the bottom in the American League in both Saves and Holds, and their relievers mostly faced low leverage innings according to Baseball Reference. In 1992, 42 percent of Brewers relief appearances qualified as low leverage; to get a sense of what that might look like, consider than the 2018 Brewers are nearly the exact opposite, with 36 percent of relief appearances qualified as high leverage. It is interesting to think about this strategic snafu of 1992 during a current season in which managers are reaching for their bullpens early and often in order to gain every advantage possible.

Yet is a bullpen ever a vehicle for anything other than strategic failure? Is there a proper way to manage the pen over an extended period of time? If the 2018 Brewers are going to catch the 1988 squad to produce the best pitching season in franchise history, hopefully manager Craig Counsell effectively dispatches those Runs Prevented in the most strategic manner possible.

Baseball Prospectus. Milwaukee Brewers Individual Statistics by Team [CSV]. Retrieved July 29, 2018.

Baseball Reference. Milwaukee Brewers Franchise [CSV]. Retrieved July 29, 2018.

Baseball Reference. Park Factors and League Encyclopedia [CSV]. Retrieved July 29, 2018.

Runs Prevented were calculated using the average of park factors between Baseball Prospectus and Baseball Reference sources, with the addition of a basic league environment runs prevented stat as well. Each Brewers team was assessed by average runs prevented and standard deviation.

Then, near the end of the first half, they slowly started to undo all of the good they’d done earlier; it is now an open question as to whether they truly are intelligently managed, or if they just happened to luck into a winning strategy without realizing it was a winning strategy.

We have all of these great stats for baseball players because baseball is mostly a series of easily quantifiable individual acts, but there are certain interlocking parts on defense and in the bullpen. If you muck with any of those, you can drastically change your fortunes. It all started innocently enough on May 9th. May 9th was the day the Corey Knebel was activated from the disabled list, and when that happened it completely changed how Craig Counsell used his stable of relievers for the worse.

The best way to demonstrate this is in Counsell’s use of Josh Hader. Hader had been used as a multi-inning fireman through all of April and most of May. Through May 25th, Hader made 18 total appearances, and in 12 of those appearances he pitched between two and three innings. He only made an appearance of one inning or less on three occasions. On May 21st, Knebel resumed a proper “closer” role, entering in the 9th inning to finish games in his next four appearances, and finishing the job three times. After Knebel became the closer, Hader’s usage plummeted.

After May 25th, Hader would only pitch more than one and two-thirds inning once, in a 3-inning appearance against the Twins on July 3rd. Hader made 13 appearances after May 25th, and lasted one inning or less in 7 of them. It’s fine to be careful with Hader as he’s a unique weapon when healthy, but this hardly seems like being careful. The ideal use of Hader probably looks like the early season version, with multi-inning appearances followed by one or two days of rest. This run of shorter appearances with one over-long appearance, seems bad.

It might not have been quite so bad had Matt Albers stayed healthy. Albers has been quietly excellent, and having him around with Jeremy Jeffress and Hader makes the bullpen mostly idiot-proof. But Albers last pitched on June 11th, and without him, things have fallen apart. Craig Counsell’s refusal to use Hader in games where the Brewers trail, even by small margins, has severely limited his use. Worse still, Counsell’s willingness to go to the weak part of the bullpen when they trail resulted in big innings for bad pitchers. Dan Jennings is ok, but he’s just OK, and his 3.76 Earned Run Average (ERA) and 1.325 Walks and Hits per Innings Pitched (WHIP) don’t warrant having been used more than the outstanding Jeffress, but that is exactly what has happened. Jacob Barnes has thrown 37 innings with a WHIP of 1.568. Mike Zagurski actually pitched innings. And, of course, Knebel’s automatic entry into save situations with a 4.53 FIP and 3.93 DRA isn’t exactly helping either.

Counsell, in many ways, has reverted to making the decisions of an average manager, except it’s almost worse as he’s put the typical constraints of a closer on his best fireman as well.

The Starters
 
The Brewers can’t afford to run a stupid bullpen, because their starters are a powder keg of dynamite sitting on a pile of twigs and oil-soaked rags inside of a magnifying glass factory. If you read Baseball Prospectus regularly you probably already know about DRA (Deserved Run Average) but if you don’t, DRA attempts to get to the true value of a pitcher by controlling for the factors outside of a pitcher’s control. It adjusts for things like the ballpark a pitcher pitches in, the quality of the catcher, the defense, the weather, the altitude, and a host of other issues. I consider DRA to be mostly a “front office stat” in that it’s most useful if you want to take a pitcher from some other environment, and stick him into yours. If a pitcher on your favorite team is bad and DRA says he should be good, from a fan perspective, it doesn’t really matter that his DRA is good. The results were bad, and that’s what counts.

In this case, I think it actually should matter to fans. The first thing you should know is that the DRA of every Brewer starter is terrifying. Zach Davies has a 5.71 DRA. Wade Miley has a 5.43 DRA. Junior Guerra has a 5.13 DRA.  Those are bad numbers, and with one exception, every Brewer starter’s ERA is drastically lower than their DRA.

Suter is close, but according to DRA, much of the success of pitchers like Chacin, Anderson, Guerra, and Miley is due to “other factors.” Unfortunately, the Brewers have removed many of those “other factors” from the team of late. One of the big other factors is the defense of Orlando Arcia.

Arcia has struggled with the bat all season, and there’s nothing wrong with sending him on a trip to Colorado Springs to get right. However, Arcia has now been effectively gone for about a month given his lack of regular playing time in late June before he was sent down on July first, and while Arcia’s bat has been awful, losing him comes with a real cost on defense. Arcia’s 3.7 Fielding Runs Above Average (FRAA) is second only to Lorenzo Cain, and he accumulated that number in far fewer attempts. On a per play basis, Arcia is likely the best Brewer defensive player, and I suspect almost all defensive metrics understate his true value. The Brewers are on the high end in terms of teams who employ the shift, and Arcia’s greatness in the field allows the team wide latitude in positioning their lesser defenders. If Nate Orf is playing shortstop, it’s much more difficult to commit extra infielders to the right side, knowing that any hits to the left will be hopeless. Orf, Tyler Saladino, and Brad Miller aren’t in the same league as Arcia defensively, and while Saladino has had a nice offense surge lately, they are not good enough offensively to compensate for the lack of Arcia’s glove.

Simultaneously, the Brewers have attempted to get more offense into the lineup by playing Eric Thames in the outfield. When the Brewers have Cain, Christian Yelich, and Ryan Braun/Domingo Santana/anyone else, they have an outstanding defensive outfield, but with Cain missing some time lately, and Thames playing more frequently, the outfield defense has suffered at the same time the infield defense is suffering. The Brewers have taken everything that was working earlier, fundamentally misunderstood why it was working, and turned it on its head. The smidgen of extra offense they may have created simply isn’t worth it.

 
What Should They Do?
 
If the Brewers plan to roll with this pitching staff, the first thing they should do is call up Arcia, and commit to living with whatever issues he may have offensively. More than anything, they need to go back to leaning on their strengths. During the All-Star game it was discovered that Josh Hader wrote several racist, homophobic, and misogynistic tweets when he was in high school seven years ago. He has apologized, will undergo sensitivity training for whatever that’s worth, and will not be suspended, but from a baseball perspective, it will be interesting to see if the constant boos and heckling he is likely to encounter for the foreseeable future will render him less effective. He was already showing some signs of mortality before the incident, and if this compounds whatever physical issues he may have been experiencing, it could destroy the team’s chances.

If Hader can no longer be relied on, it’s imperative that they do the next best thing and use Jeremy Jeffress as they did early season Hader, and if Corbin Burnes can help fill the gap, so much the better.

Monkeying with internal personnel has hurt the team more than it has helped, and Milwaukee could stand to acquire at least one more bat, and if possible, a high-strikeout starter. Having an actual good pitcher who can go deep into games and limit balls in play would have a cascade effect on the bullpen by allowing them more rest, while also boosting the offense. If the pitcher is not as reliant on the defense, the team can afford to sacrifice some defense with moves like having Thames in the outfield.

The Brewers could also address the offense more directly by acquiring a bat, preferably at the catcher position. With Manny Machado off the market, improving on offense at shortstop is likely a fools’ game at this point, but the catchers are still awful, and an upgrade would do a world of good. They could also potentially upgrade at 2nd base as Jonathan Villar has been a disappointment, and it would not be surprising to see the team acquire Brian Dozier from the Twins. Whatever moves they make, they need to bolster their strengths, not replace a major strength in one area with a comparatively minor upgrade in another.

When Knebel was out, the baseball universe taught the Brewers several good lessons about how baseball could, and should be played. As soon as their closer came back they reverted to every old bad habit that they could, and while they clearly understand their own weaknesses on offense, they don’t seem to grasp the trade-offs that can accompany fixing those issues. Hopefully the return of Albers takes care of the bullpen. Hopefully Arcia’s recent success at AAA gets him back to the big leagues in short order. Hopefully the players play their way into their proper roles. I had all of the confidence in the world in Counsell to make this all happen earlier, but that confidence has mostly eroded. Here’s to hope and dumb, stupid luck.

Baseball Prospectus: Milwaukee Brewers Team Audit

Make no mistake about it, Brewers fans and analysts, this is a trap. It’s so easy to polish off phenomenal expectations at a time like this, and rejoice that the Brewers get to play an apparently easier stretch of schedule entering the break. But the team is experiencing some injuries of attrition in the field, just as the offense has finally produced a stretch of 30 games averaging better than 2018 NL / Miller Park runs scored (more on that later). The rotation has done a fantastic job, as has the elite bullpen, which are only getting attention due to a couple of recent blow-ups and blown leads….mostly occurring in games where the batters still cannot get it together.

So in honor of this schedule, which is certainly a trap, let’s have some fun with 21 statistics that are neither here, there, nor anywhere for what will certainly Attrition Central for #TeamDepth. If the Brewers can escape this stretch of play with a 9-12 record, that’s probably correction enough for the run differentials and a sign that the war of attrition did not go terribly wrong.

Ten
Ryan Braun is having a somewhat tough year balancing some new fielding assignments, relatively part time play, nagging injuries once again, and hard-hit batted balls with relatively bad luck. But it’s not all bad for the face of the franchise: in 9.7 percent of his plate appearances, Braun has hit for extra bases (12 doubles, one triple, and eight home runs). By comparison, the average National League bat hits for extra bases in approximately 7.6 percent of plate appearances.

Twelve
For the season, much has been made of the Brewers batters’ ten shutouts. In fact, this is quite an important number for Milwaukee batters, as the total Runs Scored “zero” has appeared more frequently than all but one run total: two runs.

For the 2018 campaign, the Brewers have scored two runs more frequently than any other outcome by the offense. What’s worse is that this number is not really accompanied by very good run totals, either; five runs is very nice, and it’s good to see that number tied with “0” for second place, but after that both of “3” and “1” are below average run totals.

Sixteen
For all the criticisms that Brewers baserunners have faced for their aggressive style over the years, it seems that the exceptional baserunning performance of Milwaukee has mostly escaped fan consciousness. Undoubtedly this is due in part to the fact that the Brewers are not scoring runs at an average clip. But, according to Baseball Prospectus Baserunning Runs, the Brewers are the third best team in the MLB in terms of baserunning production. Translating this to stolen bases, Lorenzo Cain leads the team with 16 steals in 19 attempts, ahead of Jonathan Villar (10 / 12), Christian Yelich (9 / 10) and Ryan Braun (7 / 9). In fact, Milwaukee is the second best team in the National League in terms of stolen bases (58 of 71 attempts). Run, run, run!

Twenty
Only the New York Mets have attempted fewer sacrifice bunt attempts than the Brewers in 2018. Milwaukee has attempted 20 bunts thus far, with successful sacrifices 14 times; this is good for a success rate that is higher than the league average. Ironically, for the lack of runs scored, Milwaukee is not only a great base running team, but they are also posting average or better situational hitting statistics according to Baseball Reference. This occurs across categories: sacrifice bunts, productive outs, baserunners scored, and advancing baserunners (with less than two outs at third base and zero outs at second base). The problem for the Brewers is simply that they do not get enough batters on base frequently enough…

Thirteen
….and when the Brewers do get baserunners on, their tendency to hit ground balls results in the highest percentage of ground ball double plays in the National League (13 percent of GIDP opportunities). This is notably worse than the NL average of double plays produced in ten percent of opportunities. So much for strike outs being a bad thing!

Four
One wonders if the defensive flexibility of the ballclub might actually explain some of the troubles the club has in terms of scoring runs…the Brewers only have four players with more than 50 starts at one position (Lorenzo Cain and Travis Shaw lead as the most regular regulars with 70 starts, followed by Villar (55) and Arcia (53) in the middle infield). Jesus Aguilar does not even have 50 starts at first base this year; Christian Yelich’s most regular position is left field…for 32 games, and catcher and right field have also been impacted in the games started department (probably due to the respective performances of Manny Pina and Domingo Santana more than strategy).

I was certainly in the camp that expected defensive flexibility to be a strength for these Brewers, and I certainly do not think it is a downright liability given the performance of the fielders. But given the performance of the offense, I think it is worth questioning whether flexible defensive roles have an impact on batting performance for these players.

Nine
Why are the Brewers pitchers so good? Their groundball percentage is fading to the middle of the pack, minimizing their ability to produce double plays as well. However, Milwaukee arms excel at limiting fly balls, and their 9.46 percent pop-up rate is the best in the MLB according to Baseball Prospectus.

Five
For all the rumblings about the Brewers relief pitching hitting their regression to the mean, it’s worth noting that the pitchers are not terribly far above average in some stats to begin with. For instance, the Brewers rank fifth in the National League with 32 percent of their Inherited Runners Scored, despite inheriting fewer runners than the league average (100 versus 106 for the typical NL team). This is an indication of how the club is quite good with inherited runners scored, but not necessarily perched atop the league.

4.3 at 23
It’s too bad that the Brewers pitchers are not yielding more ground balls, because Orlando Arcia remains one of the best shortstops in baseball despite his lack of playing time. Arcia has the fewest games played of any SS in the Top 10 for Fielding Runs Above Average. Yet, the 23-year old glove-first fielder ranks sixth in FRAA with his 4.3 mark. Another statistic worth remembering: at 23, Arcia is tied for Carlos Correa as the youngest elite defensive shortstop, and among shortstops with at least 60 games only Ahmed Rosario of the Mets is younger (but he’s nowhere near as good defensively). If you like more straightforward statistics, according to Baseball Reference Arcia remains one of the very best MLB shortstops with 10 Defensive Runs Saved; only Freddy Galvis and Addison Russell are better in the NL.

Second Best at .336
Jesus Aguilar is having a fantastic season, boasting a .336 True Average (TAv) and 1.4 FRAA. That offensive performance is second only to Freddie Freeman among first basemen with 60 or more games played.

One
For their fantastic pitching staff, the Brewers only have one player in the top ten percent of all MLB, in terms of Wins Above Replacement Player (WARP). That player is lefty high leverage reliever Josh Hader, ranked as 40th (!) with 1.54 WARP. No full-time reliever ranks higher, and only one pitcher better than Hader is younger (Jack Flaherty).

Ten
Many Brewers fans are suggesting that the club needs an ace in their pitching rotation. When I host chats on BPMilwaukee Twitter (@BPMilwaukee), the most common questions since the off season typically concern the quality of the MLB rotation. Throwing out the extremely advanced stats, let’s look at games started and ERA+ (a contextual assessment of Earned Runs Average). Here we are, half way through the season, and only ten clubs have at least three starters with 10 GS and an ERA at or above league average: the Red Sox, Cubs, Cleveland, Tigers, Astros, Angels, Mets, Cardinals, Nationals, and Brewers.

Seventeen / 40 Percent
If you’re interested in an ace, though, using the colloquial definition of someone who can lead a rotation in terms of performance and starts, who would be better than Jhoulys Chacin? Sorting all MLB starting pitchers by games started and ERA+, Chacin meets the strongest definition of good performance in a heavy workload.

Of course, including advanced contextual statistics, it is worth questioning whether the club will see some course correction from the starting pitchers. Here, Junior Guerra’s 4.69 DRA is the best among Brewers starters with at least 60 innings pitched. That’s good for 71st in the MLB. Yet, once Guerra is working between the lines, his splitter remains one of the best in the game at inducing swings-and-misses; thus far Guerra is yielding nearly 40 percent whiffs-per-swing on the split (only slightly lagging his 2016 performance that put that pitch on the map).

Thirteen / Forty-Three
Overall, the Brewers pitching rotation forms quite a strong unit: the club’s starting pitchers have 13 Runs Prevented as a group. This performance helps the team maximize a phenomenal bullpen, as the Brewers can frequently keep the game close. With a bullpen that has prevented 43 runs, the starting pitchers are often handing close games to relief pitchers that are ready to help convert those games into wins.

Six
When is a better than average offense not really that good? Over the last 30 games for the Brewers, it turns out! Those big ticket runs totals against Philadelphia have gone a long way toward improving Milwaukee’s season long offensive figures….

….but for all that, over the last 30 games the most frequently Runs Scored total for the Brewers has declined from the season leading 2 RS. Twenty percent of the Brewers’ games since they returned from Minnesota have ended with 1 RS for Milwaukee. If you missed seeing 2 RS, do not worry, for that remained the second most frequent run total over that time.

Seventeenth in Right
Domingo Santana is a tough player to figure out right now. If someone had told Brewers fans that the right fielder would have -2.6 FRAA roughly halfway through the season, most would have expected that he would be in the running for one of the most valuable right fielders in the MLB. Alas, in True Average (TAv), Santana’s mark of .259 (i.e., roughly league average) ranks 17th of 24 MLB RF with 60 or more games played.

Fourteen
Perhaps Lorenzo Cain is able to produce so many stolen bases in part because he’s on first base so frequently: the Brewers Center Fielder is drawing walks in 13.8 percent of his plate appearances!

Nineteen (Two)
Without park adjustment, across the 2018 MLB the Brewers’ offense currently ranks 19th in terms of Runs Scored. Their pitching staff currently ranks 2nd in terms of Runs Allowed.

Photo Credit: Jeff Hanisch, USA Today Sports Images

Corey Knebel gave up what turned out to be the Phillies’ winning run in Sunday’s loss. He started the inning throwing three fastballs to Odubel Herrera and the last one caught too much of the plate. That was the fourth home run Knebel has allowed this season. His home runs per nine innings have more than doubled when compared with last year, which has fueled his DRA spike from 2.91 to 4.05. However, Knebel’s walk rate remains virtually unchanged and he’s giving up one less hit per nine innings this season.

The season long numbers paint a contradictory picture where it’s not clear whether Knebel has been the same pitcher as his dominant 2017. Looking only at Knebel since his injury return, he looks to be almost at the same level. Ignoring his three appearances to start the season reduces an already limited sample size for a late inning reliever, but it’s fair to assume he was not fully healthy, so those numbers aren’t indicative of his true performance level.

By 2017, Knebel had whittled his pitches down to a fourseam fastball and curveball. He used the fastball on 72 percent of his pitches and threw the curveball the rest of the time.  The fastball had an average velocity of 97.8 mph with a maximum speed of 100.4 mph. His curveball was slightly slower with an average of 81.0 mph and a maximum velocity of 84.4. Since Knebel returned from the disabled list, his average and maximum velocity readings are right in line with his numbers from last year.

There has been a noticeable difference on his fastball movement. The pitch is too frequently in the strike zone, which helps to explain why his zone rate is at a career high (51.3 percent). The ball isn’t moving horizontally as much as it did in 2017. Whereas last year, the fastball was generally higher in the zone and stayed more towards his arm side, the pitch hasn’t found the same locations since Knebel returned from the disabled list. There’s also less vertical movement on the pitch, which is affecting his whiff rate.

Knebel gets more of his whiffs on those high fastballs, both this year and last, but as mentioned above, he’s not getting the fastball in the same spots as last year. One potential cause is his release. Both horizontally and vertically the ball is leaving his hand at a different point, which is enough to effect pitch location, even if his velocity is the same.

Last year, Corey Knebel was one of the best pitchers in baseball according to DRA. He hasn’t quite reached those heights this year, with his fastball as the most likely culprit. If he could slightly raise his release point, he may get back to the same level. However, there’s likely something fluky about his increased home runs. He’s never given them up at this rate, and simple regression over the next three months should bring that more in line with his career numbers, which would also lower his DRA. With the performance of the bullpen, the team doesn’t need peak Knebel to make it through the season, but if he can return to that performance, there’s even more margin of error for the starters.

Eric Thames had a huge game on Sunday, hitting two home runs, his first extra base hits since returning to the team on Tuesday. His first home run came off an Aaron Nola two seam fastball which was right over the plate. Thames hit his second home run off a Hector Neris fastball in the bottom of the ninth inning, That pitch was at around the same height, but even more over the plate.

One can hope that the home runs showed that Thames is over his thumb injury and ready to tap into his prodigious power, because he struggled in his first few games since his activation from the disabled list. Over the last week, Thames has swung at almost every pitch that wasn’t outside and away, whiffing on everything low. Before he got hurt, Thames had a more balanced plan of attack, with a willingness to cover the whole strike zone. With that approach, he could get a hit anywhere in the zone, even if most of his power came from pitches on the inner half of the plate.

Thames still has one more hurdle to overcome before he’s truly back to form: he needs to stop whiffing on so many non-fastballs. This has been a recurring issue for Thames. When he can get his bat on those pitches or lay off, he has success; otherwise, pitchers can eat him up. Last week, pitchers ate him up as he swung and missed at 32 percent of the breaking pitches he faced and 60 percent of the offspeed pitches. Each of those are unsustainable rate for any kind of success and well off his April numbers. On Sunday, Thames saw six non-fastballs. He swung at three of the pitches and didn’t miss any of them. That counts as progress.

Milwaukee will play within the division all week. They open a three-game series tonight in Pittsburgh. The Pirates have fallen off after a fast start. They’re 9-19 over the last thirty-one days, falling to fourth place in the division. Milwaukee then returns home for four games with the Cardinals, who beat the Cubs on Sunday night to salvage a dismal week which saw them lose home series to both the Cubs and the Padres.

Photo Credit: Benny Sieu, USA Today Sports Images

Of course, these Brewers look very, very bad in some areas of the game. One can use Pythagorean W-L, or Run Differential (Runs Scored / Runs Allowed), to estimate a club’s expected record based on their underlying elements. In this case, the results are much uglier than .500. If one had told Brewers fans and analysts that their favorite club would be 4-8 after the first dozen games, that would probably cause a bit more pause than a .500 record. How did we get here?

• The starting pitching has been worse than many people expected, even worse than many naysayers could have imagined.

• Much of the bad starting pitching performance is due to poor fielding. While the Brewers starting pitchers are 11 runs below average thus far (!!!), these arms have also allowed four more runs than expected based on Fielding Independent Pitching (which is awful this early in the season). A 41 RS / 53 RA club might have been able to eat more innings, or given a few close games more breathing room.

• More importantly, the starting pitching’s poor performance has occurred early in games. Only Chase Anderson and Zach Davies have completed six innings of work thus far in the season, which means that in three additional turns through the rotation the bullpen has required (at least) another inning of work.

• Innings pitched workloads over nine inning games are one thing, but since the Brewers have played in so many close games, the workload has been compounded by extra innings games. Milwaukee has already played three extra innings games thus far in 2018; to put that in perspective, seventeen MLB teams have yet to play two extra innings games in this young season.

• The fielding really is bad. According to Baseball Prospectus Defensive Efficiency and Park-Adjusted Defensive Efficiency statistics, the Brewers fielding unit is easily in the bottom third of the MLB. This is somewhat surprising given that (a) the Brewers had a relatively middle-of-the-road fielding unit in 2017 and (b) the Brewers’ offseason moves largely were meant to improve the defense (see Eric Sogard, Lorenzo Cain, and Christian Yelich transactions as examples).

• Of course, the batting performances thus far have been terrible. In fact, based on the 2018 National League and three-year Miller Park factor, the Brewers have average nearly one run below average per game. The bats have scored five or more runs in 5 games thus far; the trouble is, when they are not scoring runs, they are not scoring runs. In this department, the Brewers have also scored two-or-fewer runs in 5 games thus far. You can say what you want about the pitching, but you’re not going to win many 0 run support games.

• Beyond the performances, the poor play on the field has been compounded by injuries. Currently, Christian Yelich and Corey Knebel have joined Jimmy Nelson, Boone Logan, and Stepgen Vogt on the disabled list. Meanwhile, Lorenzo Cain is also nursing a day-to-day injury, which produced the club’s listless batting order that appeared in last night’s loss in St. Louis. There’s no other way to say it: the Brewers have a pretty good team on the DL right now, which is certainly not an excuse for poor play (especially for a team that was supposed to call depth its strength), but is one explanation for the gloomy attitude among Brewers fans.

• Ultimately, there also seems to be this attitude among Brewers fans that since success was unexpected in 2017, every game in 2018 would be a referendum on those expectations. It is as though Brewers fans are simultaneously terrified and angry about the mounting poor play, while also angrily pounding their fists in vindication: “See, I told you the rotation was bad! See, I told you this wasn’t a good team! The front office was fooled by their 2017 team!” That sort of attitude does not help anyone, but in an era where fans identify more with roster-building and playing along as General Manager, rather than imagining themselves as ball players and aligning themselves with labor, this produces fan sentiments that are sensitive and easily bitter towards shortcomings on the field.

So what’s going right? According to Baseball Prospectus, first and foremost, the Brewers pitchers are yielding relatively high percentages of ground balls and pop-ups. This essentially means that the pitchers are doing their job of limiting hard contact and keeping the ball on the ground. Given the general career fielding profiles of the Brewers defense, one might expect the Brewers’ Runs Allowed profile to self-correct should Milwaukee arms continue to allow solid groundball and pop-up percentages. Additionally, although the Brewers rotation has not been designed to strike batters out (48 of 269 batters struck out thus far), they are limiting the walks (22 of 269 batters). While the home run total must come down, thus far the strikeout-to-walk ratio is a sign of success.

Of course, it is more difficult to see the silver linings with the Brewers offense. In fact, the Brewers bats have batted-ball statistics that their pitching staff would like to see: Milwaukee batters are thus far keeping the ball on the ground and popping up at strong percentages, which is not a good trend to see for an offense. Despite all this, it is worth noting that the Brewers True Average of .246 is basically around the league median; currently, a .258 TAv is a Top 10 performance among MLB teams, and six teams have TAv between .245 and .249. It is worth noting that, thus far, the Brewers batters have ended significantly more plate appearances after the first pitch in 2018 than 2017, but they are not succeeding in those plate appearances: their .305 / .317 / .441 batting average / on-base percentage / slugging percentage slash line is notably below average for first pitch plate appearances.

One key silver lining statistic that the “home run or nothing” vultures may be thrilled to see: the Brewers are significantly limiting their strike outs thus far (near 10 percent improvement), knocking the ball into play more frequently. Their home run rate has plummeted from 3.7 percent in 2017 to 2.1 percent in 2018 thus far, which is certainly something to continue watching. As Milwaukee continues to knock the ball into play more frequently, they must change their orientation away from a groundball and pop-up team. “Home run or nothing” is not a bad offense if the home runs mean a club is not grounding out and popping up.

As the season progresses, it is worth tracking home runs, fly balls, and runs scored per game across the MLB. Thus far, the run environment has deflated, which is another interesting element to consider regarding the Brewers’ roster construction. Compared to the run environment of 2016-2017, the Brewers pitching staff is even better than its current performance, but the deflation in runs scoring amplifies every shortcoming on the mound. Alternately, it is worth questioning whether a shift in the ball is affecting batter across the league. Given MLB efforts to speed up the pace of the game, as well as their ambivalent responses to the “bad press” of various (independent) corroborations of juiced baseballs during 2016-2017, it is plausible that MLB could have put the lid on the juiced ball.

Ultimately, this is not “small sample size” warning to throw out the analysis above: the Brewers have several shortcomings that cannot continue. The bats cannot continue to walk at low rates, or hit the ball on the ground, or pop up. Somehow, adjustments at the plate must center around maximizing patience and discipline to drive the ball around the ballpark. The fielding cannot continue their inefficient play, and this has nothing to do with errors; errors are one thing, but inefficiencies around the diamond are hurting a Brewers pitching staff that is meant simply to feed a defensive unit. In fact, the arms must continue to feed ground balls and pop-ups to their fielders…that’s one trend that should be maintained.

Yet, so long as Christian Yelich is injured, so long as Jimmy Nelson is injured, so long as Corey Knebel is injured, so long as Stephen Vogt and Boone Logan are injured, it is worth seeing a club scraping by at .500 as an extreme strength. #TeamDepth has already been tested, and the club is doing what many of us expected they would do anyway: they are playing in close games, night after night, and must use their strong bullpen and fielding to make that equation work. Now the equation of players executing that strategy have changed, which is not an excuse; indeed, that’s the whole point of #TeamDepth. It’s worth punting this 6-6 start, considering each .500 point as a 0-0 event from which the team can be newly evaluated. Put aside the 4-8 run differential, even: we know what adjustments the Brewers need to make, and we know they have one of the deepest clubs in the game to attempt to execute those adjustments. Now it’s time to see if it works.

Photo Credit: Jeff Curry, USA Today Sports Images.

Baseball Prospectus:
Why PECOTA Hates Your Favorite Team
13 Noteworthy Projections

Since PECOTA is a probabilistic model, which means that it is designed to reflect the most probable outcome in a distribution of projected outcomes, Brewers fans should keep in mind that “84” is not some special or magic number. As demonstrated last season, a club that was expected (at best) to flirt with .500 surged ahead and competed for the playoffs, but that surge was not even greater than one standard deviation away from the projected win total. These Brewers could indeed use their strengths to once again push the club ahead of schedule by contending for a playoff spot or winning the division in 2018, or they could indeed sputter in development patterns or role depreciation and return closer to .500. What PECOTA reflects is that the Brewers’ big offseason moves (trading for Christian Yelich, signing Lorenzo Cain) did not guarantee them a playoff spot or even playoff contention, but instead, “more probable” competition or “more probable” playoff contention.

So, what’s going to make the Brewers “tick” in 2018? Here are my favorite picks from 2018 Brewers PECOTA:

PECOTA “punts” the Yelich Trade
Standing behind the curtain during some of the PECOTA work throughout the offseason, it was very interesting to see that the trade involving Lewis Brinson, Monte Harrison, Isan Diaz, and Jordan Yamamoto for Christian Yelich….did not really “move the needle” on the Brewers’ 2018 expected win total. This is surprising given the court of public opinion, but there are two specific reasons that the trade does not immediately yield an absurd advantage for the 2018 Brewers: (1) Lewis Brinson’s high floor is real, and (2) Christian Yelich could experience some role depreciation. It’s always so easy to look at the best possible outcomes or potentialities in each trade; Brinson the future superstar, Yelich the 5.0 WARP player, but it’s also worth emphasizing Brinson’s risk in reaching his peak role and Yelich’s fluctuation between varying degrees of serviceable-to-great production.

Don’t get me wrong: Christian Yelich is a very good baseball player, and his contract makes him worth every potential prospect future that the Brewers surrendered. PECOTA thinks so, too, projecting Yelich primarily as a Brewers left fielder working a .279 TAv and serviceable fielding at a corner position. That’s good for 2.7 WARP, second only to Lorenzo Cain (3.5 WARP). But, remember that floor for Brinson? Even if the center fielder fails to reach his fullest and best hit tool (and therefore, fullest and best power) in the MLB, he’s still a speedy, strong defense, strong arm player in the center of the diamond. PECOTA projects Brinson at .262 TAv and an overall plus on defense for the Marlins, which is good for a club leading 2.5 WARP. This is great for both teams: the Brewers land a quality outfielder under control for five years who has already shown his developed peak abilities at the MLB level (while rounding out the club with a left-handed bat and better plate discipline), while Marlins fans immediately landed the face of their rebuild, the best player on their team, and (at best) someone who neutralizes the toxic offseason orchestrations of Project Wolverine.

Zach Davies and Orlando Arcia Remain Quietly Competitive
As mentioned, the Brewers contended in 2017 due to the “high floor” strengths of their youngsters: players like Orlando Arcia and Zach Davies were not set up to be immediate superstars, but still maintained quality, consistent MLB seasons that propelled the team along “behind the scenes.” PECOTA projects the same for 2018, although this time Zach Davies is leading the pitching staff with a solid 4.43 DRA over 170+ innings, good for a 1.6 WARP. Arcia sits behind Cain and Yelich in terms of overall WARP, but the young shortstop is projected to continue onward with excellent defense and a serviceable bat at shortstop. One could look at these players’ projections and emphasize that PECOTA sees them declining from their absolute 2017 WARP, but I don’t think the WARP is the point here. Instead, what matters is that this duo is still viewed as a quality backbone of the club, even with some attrition, which will undoubtedly serve crucial roles for grinding through 162.

The Outfield Depth is a Problem
Projecting the Brewers’ outfield depth was a nightmare. I previously wrote about how a rotational system can make five outfield spots work for Yelich, Cain, Santana, Ryan Braun, and Brett Phillips, but it’s much more difficult to put those ideals into the mixer and dissect the potential probabilities. Probability #1, which PECOTA currently projects sans Santana trade, is that Ryan Braun plays right field, but only some first base and left field, and therefore loses all of his defensive value. Both Braun and Santana suffer in this universe, creating a total of 1.9 WARP (but 75 extra base hits!) and TAv below .280. Comparable players for Domingo Santana are Oswaldo Arcia, Jonny Gomes, and Joc Pederson, and his plate discipline regresses (98 strike outs and 36 walks in 315 plate appearances). Granted, I do think there is still a path of optimism about the current roster depth (perhaps Braun works 1B more frequently, and Santana receives more regular playing time across the outfield, interleague designated hitter, and pinch hitting roles), but I do not think that means PECOTA is categorically mistaken for the pessimistic trends for Braun or Santana. After all, the current roster mash up is designed in a way to particularly showcase flaws for both Braun and Santana, which does not mean they’re bad baseball players (in fact, their TAv are projected to contend for best overall offensive production on the club), they simply may be imperfect ballplayers for this current roster.

Chase Anderson is Chase Anderson
There are many good stories about the 2017 Brewers, but it’s tough to find one that’s better than Anderson’s arrival as an impact starting pitcher. Anderson resonated with Brewers fans not simply because he was a previous low-to-mid rotation depth option who arrived as one of the very best pitchers in the National League, but because he also vindicated the mechanical, analytical, and strategic approach of pitching coach Derek Johnson. In 2018, PECOTA projects some of 2016 Anderson to return, particularly in the shape of walks, hits, and home runs, without phenomenal gains in strike outs or ground balls. Underlying modeling views Anderson as one of the most likely pitchers on the Brewers to “collapse” in 2018, and less likely to “improve,” and it’s not hard to squint and see a scenario in which a comparable of Dustin McGowan is suitable for the righty’s age-30 campaign. Even with all of this noted, Anderson’s DRA is projected at 4.59 for the year, which should be a better than average performance if the offensive environment holds steady. There is value in that performance over 168.0 innings pitched, and this type of season still validates the contract extension that Anderson signed.

The Bullpen is Fantastic
As a group, the primary Brewers bullpen as currently constructed looks fantastic. Josh Hader and Corey Knebel are projected as the most likely relievers to improve in 2018, but Jeremy Jeffress, Boone Logan, and Matt Albers also receive relatively strong scores in the category. The current main group is projected to produce a DRA below 4.30, which should demonstrate the potential for average or better production in most offensive environments that the arms face in 2018. Some red flags float beneath the surface, however, as the walk rates are slightly worse than average for the relief group, and outside of Adrian Houser, Jeffress, Albers, and Jacob Barnes the group is projected to have relatively low ground ball rates. Yet, even outside of Knebel and Hader the relievers are projected as a strong strike out group, suggesting that some of the slider-heavy moves of the offseason should pay dividends in high leverage situations.

Prospects Begin Appearing on the Scene
One of my favorite aspects of digging into PECOTA projections is the appearance of new faces to the MLB. Caden Lemons, Keston Hiura, KJ Harrison, and Tristen Lutz are all listed as highly improbable MLB players by PECOTA, but their appearance on the radar after the 2017 draft means that the system is now generating comparable players for this group. Jacob Nottingham was added to the 40-Man Roster at the beginning of the 2017-2018 offseason, and one of the comparable names that popped up in his player line is Jonathan Lucroy, which is fascinating for many reasons (not the least of which is Lucroy’s general reputation as a defense-first catcher for the beginning of his career, and Nottinghma’s floor as a back-up catcher with pop). Mauricio Dubon appears as one of the more probable MLB prospects for the club, and his line is a very serviceable utility infielder (.250 batting average, .380 slugging percentage).

Brewers fans might be most excited to see Corbin Burnes at the bottom of the club’s starting pitcher list with three starts, as the pop-up righty prospect is given relatively favorable odds to reach the MLB and a set of comparable players that effectively grade out his reliever risk, reliever potential, and (most excitingly) his starting pitching potential. Additionally, Adrian Houser is given lower odds of reaching the MLB in 2018, but seeing the power sinker reliever in the mix leads to an exciting scenario where the entire Carlos Gomez / Mike Fiers trade return is potentially playing with the Brewers during the same season.

It’s a good reminder that even though common perception is that the Brewers system took a big hit with the Christian Yelich trade, there is still an intriguing group of prospects potentially knocking at the door for 2018. Add an asterisk to this potential 83-win season, as one that exhibits contending-ready talent and depth roles that are still developing for more future success.

Photo Credit: Ken Blaze, USAToday Sports Images

Edit: Updated at 7:15 AM to reflect updated win total, from 84 to 83.

Of course, the Brewers win also brings the club thoroughly into “winning season territory,” beyond the mere .500 win total (81) or the “well, I guess they won one more game than .500″ mark of 82 wins.

Now, with five games remaining in the season, these 2017 Brewers are fighting for their playoffs lives, improbably fighting for a divisional shot, and perhaps most improbably, fighting for a slot among the Best Brewers Teams in Franchise History. Let’s have a look:

Obviously, the cynical Brewers fans will point out that the fact that this team is one of the best in franchise history reflects the losing nature of the franchise, rather than the strengths of this 2017 club. I think that’s a cop out, for several reasons; first, this team clearly features some key young- and prime-aged players getting ready for a contending run (hopefully); second, this team clearly features one of the very best pitching staffs in Brewers history, including both the starting rotation and the bullpen. This last fact will be true by runs prevented (even if the team allows 50 runs over the last five games, they will remain a significantly better than average club; they are currently on pace to prevent 60 runs), as well as by WARP.

The historical Baseball Prospectus pitching statistics show that Jimmy Nelson (3.95), Zach Davies (3.57), Corey Knebel (2.22), and Chase Anderson (2.13) each have more than 2.00 pitching Wins Above Replacement (WARP); no other Brewers team has accomplished that, ever! If one is inclined to complain about the offense, and call this team one-dimensional, well, sometimes very good baseball teams are one dimensional, and it just happens that this Brewers club actually is lead by pitching instead of the club reputation for being offense-first (CSV retrieved September 27, 2017).

To provide context for the significance of this pitching accomplishment, consider the fact that the Brewers have five 2.0 WARP position players in 2017, as well. However, by comparison, Brewers teams have had five or more 2.0 WARP position players in 2016, 2014, 2012, 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008, 2007, 2005, 1996, 1992, 1991, 1990, 1987, 1983, 1982, 1979, 1978, and 1972, according to Baseball Prospectus Team Batting Statistics (CSV retrieved September 27, 2017). So, indeed, this pitching performance is special for the Brewers, and makes the 2017 club a true anomaly in the history of the franchise, a true pitching-first ballclub.

The 2017 Brewers are already one of the very best clubs in franchise history, and each win as the season closes should hopefully keep the team in the playoff hunt and solidify this historically good standing within the franchise.

There will be an entire offseason to assess this club in terms of what’s next, but it should be immediately clear that this 2017 team is somewhat of an anomaly. There are no real stars (only Travis Shaw has reached the 4.0 WARP level), and the club’s identity is in the rich assemblage of depth players who just needed a chance to play. Manny Pina, Hernan Perez, Jesus Aguilar, Keon Broxton, Jonathan Villar, and maybe even Eric Sogard fit this mold as players producing 1.0 to 2.0 WARP in 2017; not one of these players is a standout, or perhaps even a member of the next “planned” Brewers contending core, but together they are worth nearly 8.0 WARP to the club. The offseason will be the occasion for deeper dives into the talent of this club and their likelihood of continuing success with this roster, but two things are certain:

(1) This Brewers club is a team in the truest sense, with a real identity across the diamond. I hope that when the club is building “planned” contenders, they do not forget the lessons learned when seeking ignored or unproven avenues of talent. Hopefully the next “planned” contender does have a productive Lewis Brinson or Corbin Burnes, named by the club as the 2017 Minor League Players of the Year, but it would not be all that bad to have a 2017 Manny Pina, 2017 Chase Anderson, 2017 Jimmy Nelson, or 2016 Jonathan Villar coming along for the ride as well.

(2) Let’s hope these Brewers continue to win out, because this pitching-first club with a deep and lights out bullpen and two notably better than average starters (Anderson and Davies) could wreak havoc in short form playoff series. All Milwaukee needs to do is get there, so get there! Go Brewers!

Photo Credit: Benny Sieu, USAToday Sports Images