New Runs Prevented Workbook || Runs Prevented Primer

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1KBQ19VcMZ4g7oW1jkGiYwxCadqjw3rYXkqN200f4lHc/edit?usp=sharing

This is not even some “to-be-expected” regression, as even if one wishes to look at Deserved Runs Average (DRA) throughout the season as a “true” measure of the Brewers talent (which should be cautioned), the Brewers would have been expected to allow anywhere between 23 and 30 fewer second half runs than they actually have allowed.

This is unforeseen and catastrophic.

The blame can be spread around to everyone, from the post-forearm injury Junior Guerra (10 IP, 9 runs on July 24 & 29), injured reliever Matt Albers (1.7 IP, 10 R), former? closer Corey Knebel (9.3 IP, 8 R entering Sunday), and even rookie rotation depth Freddy Peralta (19 IP, 17 R since the break). Worse yet, there is a sense of adding insult to injury, as newly acquired Joakim Soria hit the disabled list promptly after surrendering a grand slam home run in a devastating loss to San Diego, and quietly effective Taylor Williams hit the disabled list with an elbow injury. While fans will feel less sympathy for Matt Albers, who had a couple of different bouts of ineffectiveness surrounded by separate disabled list stints, the veteran righty was crucial to early season success (25 IP, 4 R through the end of May) and each day his injury status and effectiveness is not answered is a day that manager Craig Counsell must carefully ration Jeremy Jeffress and Josh Hader with little back-up. The same goes for Williams, and now Soria; while Jacob Barnes was previously an impact reliever and boasts solid peripherals and a 2.99 Deserved Run Average (DRA), his runs prevention performance in 2018 has not been to the level of that injured trio, and now it’s Barnes, Corbin Burnes, and Jordan Lyles trying to nail down the quietly effective support roles.

It’s as simple as this: the Brewers’ bullpen has two truly fantastic options in Jeffress and Hader, and those options will be great regardless of their surrounding cast. For the purposes of contending, however, this duo is amplified when Stearns’s excellent depth picks (Albers, Williams, even Corbin Burnes), closer (Knebel), and additional acquisitions (Soria) are performing well. Jeffress and Hader cannot do it themselves.

Injuries have also trimmed the rotation, as Brent Suter’s torn elbow ligament and Zach Davies’s back ailments have limited the Brewers’ effective rotational depth. Using Baseball Reference Three Year Park factors, both Suter and Davies combined for 18 Runs Prevented over 273 innings in 2017, offering excellent middle and replacement rotation depth. That level of impact depth performance will not be matched by the duo in 2018. Additionally, even if one could have argued that the club might not have expected Jimmy Nelson to return from his shoulder injury in 2018, having that materialize as a likely injury-scenario reality in 2018 is quite another ballgame. Consider this as Freddy Peralta meets a likely innings limit, Chase Anderson continues an uneven season, and Brandon Woodruff finds himself without a rotational role: #TeamDepth is now basically #TeamNecessity in terms of rotation building.

There’s no need to state it any other way: as much as one would like to criticize the Brewers pitching staff, and GM David Stearns for his failure to build a staff, the club is now to the point where injuries are diminishing even his strongest moves. The Soria trade looms loudest here, as the Brewers grabbed a legitimate high leverage, veteran reliever at the trade deadline and did not get six innings from his right arm before he hit the DL with a groin injury; Albers and Williams could be fan whipping posts when they were ineffective, but the Albers free agency deal looked like a brilliant low-cost gamble early in the season while Williams seemed poised to catapult himself into the high leverage workload discussion (Williams worked a 17.3 IP, 5 R stretch, Holding three leads, from June until the All Star Break).

Citing injuries to the pitching staff is not an “excuse” for the poor performance.

It would have been enough to deal with this group of recent injuries and setbacks, but the Brewers also simultaneously were gifted with a set of role reversions on the pitching staff. Corey Knebel’s descent from excellent closer in 2017 cost the Brewers a chance at a truly elite relief corps; according to Baseball Reference Three Year Park Factors, Knebel prevented nearly 25 runs in 2017. Even a 50 percent regression from that performance level would fit nicely with Jeffress and Hader, who have both been consistent Top 25 pitchers in the 2018 MLB. Add in the aforementioned struggles of Peralta, Barnes, and a bit of stalled usage from the shuttled Houser (he’s only worked two MLB appearances from July onward), and Counsell’s strategic options are looking much more thin while they are also being exasperated by some ineffective starts.

Beyond these role question marks, it is worth questioning the timing of the inclusion of Jorge Lopez in the Mike Moustakas trade. Since Lopez has served the season as an up-and-down member of the Triple-A / MLB “shuttle team” relief squad, discussions of the quality of Lopez’s performance were largely nonexistent at the trade deadline (I’m also guilty of this charge). But, it is worth emphasizing that as a back-roster depth strategy, the “shuttle team” prevented runs at a solid clip, especially when one considers the nature of this replacement role and the likely quality of other replacement pitchers to be acquired in their place.

In fact, these shuttle relievers combined to produce near-average aggregate performance for the Brewers, which leads one to question why Stearns traded Lopez and simultaneously decided to keep Brandon Woodruff at the Triple-A level to serve as replacement starting pitching depth. With Lopez in the Royals system and Woodruff now serving as starting pitching depth, the revolving door relief strategy is effectively dead at what could be the worst time of the season. Given that Woodruff boats a 3.55 DRA at the MLB level to accompany a 52 percent ground ball rate, while also demonstrating an average DRA at Colorado Springs with a consistent ground ball rate there, it is worth questioning why Stearns has not simply replaced Peralta with Woodruff (on the one hand) or simply promoted Woodruff to a steady MLB relief role (on the other hand). According to Brooks Baseball, the relief role is agreeing with Woodruff, who is throwing a sizzling 95-to-96 MPH fastball with more armside run than his 2017 variation, complete with steady change up and slider usage (both with more whiffs than in 2017, too).

This is not a bottomless pit (yet). That the Brewers remain the 12th best pitching staff in the MLB, within one standard deviation of the 10th spot, and sixth best pitching staff in the National League, should demonstrate just how good the club has been for most of the year. Indeed, this pitching staff has fallen off, and it’s important to underscore that it’s not simply “regression,” but a bad combination of regression, injuries, and strategic missteps at the worst possible time. But there could be a quick way out of this issue for the club:

• Get Zach Davies healthy, without any further setbacks, and use him to replace Freddy Peralta in the rotation.

• Develop an MLB role for Brandon Woodruff; preferably this would be a rotational role to spell another ineffective starter down the stretch (or add a sixth man for September), but even a well-defined one-inning bullpen role could be extremely helpful at the moment.

• Re-evaluate depth roles for Ariel Hernandez, Jordan Lyles, Alec Asher, and Aaron Wilkerson, and make any necessary waiver trades to boost the pitching staff. E.g., is Jordan Lyles the right arm to work in the shadow of the successful Triple-A shuttle crew? Is now the best time to make a potential long-term development play for Ariel Hernandez?

• Reconsider Adrian Houser’s shuttle role in favor of a regular one-inning role.

With the assumption that some combination of Soria, Albers, and Williams can get healthy for the stretch run, and that some of the “role regression” pitchers can make adjustments at the MLB level once again, this is a pitching staff that can improve quickly and regain its flexible frontier of roles and runs prevention that were celebrated in April and May. With Zach Davies healthy, a waiver trade acquisition (or two), and potentially prominent roles for two righties that can rush it up there (Woodruff and Houser), this pitching staff can rebound. Now we wait and watch.

Now the 2018 Brewers are on pace to challenge the 1988 Brewers for the best pitching staff in franchise history. As it stands, the Brewers could basically pitch average baseball for the remainder of the season and finish with the third best staff in franchise history; as the table above shows, Milwaukee has already surpassed their 2017 Runs Prevented total this season.

The purpose of this post is not to present a normative argument about whether or not the Brewers should be expected to produce the best pitching season in franchise history. Evidence abounds in all directions. First and foremost, at the time of this writing, the trade deadline has yet to pass, which means that the Brewers could further improve their pitching; second, the latest average Runs Prevented table demonstrates that the Milwaukee hurlers are already approximately 12 runs from their May 31 pace, meaning that the club has slowed slightly in their elite Runs Prevention; additionally, key injuries and subsequent ineffectiveness (ranging from Brent Suter and Zach Davies to Matt Albers and, of course, Jimmy Nelson) also impact projections of runs prevention. Alternately, Chase Anderson has prevented approximately seven runs since the beginning of June, and is beginning to look like a rotation leader at the same time the club traded for Joakim Soria and recalled Corbin Burnes to bolster the bullpen. If anything, this swirling set of evidence might allow one to believe that the pitching staff will at least remain steady.

Rather, I am going to investigate the pitching staff structure for a few of the best franchise pitching staffs listed in the table above. The purpose here will be fun, first and foremost, as almost everyone can name the key Brewers batters and supporting casts of the club’s great offensive performances (ten of the top 13 runs production seasons come from the 1978-1983 and 2009-2012 roster cores), but the great pitching staffs beyond Teddy Higuera, Ben Sheets, and CC Sabathia remain underappreciated or perhaps even unknown. Furthermore, by comparing the structures of these great staffs, one can get an idea of how pitching roster construction has evolved over time. For example, the 2018 Brewers may very well end up producing the greatest bullpen in franchise history, but how does their rotation compare? On the other hand, one might expect the classic 1980s clubs to be rotation-first, in terms of value.

Defensive Efficiency
Prior to investigating Baseball Prospectus pitching profiles of these classic Brewers pitching clubs, it is worth emphasizing that most of the top Brewers pitching teams were also typically very good fielding teams relative to their respective leagues.

Indeed, the table above demonstrates that the 2018 Brewers shares the top of these fielding profiles with the 1992 club, which were the most efficient fielding unit on the Junior Circuit. Here, I am using defensive efficiency to assess fielding because it is a basic number that calculates the extent to which a fielding unit converts outs. The outliers here are the 2005, 2011, and 2017 Brewers clubs, which prevented runs despite mediocre fielding performances (they prevented approximately 26, 47, and 47 runs, respectively, despite their middle of the road fielding).

Roster Construction
Teddy Higuera had quite a career for the Milwaukee Brewers, posting single season WARP totals above 4.0 in three of nine seasons. Higuera’s best year in Milwaukee occurred during the 1988 season, in which the southpaw worked nearly 230 innings while striking out 192 batters to only 59 walks. Using Deserved Run Average (DRA), a statistic that scales pitching performance to numerous contextual components, Higuera was better in 1988 than in any other season in Milwaukee, and those results total nearly 7.0 WARP.

Yet the 1988 club was also a crossing of two eras in Milwaukee, where the fading glory of Harvey’s Wallbangers (who never got the consistent ace they deserved in Higuera) would congeal into a roster core that could never quite get Robin Yount and Paul Molitor into the playoffs with a second generation of talent. Behind Higuera, the 1988 squad featured four prominent contributors age-25 or younger in Juan Nieves (23), Don August (24), Chris Bosio (25), and Bill Wegman (25), ostensibly giving the Brewers a stable pitching rotation around which their next contending seasons could follow. Yet injuries, ineffectiveness, and inconsistencies derailed this group, leaving 1988 their best performance. Of these youngsters, Bosio was en route to beginning a stretch of several quality pitching seasons, and in fact the righty was more valuable each of 1989, 1991, and 1992 (compared to 1988).

Chuck Crim deserves mention, of course, because the 26-year old rubber arm worked more than 100 innings over 70 appearances. Not only did the righty work 42 multiple inning appearances according to Baseball Reference, but he also inherited 68 runners. In terms of percentage points, Crim’s strand rate was eight points better than the league average, meaning that aside from his own exceptional runs allowed total, Crim added several Runs Prevented simply by stranding runners that occupied bases when he entered ballgames; this performance foreshadowed Brian Shouse’s efforts for the excellent 2008 pitching staff (60 IR / 20 scored), as well as Jeremy Jeffress and Dan Jennings (62 IR / 14 scored (!!!) entering Sunday) in 2018. This excellent performance is reflected in Crim’s leads converted statistics, as the righty successfully produced nine saves and 13 holds, against only two blown save or hold opportunities.

The Crim mention is a perfect transition to the 2017 pitching staff, which featured a few excellent starting pitching performances boosted by an even better bullpen. Thus appears Jacob Barnes in the club’s top performers for 2017, as the hard near-cutter / slider reliever is not only a throwback to the bread-and-butter 1980s reliever (enter Crim, a favorite media comp for Barnes, too), but also one of the only 2017 Brewers pitchers to accumulate more than 1.0 WARP. What is interesting about the 2017 pitching staff also foreshadowing the strengths of the 2018 staff, and that is the sheer depth of the pitching operations. Eventually, the pitching-by-depth gamble unraveled as the club faced injuries and a rotating cast of fifth starter ineffectiveness down the stretch. But along with the more popular impact relievers of Corey Knebel and Josh Hader, Barnes was one of the key reasons for the club’s success in 2017 and, like Crim and Hader, another deep round MLB draft success story.

By the way, let it be said that for any other critiques of the Brewers current GM, David Stearns sure can build a runs prevention unit. Despite being in his third season as GM, and ostensibly leading the club through a rebuilding phase, Stearns already boasts two of the 17 average or better pitching staffs in franchise history. Interestingly enough, for all the grief President Doug Melvin gets about his apparent inability to assemble a pitching staff, the highly regarded Harry Dalton also had the same issue. While Sal Bando is not highly regarded by most Brewers fans, the GM sure could build a pitching staff, and Bando (more than Melvin or Dalton) is Stearns’s target for building quality pitching; Dalton and Melvin are obviously the targets for beating postseason appearances.

Comparing Jimmy Nelson, Chase Anderson, and Zach Davies, who was an excellent Runs Prevented starter in 2017 even if his WARP did not look great, to the 1988 squad should underscore the difficulty of building a consistent rotation. Producing a great starting rotation certainly does not come close to guaranteeing pitching success in the following season, when injuries, mechanical adjustments, and inconsistencies that were absent in the “great year” can creep up in the following campaign. Once again, though, the Brewers have a group of truly controllable, quality starting pitching arms (as they did in the late-1980s), but it is worth raising questions about the scouting profiles and future prospects of these arms following the mechanical adjustments and injuries that have plagued 2018. The book is not closed, however, as Chase Anderson has shown over his last ten starts (59.7 IP, 3.02 ERA, four quality starts); if all goes well, Anderson’s contract extension would be well-justified if he comes anywhere near Chris Bosio’s best four years in Milwaukee.

2008 needs no introduction, as the Brewers media and Twitter recently celebrated the tenth anniversary of the CC Sabathia trade. Of course, as Sabathia rightfully carries the reputation as the arm that saved that season, it is always worth emphasizing that Ben Sheets was phenomenal in 2008 as well. Sheets managed a 3.13 DRA and 5.3 WARP across 31 starts, including an electrifying 1-0 complete game effort over the Padres while pitching through a torn elbow ligament. In terms of pitchers putting their careers on the line for Milwaukee, it’s tough to top Sabathia and Sheets, as both pitchers risked millions of dollars on the 2008-2009 free agency market to will the Brewers to their first playoff appearance in a generation; Sheets lost the bet for future millions, while Sabathia cashed on an uncanny performance.

But oh, ode to Manny Parra, Dave Bush, and Carlos Villanueva, the sometimes frustrating but often dependable low rotation and swingman crew for the mid-00s Milwaukee teams. Bush was worth approximately 10 WARP to the Brewers over his 2006-2008 seasons, with 2006 being the high mark; Villanueva and Parra each had their best Milwaukee years in 2008, which is not a bad thing to occur during a playoff race. This trio of pitchers seems quite comparable to many of the 2018 Brewers group, for this trio either had unassuming stuff, or serious profile questions or command concerns when the stuff was there. While one will be quick to point out that the 2018 Brewers do not (yet) have their Sabathia, nor do they have their Sheets, one can find semblances of the Bush, Parra, and Villanueva trio in profiles such as Junior Guerra, Jhoulys Chacin, Wade Miley, and/or Freddy Peralta. This is not an insult: the 2008 trio have never truly received enough credit for their respective roles in carrying the rotation early in the season, nor for their overall value.

Finally, if 1988 was the best franchise pitching season, 1992 exemplified the turn of generations once more, as Jamie Navarro and Cal Eldred were set to join Bosio and Wegman atop the pitching staff. This time, Wegman bested Bosio in terms of value, but both pitchers were quite strong, producing nearly 10 WARP for those 1992 Brewers. Eldred and Navarro also acquitted themselves well, although they would reprise the injuries, inconsistencies, and ineffectiveness that has served as a theme throughout these pitching profiles.

In 1992, one can suddenly see the eras shift, as baseball’s strategic tides moved toward relief pitching prominence, and these Brewers had a deep and fantastic bullpen. Fetters, Holmes, and Orosco were not even the most prominent relievers on the staff (see Plesac, Dan; Henry, Doug; and Austin, Jim). What is stunning about this group is that despite their excellent and deep composition, the Brewers were near the bottom in the American League in both Saves and Holds, and their relievers mostly faced low leverage innings according to Baseball Reference. In 1992, 42 percent of Brewers relief appearances qualified as low leverage; to get a sense of what that might look like, consider than the 2018 Brewers are nearly the exact opposite, with 36 percent of relief appearances qualified as high leverage. It is interesting to think about this strategic snafu of 1992 during a current season in which managers are reaching for their bullpens early and often in order to gain every advantage possible.

Yet is a bullpen ever a vehicle for anything other than strategic failure? Is there a proper way to manage the pen over an extended period of time? If the 2018 Brewers are going to catch the 1988 squad to produce the best pitching season in franchise history, hopefully manager Craig Counsell effectively dispatches those Runs Prevented in the most strategic manner possible.

Baseball Prospectus. Milwaukee Brewers Individual Statistics by Team [CSV]. Retrieved July 29, 2018.

Baseball Reference. Milwaukee Brewers Franchise [CSV]. Retrieved July 29, 2018.

Baseball Reference. Park Factors and League Encyclopedia [CSV]. Retrieved July 29, 2018.

Runs Prevented were calculated using the average of park factors between Baseball Prospectus and Baseball Reference sources, with the addition of a basic league environment runs prevented stat as well. Each Brewers team was assessed by average runs prevented and standard deviation.

Of course, these Brewers look very, very bad in some areas of the game. One can use Pythagorean W-L, or Run Differential (Runs Scored / Runs Allowed), to estimate a club’s expected record based on their underlying elements. In this case, the results are much uglier than .500. If one had told Brewers fans and analysts that their favorite club would be 4-8 after the first dozen games, that would probably cause a bit more pause than a .500 record. How did we get here?

• The starting pitching has been worse than many people expected, even worse than many naysayers could have imagined.

• Much of the bad starting pitching performance is due to poor fielding. While the Brewers starting pitchers are 11 runs below average thus far (!!!), these arms have also allowed four more runs than expected based on Fielding Independent Pitching (which is awful this early in the season). A 41 RS / 53 RA club might have been able to eat more innings, or given a few close games more breathing room.

• More importantly, the starting pitching’s poor performance has occurred early in games. Only Chase Anderson and Zach Davies have completed six innings of work thus far in the season, which means that in three additional turns through the rotation the bullpen has required (at least) another inning of work.

• Innings pitched workloads over nine inning games are one thing, but since the Brewers have played in so many close games, the workload has been compounded by extra innings games. Milwaukee has already played three extra innings games thus far in 2018; to put that in perspective, seventeen MLB teams have yet to play two extra innings games in this young season.

• The fielding really is bad. According to Baseball Prospectus Defensive Efficiency and Park-Adjusted Defensive Efficiency statistics, the Brewers fielding unit is easily in the bottom third of the MLB. This is somewhat surprising given that (a) the Brewers had a relatively middle-of-the-road fielding unit in 2017 and (b) the Brewers’ offseason moves largely were meant to improve the defense (see Eric Sogard, Lorenzo Cain, and Christian Yelich transactions as examples).

• Of course, the batting performances thus far have been terrible. In fact, based on the 2018 National League and three-year Miller Park factor, the Brewers have average nearly one run below average per game. The bats have scored five or more runs in 5 games thus far; the trouble is, when they are not scoring runs, they are not scoring runs. In this department, the Brewers have also scored two-or-fewer runs in 5 games thus far. You can say what you want about the pitching, but you’re not going to win many 0 run support games.

• Beyond the performances, the poor play on the field has been compounded by injuries. Currently, Christian Yelich and Corey Knebel have joined Jimmy Nelson, Boone Logan, and Stepgen Vogt on the disabled list. Meanwhile, Lorenzo Cain is also nursing a day-to-day injury, which produced the club’s listless batting order that appeared in last night’s loss in St. Louis. There’s no other way to say it: the Brewers have a pretty good team on the DL right now, which is certainly not an excuse for poor play (especially for a team that was supposed to call depth its strength), but is one explanation for the gloomy attitude among Brewers fans.

• Ultimately, there also seems to be this attitude among Brewers fans that since success was unexpected in 2017, every game in 2018 would be a referendum on those expectations. It is as though Brewers fans are simultaneously terrified and angry about the mounting poor play, while also angrily pounding their fists in vindication: “See, I told you the rotation was bad! See, I told you this wasn’t a good team! The front office was fooled by their 2017 team!” That sort of attitude does not help anyone, but in an era where fans identify more with roster-building and playing along as General Manager, rather than imagining themselves as ball players and aligning themselves with labor, this produces fan sentiments that are sensitive and easily bitter towards shortcomings on the field.

So what’s going right? According to Baseball Prospectus, first and foremost, the Brewers pitchers are yielding relatively high percentages of ground balls and pop-ups. This essentially means that the pitchers are doing their job of limiting hard contact and keeping the ball on the ground. Given the general career fielding profiles of the Brewers defense, one might expect the Brewers’ Runs Allowed profile to self-correct should Milwaukee arms continue to allow solid groundball and pop-up percentages. Additionally, although the Brewers rotation has not been designed to strike batters out (48 of 269 batters struck out thus far), they are limiting the walks (22 of 269 batters). While the home run total must come down, thus far the strikeout-to-walk ratio is a sign of success.

Of course, it is more difficult to see the silver linings with the Brewers offense. In fact, the Brewers bats have batted-ball statistics that their pitching staff would like to see: Milwaukee batters are thus far keeping the ball on the ground and popping up at strong percentages, which is not a good trend to see for an offense. Despite all this, it is worth noting that the Brewers True Average of .246 is basically around the league median; currently, a .258 TAv is a Top 10 performance among MLB teams, and six teams have TAv between .245 and .249. It is worth noting that, thus far, the Brewers batters have ended significantly more plate appearances after the first pitch in 2018 than 2017, but they are not succeeding in those plate appearances: their .305 / .317 / .441 batting average / on-base percentage / slugging percentage slash line is notably below average for first pitch plate appearances.

One key silver lining statistic that the “home run or nothing” vultures may be thrilled to see: the Brewers are significantly limiting their strike outs thus far (near 10 percent improvement), knocking the ball into play more frequently. Their home run rate has plummeted from 3.7 percent in 2017 to 2.1 percent in 2018 thus far, which is certainly something to continue watching. As Milwaukee continues to knock the ball into play more frequently, they must change their orientation away from a groundball and pop-up team. “Home run or nothing” is not a bad offense if the home runs mean a club is not grounding out and popping up.

As the season progresses, it is worth tracking home runs, fly balls, and runs scored per game across the MLB. Thus far, the run environment has deflated, which is another interesting element to consider regarding the Brewers’ roster construction. Compared to the run environment of 2016-2017, the Brewers pitching staff is even better than its current performance, but the deflation in runs scoring amplifies every shortcoming on the mound. Alternately, it is worth questioning whether a shift in the ball is affecting batter across the league. Given MLB efforts to speed up the pace of the game, as well as their ambivalent responses to the “bad press” of various (independent) corroborations of juiced baseballs during 2016-2017, it is plausible that MLB could have put the lid on the juiced ball.

Ultimately, this is not “small sample size” warning to throw out the analysis above: the Brewers have several shortcomings that cannot continue. The bats cannot continue to walk at low rates, or hit the ball on the ground, or pop up. Somehow, adjustments at the plate must center around maximizing patience and discipline to drive the ball around the ballpark. The fielding cannot continue their inefficient play, and this has nothing to do with errors; errors are one thing, but inefficiencies around the diamond are hurting a Brewers pitching staff that is meant simply to feed a defensive unit. In fact, the arms must continue to feed ground balls and pop-ups to their fielders…that’s one trend that should be maintained.

Yet, so long as Christian Yelich is injured, so long as Jimmy Nelson is injured, so long as Corey Knebel is injured, so long as Stephen Vogt and Boone Logan are injured, it is worth seeing a club scraping by at .500 as an extreme strength. #TeamDepth has already been tested, and the club is doing what many of us expected they would do anyway: they are playing in close games, night after night, and must use their strong bullpen and fielding to make that equation work. Now the equation of players executing that strategy have changed, which is not an excuse; indeed, that’s the whole point of #TeamDepth. It’s worth punting this 6-6 start, considering each .500 point as a 0-0 event from which the team can be newly evaluated. Put aside the 4-8 run differential, even: we know what adjustments the Brewers need to make, and we know they have one of the deepest clubs in the game to attempt to execute those adjustments. Now it’s time to see if it works.

Photo Credit: Jeff Curry, USA Today Sports Images.

These six starting pitchers, justifiably described as bad or less-than-ideal (if you’re feeling kind) in 2016, worked 750.3 innings while preventing nine runs in 2017. The club definitely suffered from Guerra’s opening day calf injury (and then his lack of command), while Peralta showed that he could not build on any gains made during the previous season. But Davies was no joke, improving on his 45 Overall Future Potential (OFP) role to the extent that one might at the very least discuss enshrining him as the ideal back-end starter (at best, he’s surpassed that role). Anderson and Nelson both proved to be the real deal at least for one season, leading the 2017 rotation to an even greater extent than Guerra and Davies lead the 2016 group.

Everyone knew the 2017 returning rotation was going to be dreadful, until it wasn’t.

So here we stand, with almost everyone (including myself) assuming that David Stearns will make another pitching move entering 2018. What’s strange, however, is that for all the #InStearnsWeTrust that Brewers fans fly, they still largely refuse to learn or analyze the GM’s inner workings, such as his 2016-2017 lack of rotational moves and the resounding success that followed. It remains worth repeating that pitching is the strength of this Brewers club, which is why Stearns spent significant monetary and prospect resources (justifiably) improving the outfield and, by extension, batting order for 2018.

Related:
Low Rotation Shift
Aces Do Not Exist
Rotation Spots
How the Brewers Beat the Cubs

Stearns did not necessarily need to improve the starting pitching rotation in 2018, unless one rambles off a set of beliefs: Anderson isn’t who he was, Davies isn’t who he was, Nelson is injured, Garza and Peralta are gone, and Junior Guerra cannot be relied upon. Okay, so Stearns signed the inimitable Jhoulys Chacin, who looks like a rich man’s Junior Guerra (seriously, look at his arsenal and tell me that’s not Guerra’s ideal form), and brought back Franchise Pitcher Yovani Gallardo for what could be another spin at the rotation in Milwaukee.

Meanwhile, the rotation is filled with enough “You’ve got to be kidding me” to give the excellent 2017 staff a run for its money. Homegrown arms take the shape of Brandon Woodruff and Brent Suter; deeper into the system, there are advanced prospects like Jorge Lopez and Freddy Peralta (on the 40-man roster) and Corbin Burnes (off the 40-man roster). If you squint, there’s at least two #3 starters among that trio, maybe as soon as 2018 to boot. If you’re a glass-half-empty kind of fan, that’s a whole bunch of low rotation and reliever risk. But this is not a problem, either, and I direct you to the 2013 rotation as evidence.

Although, perhaps that 2013 rotation is a precisely perfect corollary to the 2018 rotation, as then GM Doug Melvin punted on replacing Zack Grinke or Shaun Marcum and only really received a rotational upgrade after Mark Attanasio negotiated with Scott Boras deep into Spring Training. Still, having lived through that rotation, I’m not convinced that Alfredo Figaro (74.0 IP / -6 runs prevented), Hiram Burgos (29.3 / -9), Mike Fiers (22.3 / -10), Johnny Hellweg (30.7 / -16), and Wily Peralta (183.3 / -21) are quite the same as Guerra, Woodruff, Suter, Gallardo, and Lopez. Even if you’re the glass-half-empty type here, that low-rotation floor should be substantially higher for Woodruff and even Suter than it ever was for Johnny Hellweg or even Peralta (although that’s probably rewriting history with hindsight). In fact, looking at this story again makes it seem inevitable that Jake Arrieta will be wearing Brewers blue on March 26.

With all this in mind, it’s time to take Stearns seriously with this rotation. Even the fact that the Brewers were rumored to be involved with Yu Darvish, and are still connected to nearly every free agency or trade rumor with a pulse, does not negate the fact that Stearns has built a rotation with a very particular character. And this is a very particular character that has worked in 2017, as well:

• Stearns may work with starting pitchers who are typically smaller than the ideally hyped “rotation workhorse body.”

• Stearns works with starting pitchers who do not throw with elite (or even median!) velocity.

• Stearns largely continues the Doug Melvin trend of working with over-the-top deliveries (Anderson is probably his best example here, and Suter was an anomaly be it with Melvin or Stearns).

• Stearns loves starting pitchers who have some type of wiggling fastball (be it a sinker or cutter) and a change-up / curveball profile.

Obviously, you can’t check all three boxes with all pitchers (e.g., Chacin and Woodruff both approach that ideal workhorse body while working as primarily fastball / slider types, and Woodruff’s primary fastball velocity was in the Top 15 percent of all 2017 starting pitchers who threw at least 50 pitches). But there’s enough of a trend across these arms that one can begin to assess what Stearns is looking for in a rotation, and there’s enough success (even if it was somewhat surprising success) in 2017 to begin to take seriously the idea of “trusting” in Stearns’s rotational ideals.

So here we are: why trust the rotation?

• Baseball Prospectus recently released three new pitching statistics that approximate a pitcher’s Power, Command, and Stamina. Of the 608 pitchers that threw at least 10 innings in 2017, Brandon Woodruff is one of only 51 to score a “50” (or better) in all three categories. This list is dominated by two types of players: young pitchers or injured pitchers who posted mediocre (or worse) DRA during their 2017 campaigns, veteran starters generally regarded as solid-to-top rotation types (see Jacob deGrom and Justin Verlander or Gerrit Cole, Lance Lynn, or Jeff Samardzija), or elite relievers (Woodruff’s teammates Corey Knebel and Jacob Barnes are also on this rare list). Woodruff probably is not slated to become Verlander or deGrom or Cole, but even if he reaches Michael Wacha’s range of production, the club is in fantastic middle rotation shape.

• Zach Davies and Brent Suter are both command “aces” (for lack of a better term), overcoming their velocity shortcomings by hammering the strike zone in quality locations (the Command statistic actually tracks certain pitching zones deemed ideal for working corner / borderline strikes).

• Yovani Gallardo and Chase Anderson are near clones of one another (one might ask whether the Brewers are still using biomechanical data that drew the club toward the high release point years ago!). While neither pitcher is graded as a strong “Power” arm, both make up for their lack of power pitching with better than average command and stamina grades.

• Jhoulys Chacin and Junior Guerra both grade as mediocre Power and Command pitchers, but Chacin makes up for these grades with his Stamina. On the other hand, Jimmy Nelson probably grades as the club’s truest “Power” starter, as the righty does not grade well in Command but makes up for that shortcoming with Power and Stamina.

• Across the rotation, Nelson, Davies, and Chacin grade as groundball pitchers (each with a rate at or slightly better than 50 percent in 2017), while Suter, Anderson, and Gallardo grade as steady or improving groundball workers (this trio sits below 50 percent grounders, but one might question whether Suter and Anderson can flirt with that mark given their improvements).

• Finally, as I examined with the club’s approach to the elite Chicago Cubs offense, the Brewers starting pitchers attack the strike zone. Compared to the 2017 National League, the Brewers starters walked notablty fewer batters (23 fewer batters than expected, a 7 percent improvement versus the league). What is particularly interesting here is that the pitchers as a group do not grab an 0-1 count more frequently than the National League average, which suggests that the Brewers win their command battle by yielding weak first swings (95 split OPS+), and winning 2-0, 3-0, 1-1, and 2-1 counts.

The Brewers are entering one of the most important seasons in franchise history with a “What on earth?” rotation. Their likely best pitcher is either injured and therefore an unknown (Nelson), a low-velocity sinker/change command master (Davies), or on the wrong side of 30 with one good career year (Anderson). Their major free agent signing is best described as a potential darkhorse improvement candidate (Chacin), and their other free agent is on a change-of-scenery, win-a-job-in-camp contract (Gallardo). Behind this group, there’s either the one-off age-31 star from 2016 (Guerra), the Raptor swingman working from the south side (Suter), and the Top 10 prospect who grades as a middle-rotation guy (Woodruff). Ironically, the warts on this group resemble the 2017 #TeamDepth that nearly lead the team to the playoffs, where everyone could find so many words to describe the team’s shortcomings without finding enough words to figure out how it would all work.

I’ll be damned if this doesn’t look like another market inefficiency (pick up guys with profiles other teams might punt on and throw some strikes!); I’ve learned my lessons as an analyst, and with these beautiful shortcomings in mind the best story of Spring Training could be the Brewers entering with the rotation as it stands.

Photo Credit: Lance Iverson, USAToday Sports Images

• The Marlins ownership group’s refusal to capitalize payroll indeed resulted in a bargain bottom deal for Giancarlo Stanton, who will now call the Yankees his team.
• The….Angels won the Shohei Ohtani sweepstakes, prompting a range of reactions calling non-existent (see NEIFI Analytics) to positive impacts.

A non-contender won Ohtani’s services, and the Marlins are indeed officially in…well, they’re not rebuilding, so let’s call it “firesale mode,” and these two clubs fittingly define a mediocre MLB. The Marlins join the announcements from the Royals front office that they expect to rebuild, along with the Tigers who are rebuilding alongside the already-rebuilding (and maybe on the upswing) Chicago White Sox, who join San Diego, Atlanta, Philadelphia, and Cincinnati as rebuilds-in-progress. Other clubs in bizarre territory include the Athletics (what are they doing?) and the Blue Jays (some fans now clamoring for their share of #ThatProcess). The Mariners and Giants (losers of Ohtani sweepstakes) at least seem like they’re trying to win, as do the Pirates and Mets.

That’s half the MLB, right there. Wouldn’t it be nice to be playing 2018 in the American League Central, where the upstart Twins will battle Cleveland for the title, alongside three stated rebuilding efforts?

Anyway, with roughly half the MLB hilariously trying to rebuild, or maybe not in an earnest position to win, the Brewers have their own principles to consider: Milwaukee is on the upswing after completing their quick-and-easy rebuild, but now it’s time to watch some young (or, if not young, inexperienced) players cut their teeth at the MLB level. This is not the best scenario to be in entering the Winter Meeting, as there’s a very good argument to be made in favor of the Brewers simply sitting tight; no, they don’t need to trade Domingo Santana for prospects, and similarly, no, they don’t need to trade Lewis Brinson to win now. In fact, the Brewers are one of the few clubs in the MLB that can justifiably stand pat for the offseason and simply rerun the algorithms that powered 2017 (after all, the spreadsheets looked so good the first time around that it’d be great to give it another shot).

Of course, with so many clubs purposefully trying to shed MLB contracts and competitiveness in order to play for the future, the Brewers do have two key assets in their favor of the offseason:

• Tons of free cash, both in the form of revenue savings from 2016-2017 (probably close to $120 million), and payroll space for 2018 (and onward).
• Tons of interesting prospects behind the top tier of the system.

Thankfully, many of the aforementioned rebuilding or limbo clubs also have something that the Brewers need for 2018: starting pitching under arbitration or guaranteed contractual reserve. Where this group of arms gets interesting is their sheer boredom as a group. To demonstrate this, imagine a winter meetings in which the Brewers emerge with…Dan Straily, Kendall Graveman, and BPMilwaukee chat fan-favorite Danny Duffy; or even Jeff Samardzija and Marco Estrada; or Jake Odorizzi and Mike Foltynewicz; or any combination of these arms!

The question one could ask is, how much would these arms cost? What is difficult to assess about this group is their general trajectory, as most of these arms feature one genuinely good season over the year few years while offering stable depth in the majority of other seasons. Yet, there are clear improvements by someone like Danny Duffy, or Jeff Samardzija’s phenomenal peripheral development in 2017, that raise questions about whether spending on the heftier side of these arms’ prospect prices would be beneficial. An additional issue is that these arms feature well-priced contracts or arbitration control, which leads to a difficult market position in assessing a prospect package. What types of prospects within the current Brewers system are worth surrendering for cost-controlled starting pitching?

I did not consider popular Brewers Twitter trade discussions like Chris Archer or Jacob deGrom, simply because both of those arms are indisputably elite pitchers who will not be in any type of “bargain” position for the Brewers. Even someone like Michael Fulmer is more of a potential bargain for a club like the Brewers, given his relative lack of track record compared to deGrom and Archer (and, no, even five years of contract reserve do not erase the risk of unknown MLB performance trajactories compared to Fulmer’s previous scouting pedigree). Coupling Fulmer and Jordan Zimmermann could also be a unique strategy for the Brewers to lower the Fulmer prospect package out of “elite” territory.

What Brewers fans will undoubtedly complain about is that many of these pitchers seemingly offer nothing more than middle-, and often low-, rotation, innings-eater profiles. In some cases, recent injury questions (as in Graveman’s case) may not even lead to solidly dependable innings eating in Milwaukee. But, there are two easy responses to this:

• Outside of someone like Jake Arrieta or Yu Darvish, the current pitching free agency class is full of these types of gambles anyway.
• Some combination of Junior Guerra, Brent Suter, Brandon Woodruff, and even current fan rotation favorite Josh Hader do not profile as anything better than the immediate value provided by the arms noted above. Yes, if Hader continues his 2017 profile, he’s not a #3 starter (or better).

Of course, the Brewers also entered 2017 with a mostly innings-eating or uninspiring middle rotation set of pitchers, and their pitching staff was one of the club strengths. One also needs to assess each potential trade target’s arsenal, approach, and persona for compatibility with the new Derek Johnson coaching regime (if Johnson can help to turn around arms like Jimmy Nelson and Chase Anderson, what can he do with other middle rotation arms? What is the Brewers’ systematic pitching?). Additionally, acquiring more proven rotational options via prospect packages for arbitration controlled or guaranteed contract starters could prove to be a cheaper strategy than pursuing the current free agency market. The benefit here is that each of these arms would push options like Woodruff, Suter, and Guerra into more palatable depth roles within the rotation. It should not be detrimental to suggest that Suter is a fantastic swingman option; penciling Suter into the rotation to start the season raises some alarms about the potential of the southpaw delivering a full season rotational role.

One way or the other, the Brewers will need to win in 2018 with a motley and unsuspecting rotation. But that’s okay, because the team has the front office and coaching staff to make this type of profile work. The alternative path is parting with significant prospects (such as Brinson) to acquire an ace like Archer, or chasing the huge contract top-tier free agents. It should be noted that the beauty of this middle path will be the Brewers’ ability to trade from a position of strength (their depth) while developing key elite prospects at the MLB level (like Brinson) and giving the new pitching system another group of unassuming talent to churn into MLB winners.

Photo Credit: Lance Iverson, USAToday Sports Images

2018 Milwaukee Brewers Top Ten Prospects (and more)

The Brewers are in a bizarre state of flux as an organization, with the most hyped prospects of the 2015 and 2016 drafts largely stalled, injured, or drifting backwards save for an exception or two, and several of the rebuilding trades hanging in a suspended state of anticipation. This whole line could easily turn around if Lewis Brinson makes adjustments at the MLB level and hits, or Brett Phillips continues to override his weaknesses with a well-rounded set of secondary skills. As has been previously mentioned, the 2017 surprise success largely vindicated President Doug Melvin’s 2015 deadline trades (Zach Davies, Domingo Santana, and Josh Hader combined for 7.5 WARP), and the greatest steps forward in the minor league system (perhaps for the second consecutive year, if one counts last year’s Brandon Woodruff campaign) belonged to the late Bruce Seid’s 2014 draft (Monte Harrison for certain, as well as improving depth roles from Jake Gatewood, Troy Stokes, and Jordan Yamamoto).

Again, none of this is news to the Brewers minor league fan, but it’s worth repeating in order to process the difficulties and absurdities that define player development: there is no linear path to baseball success. Now, one of the ostensible reasons for the necessity of the Brewers rebuild (a weak homegrown farm system) will define key roles for the 2018 big league club (Orlando Arica, Jacob Barnes, Brent Suter, and the aforementioned Woodruff) and perhaps the next impact outfielder for the club (Harrison). A system in which Harrison potentially leapfrogs Brinson is fascinating insofar as it seemed highly improbable even a year ago, but then again, unexpected outcomes are the new normal in Milwaukee. This is the club whose rebuilding GM, David Stearns, has made his best moves at the MLB level (Travis Shaw, Chase Anderson, Jonathan Villar, and Junior Guerra) rather than with the minor leagues (Brinson is his major hope here).

Stearns awaits his first impact prospect graduation to the MLB level. Will 2018 be that year?

Update (9:15 AM): to visualize the system in another light, here is a look at the last five drafts, including the top five picks from each and their 2018 organizational outlook. Ten of these players dot the Top 20, including three top tier prospects, another two are already on the MLB roster, and two other prospects have defined the MLB roster via trade:

All of this is a prelude to a difficult question about the state of the Brewers minor league system once more. For a system with advanced quality prospects (Brinson, Woodruff, and Phillips still make the cut as rookies), there remains much risk in developing full MLB roles. Phillips may be the closest of the group to his impact role, as the fantastic defensive centerfielder and Three True Outcome bat showed just how an “inbetween” role at the MLB level can look at its best. My favorite comp for Phillips is Jarrod Dyson (who also happens to be one of my favorite free agent targets for the Brewers), as Dyson exemplifies the “true fourth outfielder” role, someone who has evident shortcomings in terms of pure scouting but uses his strengths to define an extended career. Dyson is a 9.7 career WARP player despite never cracking 350 plate appearances in a season; he has become one of the most valuable players of his draft class and a true anomaly as a player that can define a career through a string of sub-2.0 WARP seasons.

As for Brinson, the BP Prospect Team listed one risk: “He may not hit major-league pitching. Wheeee!” In extended form: “Brinson has shown the ability to make adjustments at each level, but he’s also needed adjustment time. I find those prospects to be a bit riskier at the highest level.” Woodruff, on the other hand, does not exhibit the same type of risk as someone like Brinson, as the righty has never been held to All-Star ultimate roles. But, even if the “will he be a reliever?” debate is not as loud with Woodruff as it was (and is) with Josh Hader, it remains, hiding within the necessary adjustments in Woodruff’s secondary pitch approach. This is not an incurable problem, as it is worth noting that Zach Davies had the same back-end rotation versus bullpen question marks, and has since adjusted his arsenal and approach into an MLB rotational bulldog stance.

Any warnings about Brinson are worth extending to Monte Harrison, perhaps the most stunning solid Top Five appearing in the 2018 list. One can learn from Brinson’s MLB transition in order to temper hype expectations for Harrison, as indeed the pure athlete has already demonstrated the extent to which a professional baseball career will take its twists. 2017 top draftee Keston Hiura joins Harrison at the very heights of the list, arguably the best prospect in the system on the basis of that hit tool, but knocked down a rung depending on how one views the defensive scenario for Hiura. The second baseman-to-be will inevitably receive every chance he needs to stick in the infield, and then he’ll get every chance to stick in the outfield, too. One wonders if he might, at worst, follow a path blazed by Jason Kipnis, who certainly showed that an impact second baseman need not bring the leather year after year.

Corbin Burnes rounds out the new faces in the Top Five. The righty might exemplify the risk-hype wager for the Brewers system, as Burnes will almost certainly not meet the expectations of Brewers fans who are solely scouting his stat line thus far. Burnes became quite an interesting case study throughout the 2017 season, as scouting reports based on early season viewings had yet to capture his delivery adjustments that occurred later in the season, and almost everyone on Brewers Twitter had conflicting information about his stuff. It was interesting to watch the developments unfold, certainly a lesson to fans that (1) statistics do not mean a thing at the minor league level because (2) there is often significant disjoint between those stats and the scouting of mechanical adjustments and organizational approaches with minor leaguers. There are numerous player development hurdles to define role risk for prospects before one considers questions about information asymmetries.

What is intriguing is that Burnes may be one of the clearest prospects on this list to quickly reach his peak role, middle rotation starter.

Let us bask in the mid-rotation arm that could be Burnes, and destroy the narrative that “the Brewers do not have any aces.” This concern occurs again and again with Brewers fans, and it’s as unnecessary an application of unrealistic expectations that could exist within baseball fandom. Here, leaning on the successes of 2017 can provide worthwhile lessons going forward: Jimmy Nelson was never scouted as an ace, Chase Anderson was never an ace, Zach Davies was never an ace, even Josh Hader was never an ace. Brent Suter? Junior Guerra? ….well… Anyway, you’ve clearly seen the point by now: MLB pitching is quite a volatile endeavor, with very few pitchers piecing together consistent MLB campaigns (or even consecutive, successful MLB campaigns as regular starters). Should Davies follow up on his 2017 season with another good year, for instance, even he would be catapulted into some fantastic category, “MLB pitcher with three consecutive better-than-average seasons.” If Davies does that, and Burnes is even Zach Davies, the Brewers rotation will be solid beyond belief.

If you do not learn anything else from the Milwaukee Brewers 2018 Top Prospect list, hopefully you will walk away with the view of the benefits of having multiple advanced-minors, mid-rotation pedigree arms lined up. For that matter, even the value of having multiple players stacked at any position should be evident; now, the 2020 Milwaukee Brewers do not necessarily rely on Lewis Brinson in the outfield. Through the layers of 5,000 universes, it’s probably Brinson, but we also know that it could be Phillips, or it could be Harrison (or of course, someone else entirely). Each of these statements, each of these players, obviously means different things for the Brewers, who could be a 76-win team in 2020 after peaking with this current roster. So it goes: once you walk away with the lesson about aces, or #TeamDepth, or role risk, you gain the comfortable certainty of player development and team-building volatility. The best part is that many of these players are close to the MLB, meaning that Brewers fans will soon get to agonize over a new, tumultuous journey.

Photo Credit: Benny Sieu, USAToday Sports Images

Throughout the summer, I found myself repeating an argument about the Brewers front office: if the Brewers front office implements scouting, mechanical, and coaching adjustments with a given player, they have some form of prediction or forecast that forms an expectation for the impact of that adjustment. Consider the two major pitching developments for the Brewers, namely Jimmy Nelson’s delivery shift, pitch addition, and subsequent breakout, and Chase Anderson’s arsenal adjustment: given that the organization has kept biomechanical data for quite some time, it is reasonable to suspect that player development decisions about adding pitches or redesigning mechanics at the MLB level are data-driven to some extent.

Namely, if the Brewers front office understands that Nelson will change his delivery timing and throw a curveball, or Chase Anderson will shift his cutter and curve, they have some idea of the range of success expected by such a move. Even this is quite a conservative statement; given the amount of time invested in developing these players (for example, Nelson threw at least 640 innings before using a curve in 2015), a development such as adding a pitch or mechanical overhaul will not be taken lightly. It was my contention that the Brewers understood the benefits of these moves, and expected significant improvement because of these moves.

The flipside of the argument, which becomes more speculative and therefore much more interesting, is that the Brewers front office should be able to form a solid idea about the relative success or failure of a pitching mechanics or arsenal shift for a player. I gather that they should be expected to do the same for a batting mechanics adjustment, as well. This statement is not quite as radical as it sounds; it is not an inversion of “can” into “should” (where, “the Brewers can design data-driven formula to track the success of pitching mechanics and arsenal adjustments” becomes “the Brewers should be able to forecast the impact of mechanical and arsenal adjustments”). Forecasting involves the use of data collection, statistical methodology, and some form of modeling (this can come from relatively simple and straightforward measurements of change to more complicated methods such as linear regression, or ever more complicated methods still) in order to look at a series of projections and craft a statement about its most likely path; think about this in the way that Nate Silver encourages “probabilistic thinking” (providing a range of predictions instead of one), or the way PECOTA offers “percentile” projections and thousands of tests of any given season.

Granted, there are potential data issues that the ballclub could encounter (data could be incomplete and face additional questions of quality or collection errors, or the club’s analysts could make suspect decisions about the underlying concepts for their forecasts, etc.). Yet, that there are potential concerns with MLB data collection and forecasting should not be viewed as a reason to dismiss discussions of clubs’ forecasting expectations for particular mechanical adjustments; in fact, I’d argue that this is the whole point of an “analytical” movement in MLB front offices.

Stated simply, the Brewers front office probably had a very good idea of what their key pitchers’ adjustments would be worth on the field. At the very least, they should have forecast (and probably did forecast) the likely impact of those adjustments. At worst, if the Brewers forecast those mechanical adjustments and completely missed the breakout seasons, they now have additional data to expand their models. Now, they can return to their layers of data, and any previous forecasts, and investigate where their models succeeded and where they failed.

What the Brewers now have in Chase Anderson is a prototype: fans and analysts can break this prototype into any number of characteristics worth testing.

• Chase Anderson is listed as 73 inches tall and 200 pounds according to Baseball Reference; he throws with his right hand;
• he worked 418 MLB innings before his breakout;
• his breakout occurred in his age 29 season;
• he does not throw a slider according to Brooks Baseball; and so on and so forth.
• Each of these characteristics can be used to build comparisons with other MLB pitchers, in order to test lessons about Anderson’s arsenal and mechanical adjustments.

The trouble here, in terms of statistical theory, is that within the MLB there will be no randomized sample of a population of pitchers who could perform like Chase Anderson. Constructing such a sample would require meeting extremely narrow characteristics that already limit the underlying population. For example, according to Baseball Reference Play Index, 163 MLB expansion era pitchers were 73 inches tall, less than or equal to 210 pounds, and right-handed while working 100 or more innings during age-29, age-30, or age-31 seasons (limit that to age-29 seasons, and the list drops to 60; or focus instead on right-handed or left-handed pitchers, and that list expands to 231 pitchers; and so on). Luckily, there are statistical tools available for controlling for variables in a model that does not involve a randomized sample of a population.

Following the criteria listed above, here’s an example of pitchers most comparable to Anderson’s class, focusing specifically on the last two seasons. This will be helpful to begin the next installment of this series, which be an analysis of particular player acquisition targets for the Brewers:

Beyond the technical issues, an intriguing theoretical issue exists. Since one is ostensibly testing Anderson’s prototype in order to find another pitcher with similar mechanics, arsenal, or characteristics that could conform to the successful lessons passed to Anderson, we already know what we’re looking for (our pitching survey is biased). This is acceptable for one very specific reason: baseball players are extremely scarce, and pitchers especially approach the game with a relatively narrow set of strategies (the vast majority throw a fastball) and mechanical approaches (ex., the vast majority throw overhand), and rulebound constraints (delivery timing requirements, approach to the batter, etc.). Moreover, a front office is not simply “looking for baseball players,” they are “looking for baseball players that could be good,” or “looking for baseball players that could improve,” etc. What the Brewers can use their mechanical, arsenal, and coaching lessons to construct is a system, a system into which particular player prototypes can be included in order to apply lessons and logic of that system to coax future success. This is very obviously a difficult thing to do, and one should not expect an MLB front office to be successful in every case. Yet, one should expect an MLB front office to reasonably apply their successes to as many future players as possible in order to maximize those successful lessons (or even to improve upon, to build from player development failures).

In this way, assessing a pitcher’s mechanical approach is much like underwriting a real estate development deal: an MLB front office will have to make decisions based on extremely limited, or flawed, samples. Player acquisition and development is more akin to working within conditions of market failure than a perfectly competitive marketplace. Continuing the analogy, an underwriter for a multifamily project will not compare that project to single family homes, nor will an underwriter of an affordable housing multifamily building compare that project to a market rate multifamily set-up, and so on: there is a particular ideological approach and set of market constraints for each type of deal listed above, just as there are specific constraints for each class of MLB pitcher that can be evaluated. There certainly may be some scenarios in which assessing those real estate deals blindly and with an overreaching view is valuable (such as a regional land value survey), just as there may be some scenarios in which blindly assessing all baseball players would be valuable (ex., “What percentage of draft signees from the 2000s reached the MLB?”). But these conditions will not necessarily adhere to each particular transaction (and each particular player development decision is likely made with much more focused, narrow forms of knowledge, and much more problematic forms of data at that).

The Chase Anderson system can be applied to the 2017-2018 free agency, trade, and waiver classes, in order to answer one of the Brewers’ most difficult questions of the offseason: how will the club repeat rotational successes of 2017? How will the front office fill the void of the injured Jimmy Nelson? How will the club build on the success of Chase Anderson? Looking at these questions produces one of the most fun aspects of this coming offseason, for these questions can be addressed in a very particular manner by an openly analytical front office. What is especially fun is that when the Brewers eschew big name free agents (perhaps by necessity of market size, perhaps by choice) in favor of someone less well known, or perhaps more puzzling, fans and analysts should immediately look to the club’s prototypes in order to consider which lessons (from successes or failures) are being applied to the roster.

Photo Credit: Jeff Curry, USAToday Sports

Those narratives will undoubtedly carry into 2018 guided by the very same contradictions: Milwaukee will indeed be developing many young players at the MLB level (including Lewis Brinson, Josh Hader, Brett Phillips, and Brandon Woodruff), while the team also has several opportunities to improve with established players (either through trades involving their prospects, through free agency signings, or both).

To put it another way: GM David Stearns can take the roster in several directions, and certainly has the resources available to contend while continuing to develop some players.

One way to assess player value, and therefore roster needs, is to estimate the surplus value that each player (and their contractual situation) provides the team. Value is assumed to be production and scarcity, recognizing that a player is not simply valuable to a club based on production, but also based on cost and the general availability of that skill set within the MLB. Surplus is the difference provided between a player’s production and their contract, recognizing that these aspects can be double-counted (a team simultaneously receives a player’s production on the field and their production gauged against their contract). Based on these assumptions, I tracked the surplus value of the Brewers 40-man roster (as of October 20, 2017) by using harsh depreciation to reduce each player’s maximum value (recognizing that a player’s performance typically declines over time save for rare cases).

The following chart tracks changes in surplus entering 2017 to entering 2018, while also assigning an Overall Future Potential (OFP) role for each Brewers roster member:

What these surplus numbers can suggest, in the abstract, is the difference between “the number of the wins above replacement” a player will produce during their contract and the OFP a team might receive if they traded the player at this point in time (alternately, they might suggest a contract range; for example, if the Brewers offered Neil Walker a $30 million contract, they would likely retain some surplus value during that contract).

Using the extremely interesting and difficult case of Jonathan Villar to interpret this table, his 2016 campaign and contract control years still loom large enough to suggest that the Brewers should not move the infielder for cheap; but the shortstop-turned-bench/utility option does mean that Villar’s ultimate role is trending downward, meaning that if Milwaukee believes that role decline is real and will continue to materialize, moving Villar for less than his top value could offset the issues of rostering a declining role. This should outline the difficulty of making roster decisions: in the case of Villar, there is not necessarily a right answer.

I should add that surplus value is abstract in the sense that there is a point at which additional surplus does not provide a team transaction value. Scooter Gennett and Chris Carter should be the most specific examples of this phenomenon in recent Brewers memory, as both players retained solidly positive surplus value entering 2017, but were essentially unwanted on the trade market and therefore expendable for nothing. Following this example, a rule of thumb might be to expect any type of roster move once a player’s surplus value dips below $20 million (or, less than three wins above replacement). Looking at the table of the Brewers roster above, this fact should seem intuitive with many of the names on the list (for example, it is highly unlikely that the Brewers would be able to move a player like Andrew Susac or even Eric Thames for their maximal surplus value).

By averaging each player’s 2017, 2018, and OFP surplus value, and comparing that to their change in value over time, a rather intuitive 2018 roster emerges. In this case, I excluded each player with a Negative-50 percent change in value (ex., a 50 percent decline), which produced need at Catcher, Second Base, and Right-Handed Pitcher, with additional question marks about the Utility roles. This is a rather succinct picture of the actual needs for the 2018 Brewers, and it also shows that if a few key free agents are retained, or similar free agents from outside the organizational signed, the Brewers can assemble quite a good roster:

These tables need not force an analyst to rely on numbers alone in order to validate roster decisions. Compare the following descriptions of potential role upgrades for the 2018 Brewers with those players’ statistical trends, and find nearly 20 roster spots (on the 40-Man) that can be upgraded for 2018:

The benefit of this exercise is that additional roster functions can be analyzed, either through descriptive or analytical means. For example, one could compare some of the best Rule 5 Draft Roster Protection candidates with the players above in order to find the most salient moves for the future value of the organization. Via Brewerfan.net:

Once again, this should exhibit a rather intuitive process of evaluation. If the future value of a catcher such as Jacob Nottingham is better than either Stephen Vogt, Andrew Susac, or Jett Bandy (or all three players), it should not hurt to lose one of those players in order to roster Nottingham. Each of these catchers are good candidates for contractual non-tenders for this reason (and, indeed, catcher is a position that the Brewers can upgrade in terms of depth behind/alongside Manny Pina). Similarly, allowing Matt Garza to walk via free agency and rostering Marcos Diplan, Freddy Peralta, or Devin Williams in that place should improve the pitching surplus of the roster. Where it gets more interesting is considering a player like Mauricio Dubon, and whether he simply takes the spot of free agent Eric Sogard, or overtakes Villar or Hernan Perez.

Using these analytical approaches should validate the fact that the Brewers are in a unique position entering 2018. They are a good team, indeed, that also features many up-and-coming players to develop at the MLB level and many declining roles that can be replaced. Where surplus value becomes useful is targeting particular trades, or simply determining when a player should be released or non-tendered.

A player like Keon Broxton, Perez, Susac, or Vogt should demonstrate this difficult decision-making process, and perhaps cause fans to realign their expectations that these types of players can receive impactful trade returns to Milwaukee. Given the packed outfield for 2018, the Brewers could conceivably release a player like Broxton should trade partners refuse to bite with a 45-to-50 OFP / quality depth trade (matching Broxton’s $11.5M-to-$19.8M surplus), for the trouble is that Broxton’s expected role is indeed declining (and any particular trade partner will also know that). This should not simply be viewed as picking on Broxton, as the point exists for Vogt and several other players on the roster.

“Slingin’ Stearns” earned his nickname for wheeling-and-dealing on the trade market during his first offseason in Milwaukee, but that reputation has calmed over time (not surprisingly, as the club completed their rebuilding process). Stearns did not show any hesitation in aggressively using waiver claims and releases to define his 2016-2017 offseason, and now the GM’s reputation may be defined by how effectively he clears roster space for what’s next: refined future development and improved MLB roles to contend in 2018.

The 2017 season proved that these goals can align and coexist within the same roster, so there are no excuses for failing to improve this strategy by learning from the 2017 progression.

Photo Credit: Jim Young, USAToday Sports Images.

Except the pitching would indeed prove to be a problem for the Cubs, one that fully defined the club’s descent from “great team bordering on dynasty” to “just another very good team.” The distinction is crucial, for the Cubs slip left the door wide open for an upstart Brewers club that chased their big market foes deep into September; the two clubs played an extremely close series in Milwaukee in September that allowed the Cubs to finish the Brewers’ divisional aspirations, but the Brewers pushed the Cubs as hard as they could. The Cubs rotation would nearly be shambolic compared to its 2016 version, if fans were to forget that 14 runs prevented from the first four starters in a rotation is quite solid.

On the other hand, the Brewers entered the season with a rotation full of question marks. Ace Guerra would be returning for his second career season, after taking the world by storm as an age-31 rookie in 2016. He could not make it through his first start before the Brewers needed their first depth option. Wily Peralta came on strong to close the 2016 season, but quickly showed that those results were a mirage. That the front office kept Matt Garza around could lead one to question just how “analytical” this club is, as the righty’s first three years in Milwaukee proved his release at $12 million+ would be worth more than his spot in the rotation. Brent Suter emerged as a valuable up-and-down, swingman type in 2016, and expanded that role in 2017. Chase Anderson and Jimmy Nelson looked like low rotation innings eaters, at the very least, until mechanical changes in delivery timing (Nelson) and pitch sequencing adjustments (Anderson) catapulted both starters to the top of the National League.

If the Cubs opened a -90 run door for the Brewers, Milwaukee entered that door with a 35 run improvement of their own, closing some of the gap between the clubs (the remaining gaps would be largely explained by the exceptional Cubs offense, but the Brewers stuck around thanks to their equally exceptional bullpen).

In the middle of the season, I studied 2011-2016 runs prevented progressions for National League rotations, and found that a typical pitcher working in two consecutive seasons would see their production fluctuate by approximately 57.0 Innings Pitched and 12 runs prevented. Granted, this was only the average fluctuation; more extreme fluctuations like those from Jon Lester or Jimmy Nelson would not necessarily be uncommon even if they were surprising. At the very least, the 2017 season demonstrated how rotational fluctuations can help to define the fate of a ballclub simply when the same cast of characters are kept around (again, these rotational fluctuations are calculated without any consideration to additions or subtractions in personnel).

For the Cubs, they likely learned a lesson that their large payroll capacity can readily solve, and pending free agency from a couple of their declining options will help them make that decision. Chicago largely began answering this question when they unloaded prospects for the midseason acquisition of Jose Quintana (84.3 IP, 6 runs prevented in Lakeview). Milwaukee, on the other hand, must heed the warning of the 2017 Cubs, and look at their own internal fluctuations for clues about building a successful 2018 rotation.

• First, were the positive steps of Anderson and Nelson missed entering 2017, or were the pitchers expected to take steps forward? This will be a crucial test of the club’s pitching approach with their internal analytics and their on-field coaching staff. If the Brewers were working with both pitchers on adjustments and did not expect either to move forward, the club must investigate these lessons to make better forecasts for the 2018 rotation.

• Second, were the overall forward steps of the rotation worthwhile enough to keep the same staff around? The Brewers already have a rotation spot to fill due to Jimmy Nelson’s shoulder injury (which the club is expecting to eat into a significant portion of the season), and they also have a decision to make about Matt Garza’s option. But, it is worth asking whether the club can expect to move forward by opening rotation spots for pitchers like Brandon Woodruff (43.0 IP, -1 Runs Prevented in his first taste of MLB action) or even Suter (who could serve as a season-opening 5th man while advanced minors options make their last adjustments before promotion).

Beware those fluctuations, and heed those forward steps by Anderson and Nelson: the Brewers contended in 2017 solely on the strength of their above average pitching staff. So the question remains, what will be the next step for this pitching system?

Photo Credit: Benny Sieu, USAToday Sports Images

Of course, the Brewers win also brings the club thoroughly into “winning season territory,” beyond the mere .500 win total (81) or the “well, I guess they won one more game than .500″ mark of 82 wins.

Now, with five games remaining in the season, these 2017 Brewers are fighting for their playoffs lives, improbably fighting for a divisional shot, and perhaps most improbably, fighting for a slot among the Best Brewers Teams in Franchise History. Let’s have a look:

Obviously, the cynical Brewers fans will point out that the fact that this team is one of the best in franchise history reflects the losing nature of the franchise, rather than the strengths of this 2017 club. I think that’s a cop out, for several reasons; first, this team clearly features some key young- and prime-aged players getting ready for a contending run (hopefully); second, this team clearly features one of the very best pitching staffs in Brewers history, including both the starting rotation and the bullpen. This last fact will be true by runs prevented (even if the team allows 50 runs over the last five games, they will remain a significantly better than average club; they are currently on pace to prevent 60 runs), as well as by WARP.

The historical Baseball Prospectus pitching statistics show that Jimmy Nelson (3.95), Zach Davies (3.57), Corey Knebel (2.22), and Chase Anderson (2.13) each have more than 2.00 pitching Wins Above Replacement (WARP); no other Brewers team has accomplished that, ever! If one is inclined to complain about the offense, and call this team one-dimensional, well, sometimes very good baseball teams are one dimensional, and it just happens that this Brewers club actually is lead by pitching instead of the club reputation for being offense-first (CSV retrieved September 27, 2017).

To provide context for the significance of this pitching accomplishment, consider the fact that the Brewers have five 2.0 WARP position players in 2017, as well. However, by comparison, Brewers teams have had five or more 2.0 WARP position players in 2016, 2014, 2012, 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008, 2007, 2005, 1996, 1992, 1991, 1990, 1987, 1983, 1982, 1979, 1978, and 1972, according to Baseball Prospectus Team Batting Statistics (CSV retrieved September 27, 2017). So, indeed, this pitching performance is special for the Brewers, and makes the 2017 club a true anomaly in the history of the franchise, a true pitching-first ballclub.

The 2017 Brewers are already one of the very best clubs in franchise history, and each win as the season closes should hopefully keep the team in the playoff hunt and solidify this historically good standing within the franchise.

There will be an entire offseason to assess this club in terms of what’s next, but it should be immediately clear that this 2017 team is somewhat of an anomaly. There are no real stars (only Travis Shaw has reached the 4.0 WARP level), and the club’s identity is in the rich assemblage of depth players who just needed a chance to play. Manny Pina, Hernan Perez, Jesus Aguilar, Keon Broxton, Jonathan Villar, and maybe even Eric Sogard fit this mold as players producing 1.0 to 2.0 WARP in 2017; not one of these players is a standout, or perhaps even a member of the next “planned” Brewers contending core, but together they are worth nearly 8.0 WARP to the club. The offseason will be the occasion for deeper dives into the talent of this club and their likelihood of continuing success with this roster, but two things are certain:

(1) This Brewers club is a team in the truest sense, with a real identity across the diamond. I hope that when the club is building “planned” contenders, they do not forget the lessons learned when seeking ignored or unproven avenues of talent. Hopefully the next “planned” contender does have a productive Lewis Brinson or Corbin Burnes, named by the club as the 2017 Minor League Players of the Year, but it would not be all that bad to have a 2017 Manny Pina, 2017 Chase Anderson, 2017 Jimmy Nelson, or 2016 Jonathan Villar coming along for the ride as well.

(2) Let’s hope these Brewers continue to win out, because this pitching-first club with a deep and lights out bullpen and two notably better than average starters (Anderson and Davies) could wreak havoc in short form playoff series. All Milwaukee needs to do is get there, so get there! Go Brewers!

Photo Credit: Benny Sieu, USAToday Sports Images