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Bandy-Maldonado

Here, following the offseason treatment, I am including major deals from July 2015 (the arguable start of “Rebuilding”) through the present day, meaning that these moves are not entirely Stearns’s trades. Indeed, the Zach Davies / Gerardo Parra trade and the Carlos Gomez & Mike Fiers return remain two reasons that the Brewers did not need to “tank” and design a “scorched earth” rebuild that completely reconstructed the organization. Coupled with draft signings by the late Bruce Seid (such as Jacob Barnes and [soon] Brandon Woodruff), as well as graduated top prospects like Orlando Arcia, and superstar Ryan Braun, the “rebuilding” Brewers have remained competitive due to several different talent streams entering, remaining, and graduating through the system.

Trade Surplus Depreciated WARP & OFP Summary:

As a reminder, I will be following the historical model of Overall Future Potential (OFP) production drawn from the history of MLB performances. Scaled for prospect risk, here’s how those prospect levels can be valuated, with 50 OFP being an “average” MLB player:

Last check-in, here’s how the Brewers’ trades looked. Given Zach Davies’s quick ascent to the MLB, I forgot to add him in this list, so his trade will be featured below.

Following this set of deals, it should be interesting to note that while the Brewers system prospects have had ups and downs, the players traded away have exhibited true depreciation within one year. This should demonstrate one benefit of using a depreciation model to assess future player value, which is the model I have been working with throughout the offseason; players do depreciate in terms of production. Jonathan Lucroy, Jeremy Jeffress, Gerardo Parra, Carlos Gomez, Mike Fiers, Adam Lind, and Jason Rogers all demonstrate this, and it should be noted they demonstrate this without completely crashing their value in the meantime (especially in the case of Lucroy). Khris Davis is perhaps the worst counterexample, as Stearns almost certainly sold low on the slugger, who also deserves credit for making adjustments and shifting his approach in Oakland.

A few quick notes:

• The Lucroy-Jeffress and Gomez-Fiers deals shifted value for completely different reasons. The former relies fully (thus far) on problematic performances by the players the Brewers traded away, while the latter is improving in value both due to struggles by Gomez and Fiers and improvements by Domingo Santana. The Gomez-Fiers deal remains one of the strongest deals to build the Brewers system, even with Josh Hader’s recent struggles, and Brett Phillips’s graduation solidifies at least the 45 OFP grade (which is not nothing), while the ceiling remains to be seen.

• Hidden in the middle of this table is the Francisco Rodriguez trade, which was one of Stearns’s worst trades on the day it occurred. But thankfully, trades are not solely graded on the day-of, and post hoc analysis loves Manny Pina’s development into (at least) a split time catcher at the MLB level. K-Rod has not been terrible, for what it’s worth, but when that contract winds down to its last year the surplus value really depends on short-term production rather than longterm outlook. This hurts the K-Rod score as much as it hurts Lucroy’s assessment in Texas.

• Let it be stated that the Khris Davis trade return was solid (if not spectacular) on the day-of. But it’s great to be reminded that prospect stock can depreciate, too. Fortunately, scouting reports suggest that Jacob Nottingham can remain behind the plate, answering one previous question. But if that power (and bat) does not come around, it may not matter as much; it is getting more appropriate to highlight, say, the 40-45 end of Nottingham’s grade (still means he reaches the MLB) than the 55 end that helped him reach Oakland’s Top 10. Of course, remember that Manny Pina was probably a 40-45 grade minor leaguer when Milwaukee acquired him, so…you know the rest.

• I believe there could be some reason to reassess prospects like Freddy Peralta or Ryan Cordell, who I would rate as valuable depth options for the system. However, for the purposes of this exercise, there is not necessarily enough non-statistical information to fully develop a new scouting grade. So perhaps a few prospects in this table deserve an asterisk next to their grade.

Turning from the “earlier” trades to the 2017 offseason, one can see how Stearns developed the surprising 2017 contender. It is interesting to note that for the offseason coverage of the club, so many of us (myself included) completely failed to properly price the GM’s immediate value for these trades.

For example, Mauricio Dubon was never (and probably will not be) the prime value of the Thornburg deal. What makes the Thornburg deal so amazing is that, given Thornburg’s career development, a straight-up Dubon-for-Thornburg deal would have been solid. Yet, Stearns did not stop there; the GM managed to return not just Dubon, but also a legitimate MLB asset in Travis Shaw, as well as two total lottery tickets (exemplified in Yusion Coca, the Player-To-Be-Named-Later who completed this deal). This trade should continue to “give” to the organization, whether it is in the form of Josh Pennington or Coco being included in a future trade (they are sufficiently far from the MLB to be traded once more), or Dubon working in a utility role or second-tier MLB starting role.

A quick word: These numbers are indeed abstract! The Brewers claim approximately $472.2 million in depreciated surplus value from these trades, which roughly translates to 67 WARP (Wins Above Replacement Player) within the system. These 67 WARP could be maximized and turned into 87 market-rate WARP, they could remain steady over time, or they could further depreciate to 49 WARP. These figures are abstract, of course, because they incorporate risk into the system, and can be cashed out any which way; if Stearns cashes out 87 WARP within the next two years, the Brewers will have quite a competitive team; if these players remain merely competitive or decline further, it will be questioned whether more trades were necessary. The players could continue to depreciate, and many could fail to reach the MLB (if they are prospects). Stearns can cash out surplus through trades or development. So these numbers should not necessarily be interpreted to apply to any timeframe; that’s up to the GM to determine.

Since I’ve already focused specifically on the Jett Bandy-Martin Maldonado deal recently, I will not dive deeper into that deal except to emphasize the importance of post hoc trade analysis. Returning to a trade after the fact, with the proper tools, is not simply “using hindsight,” but rather healthy Benefit-Cost Analysis. Moreover, returning to a trade after the fact, with the proper tools, is an opportunity to potentially sharpen those analytical tools in order to provide better day-of trade analysis. But of course, the Bandy trade is not yet complete, nor are most of these deals, really. So, by returning to these trades with analytical methods over time, one can come to understand organizational value as a malleable entity that is never truly solidified at one point in time. This is arguably yet another reason to oppose “rebuilding,” or to opposing “winning now,” or any extreme organizational strategy; it is also possible to never build an organization, or to build an organization through contrarian means (as Stearns is doing). There should be no reason for an MLB club to fail to simultaneously build for the present and future, save for a lack of creativity.

For demonstration, take Bruce Seid’s 2009 draft, which was driven (according to popular arguments) either by great late round value or astonishing early round missteps. Any way one slices it, Seid ended up with three 2.5+ WARP players (“Fastballer” Mike Fiers, “Khrush” Davis, and Scooter “Scoots McGee” Gennett. Incidentally three of my favorite Brewers). That former GM Doug Melvin was unable to transform the 2013-2015 Brewers into strikingly consistent contenders with this supporting cast is less an indictment of these players than an indictment of the front office’s miscalculations (or failures of imagination) during those years. Complain all you like about the early round failures, that’s an astonishingly good draft (interestingly enough, the draft return will be even better once one incorporates the trade returns for deals involving Fiers and Davis, respectively).

Alternately, take Scoots McGee’s predecessor, Rickie Weeks, arguably one of the greatest Brewers of all time and (probably quite easily) the organization’s best second baseman. One of the commonly cited “Core Players” drafted by Jack Zduriencik, Weeks easily lands among the top third of MLB players from the 2003 First Round. The median player from that round (according to bWAR) was outfielder Mitch Maier (1.5 career WARP accumulated from 2006-2012). Of course, by now everyone knows that Weeks’s career was derailed by misguided prospect hype, which unfortunately makes the Brewers’ franchise second baseman a “bust” in many fans’ eyes. Nevermind that he’s nearly 12x more valuable than the median player drafted in the 2003 First Round; one of the very best players drafted in 2003 overall; or a better-than-median overall 2nd pick in the history of the draft: Many Brewers fans prefer to side with hype over their beloved power/speed franchise second baseman.

These drafts are merely two organizational examples of the extremes that populate draft analysis. One of the basic reasons that these types of analytical and narrative shortcomings exist is that fans and analysts alike “dismiss” as a truism the fact that the striking majority of players in every draft will never make the MLB: such a fact is taken to be so clearly true on the surface that its impact is not seriously considered.

To counter this analytical blindspot, one can simply look at the median player value for each round in each draft. For this exercise, I wanted to focus on drafts that are mostly “finished,” since more recent drafts would require judging players by value metrics, organizational depth charts, and prospect rankings. By beginning a decade out (with the fantastic 2006 draft), one can find a rather clear model for how player talent may populate the rounds of an MLB draft. To construct the chart below, I began in 1999 and stopped at 2008, since I understand that even aspects of the 2009 draft remain unsettled (take Davis, Gennett, and Fiers, for instance: their careers still hang in the balance, so it’s not really safe to say that their overall value can reasonably be measured).

The spoiler alert is that due to the overwhelming or daunting fact that most drafted players simply fail to reach the MLB, by the third round of the draft the solidly median player value is “Did Not Reach MLB” (DNRM for short). One should not necessarily dismiss this as nonsense, as one must consider that teams are still (mostly) drafting within the Top 100 in the third round. So, if a team is drafting median talent that fails to reach the MLB as early as the first, second, or third round, one can use that metric to evaluate draft day approaches, expectations, risk assessment and management, bonus assessment and analysis, player profiles, hype, etc. (that’s for another day). The purpose of this chart is to simply begin the analysis, starting with the first five rounds:

In the most straightforward terms, this chart means that for the first five rounds, at least 16 players (per round) fail to make the MLB.

Incidentally, the importance of the first round should not be understated: in recent drafts, it is likely that somewhere around 20 percent of all MLB players from a given draft will reside within the first round of that given draft. So, in this sense one can weigh first round misses much more heavily than others, since that is the most likely spot to find an MLB’er (like Rickie Weeks, even, as noted above).

This lends some credence to criticisms of Seid’s early drafts, although one still must deal with the pushback from that excellent late round value (some teams failed to land 10.0+ WARP in the entire 2009 draft, let alone after the fifth round, which should increase the considered value of Davis, Fiers, and Gennett). Successful depth drafting places Seid’s efforts in the top half of MLB draft value in 2009.

One should also note how the increase in supplemental first round picks (and therefore overall first round picks) spiked the MLB player totals (especially in the 2005, 2007, and 2008 drafts). It stands to reason that the basic institutional fact of higher draft bonuses in the first round accounts for those steep MLB player totals; judging by the sheer number of replacement level players available in the first round, one might question whether an 11th or 15th or 20th round organizational player would have an equal shot at reaching the MLB as replacement depth if their bonuses were as high as first rounders. Even a replacement player bumps a club’s first round efforts into “successfully produced an MLB,” which must be a much more favorable return on investment in the eyes of that organization.

Who are these median players? For fun, let’s highlight the best median talent from the first through fifth rounds of the 1999-2008 MLB drafts:

Building a narrative and analysis of the draft, one can take two steps.

• First, one must heavily weigh the “DNRM” reality and build a comprehensive analysis of scouting profiles, player backgrounds, player competitive levels, pre-draft hype, and various aspects of organizational ideologies (mechanical & statistical analytical tools, risk assessment, bonus pool strategies, etc.). There is one sense in which all players that fail to reach the MLB are equal, but the institutional factors of signing bonuses and scarcity of elite talent render first round failures more problematic than, say, 20th round failures.
• Second, one can mine the profiles, backgrounds, hype, and organizational ideologies involving successful “median” drafted players as well, in order to effectively recognize additional replacement talent within any given system, and ultimately build an effective account of how talent is dispersed throughout a draft. In this sense, the profiles of “median” first or second round players (like Eddie Kunz or James Darnell) can potentially serve as guideposts to other replacements or depth talent within an organization.

Of course, one might eventually opt to celebrate the careers of the likes of Josh Banks or John Mayberry, etc., in order to further appreciate the weight of reaching the MLB. Even at the margins of the draft, there is talent that can help an organization in some regard. Should organizations wish to push ahead with current cost-cutting measures, thereby enhancing and maintaining their revenue shares, and extract ultimate value from the draft, they may find valuable lessons by wading through the draft median and DNRM.

Brew Crew Ball || Trade Analysis: Khris Davis Valuable Commodity for the Brewers (Feb. 13, 2016)

Khris Davis is neither a pitcher or a catcher, but both of the prospects he was dealt for are. Kyle Lesniewski over at Brew Crew Ball breaks down last Friday’s big trade, which sent the slugging left fielder to Oakland in exchange for a pair of prospects. Jacob Nottingham, the headliner of the deal for Milwaukee, ranks as the 66th-best prospect in the Baseball Prospectus Top-101 and represents far greater value on his own than your author imagined Davis might be worth this offseason that was flooded with outfield talent. As with all prospects, it’ll be a few years before we know the true value of Nottingham and Bubba Derby, but it appears at first glance that GM David Stearns has pulled off another coup.

Minor League Ball || Was Jacob Nottingham a good pickup for the Brewers? (Feb. 15, 2016)

Wayne Cavadi takes a look at Nottingham, a catching prospect with some questions on defense but very few on offense. There has been plenty of speculation that the 20-year-old slugger may not be able to stick behind the plate, but Cavadi says that even if he eventually needs to make a switch to first base, he has the bat to carry the position. If he can improve enough behind the plate to be a serviceable defensive catcher, the Brewers have a legitimately elite prospect on their hands.

BP Milwaukee || Did Chase Anderson have a Sophomore Slump? (Feb. 16, 2016)

We normally don’t feature our own site’s work in this space, but in keeping with today’s theme, I encourage you to take a look at Ryan Romano’s analysis of the major-league career of Chase Anderson, whose second year was either better or worse than his rookie season, depending on which stat you look at.

FanGraphs || How Badly Would You Hurt a Team for a Week? (Feb. 18, 2016)

Breaking away from today’s theme a bit to show you something I think you’ll have fun with, Matthew Kory, who can also be found at BP Boston, explores the damage you or I might cause in the hypothetical situation in which we were pressed into starting duty for our favorite ball club for a week. The results, as you might imagine, are not particularly pretty.

FanGraphs || How the Brewers Rebuilt Their Way Into KATOH’s Heart (Feb. 16, 2016)

Earlier this week, Chris Mitchell released his organizational rankings based on his KATOH projection system, which had Milwaukee as baseball’s top farm system by a rather large margin. In this follow-up, he explains how the Brewers amassed the kind of talent that his system is so fond of — KATOH is a particular fan of under-the-radar prospects Ramon Flores, Javier Betancourt and Keon Broxton.

Brew Crew Ball || 10 Things I learned about the Brewers in the 2016 Baseball Prospectus Annual (Feb. 16, 2016)

Speaking of things I don’t normally do in this space, this is a piece I wrote for Brew Crew Ball this week. I share it because I think it’s pretty good, but also to highlight the incredible work of the Baseball Prospectus staff on the 2016 BP Annual book, from which this entire article is derived. The aforementioned Romano took the lead with the Brewers’ essay in this year’s edition, and our EIC J.P. Breen led a group of BP writers in evaluating a number of Milwaukee’s prominent players. Check out my article here for a teaser, then maybe pop over to Amazon and think about grabbing your copy, if you’re among the minority that doesn’t already have one.

FanGraphs || The Best Transactions of the 2016 Offseason (Feb. 15, 2016)

Finally this week, Dave Cameron of FanGraphs counted down his top ten best transactions of the offseason (thus far), since everyone loves a rankings piece. The Brewers trade with Arizona that sent Jean Segura and Tyler Wagner to the desert in exchange for Aaron Hill, Chase Anderson and Isan Diaz checked in at no. 8 on the list, as the Brewers basically upgraded at pitcher and bought a top-15 prospect in exchange for the last decaying bits of Segura’s trade value and half of Hill’s contract. Cameron also did a worst transactions list, which of course includes the Diamondbacks side of this deal in the same no. 8 spot.

With Yoenis Cespedes re-signing in New York and Justin Upton inking a long-term deal with Detroit, the stagnating outfield market seems to finally have jumped to life. Dexter Fowler and Austin Jackson still have to find homes. As the latter two are primarily center fielders, though, it’s fair to suggest that the free-agent market is meaningfully over at the corner positions. That could mean the trade market heats up over the next couple weeks.

Khris Davis compiled a .247/.323/.505 slash line with 27 homers in just 440 plate appearances in 2015. Some signs still indicate that he’s best utilized as a platoon outfielder, but in an power-depressed league, Davis’s bat carries enough value to garner 500+ PA in the right situation. Now that teams can’t acquire impact outfield bats in free agency, Brewers’ GM David Stearns should finally get nibbles on the line for the 28-year-old slugger.

The fact that Davis has four control years remaining on his contract makes him stand out from guys like Jay Bruce, who will almost certainly be shopped prior to opening day. Working against him, though, is the fact that he can only handle left field.

The Chicago White Sox are desperately looking for a reason to not start Avisail Garcia in right field (and could move Melky Cabrera to right). The Los Angeles Angels could use someone to platoon with Daniel Nava in left. A team like the Oakland Athletics may see someone like Davis as a low-cost option beyond 2016, and they’ve been haphazardly active this winter. Other teams could show interest, too, but those are a few that make sense.

JIMMY NELSON, THE KNUCKLE-CURVE, AND PLATOON SPLITS

Jimmy Nelson drew rave reviews for his early-season performance in 2015. He posted a 3.58 FIP in April and unleashed his new knuckle-curve, which buckled the knees of many spring opponents. It was a pitch designed to replace his changeup and improve his effectiveness against lefties.

In 2015, the right-hander allowed opposite-handed batters to hit .298/.381/.495 with a walk rate of 4.13 BB/9 and a 1.68 WHIP. It represented a stark difference to his performance against righties, who he dominated throughout the entire year. The existence of a cavernous platoon split suggests that his knuckle-curve wasn’t really all that it was cracked up to be.

Of course, this skirts the fact that baseball is played over six months. Consistency is perhaps more important than raw stuff. To that point, Nelson gradually lost what made his knuckle-curve so promising: the vertical tilt.

As one can see, his knuckle-curve became more horizontal and less vertical as the season progressed. And the pitch isn’t much different from his slider — aside from a bit of velocity — if it’s not breaking downward to a significant degree. It’s also less effective against lefties when it’s not dropping off the table.

Nelson allowed left-handed hitters to post a .379 and .317 batting average in June and August, respectively. Lefties also hit over .300 in September, but he only threw 19 innings due to being struck in the head by a line drive. All of the damage may not have come against the knuckle-curve; however, the decreased vertical movement allowed opposing lefties to sit on his fastball and not offer as often against the offspeed pitch.

For Jimmy Nelson to take a step forward and become a mid-rotation starter for the Brewers, either his knuckle-curve or his changeup (in which I still believe) has to become a consistent third offering. Otherwise, he’s simply going to struggle against lefties once more in 2016 and the story won’t be meaningfully different.

WHAT MAKES LUCROY’S COMMENTS DIFFERENT?

Craig Counsell (September 23, 2015): “I don’t have any grandiose speeches yet, because I do think that where we’re at it the process of building, there’s going to be painful moments still. And that’s OK. That’s what happens when you try to build something great. There’s some pain in there. It almost has to happen, that pain. And there’s still more pain coming. That’s not to scare people. But if you want something great, you’ve got to be willing to undergo some pain. It’s a big job getting to where we want to get to. It’s a big job.”

Mark Attanasio (December 17, 2015): “By doing better, I mean fielding a playoff-competitive team and one day bringing a world championship to Milwaukee. To move toward accomplishing this lofty goal, I believe we need to take a step back and build more intensively from within.”

Jonathan Lucroy’s recent comments, suggesting that he would welcome a trade, have made many Brewers fans uncomfortable. One of the common criticisms has been that Lucroy’s “expectations of losing” could negatively impact the development of the Brewers’ young pitchers, as they may resent Lucroy and not accept his mentorship. Furthermore, maybe the comments are supposedly going to foment some kind of clubhouse disfunction.

All of that smacks of fans searching for reasons why comments they don’t want to hear are somehow worthy of anger. This isn’t the case for several reasons:

1. If “negative” comments from ownership and the club’s manager — meaning, comments that seemingly convey an expectation to lose in 2016 — aren’t problematic, why are Lucroy’s? That somehow a fellow player’s unbelief will rub off and stunt development? That somehow a pitcher is going to understand his manager’s rebuilding comments, but not the ones from his catcher? I really struggle to see a qualitative difference between the comments from Counsell/Attanasio and Lucroy, other than the latter saying that he wants to leave. And, of course, only one of those individuals has limitations on his patience due to the fleeting nature of player peaks. If anyone deserves benefit of the doubt in this situation, it seems to be the player who understands that he may not have many seasons left.
2. Why can outsiders understand the motivations behind Lucroy’s comments, but not his fellow teammates, many of whom are likely his friends and people with whom he’s in communication this winter? Seems to me that we’re treating the young Brewers players as if they’re unintelligent or unable to empathize with their teammate.
3. Lucroy is smart enough to know that his trade value is tied up in the performance of the Brewers’ young pitching staff. He’s not going to dog it, nor is he going to ignore the development of guys like Nelson, Peralta, Davies, and Jungmann. With all the articles being written about his framing decline and his decreased ability to handle pitching staffs, there’s no way that Lucroy neglects that piece of his responsibilities.
4. If we’re treating Lucroy’s comments as truthful, meaning he only cares about winning and not loyalty to the Brewers, it seems to me that his only desire in 2016 will be winning baseball games — whether that’s in Milwaukee or elsewhere. I don’t think we’ve ever seen any evidence to suggest the contrary. Part of that desire to win will be maximizing the performance and development of the young pitching staff. Assuming otherwise is blatantly ignoring Lucroy’s motivations for making the original comments.

So, no, I still don’t believe Lucroy’s comments are a big deal, and I particularly despise that I’m only feeding into the narrative by devoting 1,000+ words on the topic on this site. I hope this is the end of it.

Beyond the Box Score || The Decision between Khris Davis and Domingo Santana won’t be easy 

As Kevin Ruprecht (@KevinRuprecht) explains, in Domingo Santana and Khris Davis, the Brewers have basically the same player offensively: a high-strikeout bopper who is a virtual lock for a quarter-century home runs as long as he gets enough at-bats to qualify. But he will also provide far more than his fair share of whiffs. While Santana projects as a better defensive player, he’ll need to cut down on his 37.6 percent Major League career strikeout rate in order to match Davis’ production. Neither is capable of being the long-term answer in center field, which means Milwaukee is faced with a three-headed decision: (1) relegate one of their best prospects to the bench; (2) trade Davis now at the height of his value; or (3) move Santana (which Stearns has already done once) before he has a chance to prove himself and hand the left field job to Davis until the younglings are ready to take over.

Beyond the Box Score || Will Smith requires your attention

Indeed, he does. While it comes as absolutely no surprise to Brewers’ fans, Austin Yamada explains why Smith is one of the best — and most underrated — young relievers in baseball right now. While it’s certainly nice for the Brewers to have a youthful, cheap and controllable ace reliever in the fold, Smith’s true value to the franchise at this point of the rebuilding process may ultimately lie in his trade value. With K-Rod gone, the southpaw is likely to get the first crack at the closer role and if he can prove effective, he could bring Milwaukee back a tidy little ransom from a contender looking for left-handed relief help.

Beyond the Box Score || Jon Singleton is keeping A. J. Reed’s seat warm 

The Brewers have already acquired one former Houston first baseman, and while Chris Carter is still under team control for three years, only the most optimistic members of Carter’s family believe he’s the Brewers long-term answer at first. However, there’s a chance that Milwaukee’s long-term first baseman was an Astro all along, as Houston appears ready to make Jon Singleton available. Nicolas Stellini (@StelliniTweets) says that A.J. Reed is knocking on the door for Houston, and Singleton’s days as a starter will be numbered once the Astros have Kris Bryant’d Reed by keeping him in Triple-A until the Super 2 deadline has past. If the Astros do decide to move on from Singleton, David Stearns (who had a hand in drafting him in 2009) would almost certainly have some interest.

There are two clear favorites for this role: Jean Segura and Khris Davis. Both are big-league-quality players, and neither one appears to have a long-term future with the Brewers. Segura is a fringe-average shortstop who is likely to be replaced on an everyday basis by Orlando Arcia in the coming year (and who the Brewers already acquired a temporary replacement for in Jonathan Villar), and Davis is a corner outfielder who is only suited to be the short side of a platoon. If the Brewers are to maximize value, Segura should be traded to allow Arcia enough opportunity to play whenever he’s ready. And Davis is a viable puzzle piece for a playoff team, but the Brewers are not in a situation to use that type of role player.

As a shortstop, Segura has more trade value; however, that is part of the reason I believe he will be traded later. Stearns is clearly on a mission to make room on his 40-man roster and to move the spare parts for lottery-ticket prospects. Davis fits that bill more than Segura does. Teams will always be able to trade starting-caliber shortstops, but that is not so much the case for players such as Davis. This same logic applied to Lind and Rogers — as the rest of the teams fill out their respective benches, there is progressively less need for platoon corner infielders. Everyone signs their own, so there is no need to spend anything to acquire one.

For shortstops, though, this is not the case. Shortstops are painfully difficult to find; thus, many teams should hypothetically be willing to go out of their way to get one. One team to illustrate this phenomenon is the Mets, whose current rotation of Wilmer Flores and Ruben Tejada at shortstop is unspectacular. If, in February, the Mets decided they wanted to upgrade, Segura would be a logical choice — but there is no danger that they will fill that spot prior to a potential trade, as there simply are not enough quality shortstops for everyone to have one.

But Davis does not fill a similar scarcity. Corner outfielders with some power are relatively common; funnily enough, Chris Davis — who just signed with the Red Sox — has the ability to perform in such a role. Additionally, not every team needs one. Some teams, of course, have full-time outfielders so a part-time player such as Davis who cannot play center are not needed. This makes trading Davis before rosters are finalized a more urgent matter. 

The Lind, Rogers, and Rodriguez trades make it clear that Stearns realizes this fact. There is no big hurry to trade Segura; as injuries take their toll on the 2016 season, Segura may in fact be more in demand when the trade deadline comes and Arcia proves ready to be in the big leagues. Davis, though, has no clear role on the 2016 roster. Ryan Braun will play one of the corners, and the Brewers would presumably like to get Domingo Santana consistent at-bats in the other one, which would result in limiting Davis’ playing time. But with rosters filling every day, the Brewers likely need to move quickly.

After a 2014 season in which the Brewers’ hot hitting carried them to the brink of the playoffs, they prayed that 2015 would bring more of the same. With Carlos Gomez and Aramis Ramirez regressing (and departing via trade), Jonathan Lucroy playing hurt and Jean Segura remaining terrible, those hopes didn’t come to pass. The season brought three real offensive bright spots: Adam Lind — who has since moved — continued his solid performance from the prior two years; Ryan Braun, who rebounded from a couple of injury-ridden campaigns; and Khris Davis, who took the proverbial next step as a sophomore.

As the two best projected hitters on the team for 2016, Braun and Davis will probably garner the most attention this offseason. In terms of their past numbers, we can see an interesting development. Both have undergone similar changes, with the same end product: incredible hitting to the opposite field.

Entering 2014, Braun had always done fairly well when poking the ball to right. From his rookie year in 2007 to his injury-marred 2013 effort, his .408 wOBA on such plays ranked 16th in baseball. But, as my colleague Jack Moore observed in July, he’s since taken that to a new level, with a .544 opposite-field wOBA. For 2015, he posted a .533 wOBA, trailing only Bryce Harper among hitters with 50 balls in play. A few spots behind him on that list? Davis, with a mark of .504. That represented a significant upgrade from the preceding year, when his .458 wOBA to right field came in at 16th — on par with Braun’s original place. In this regard, Milwaukee’s corner outfielders both went from great to unbelievable in the blink of an eye.

Oddly enough, however, they traveled different paths to arrive at this point. Davis became more patient on the outer portions of the plate:

Pitches in this area go to the opposite field the most often, since the batter can most easily drive them the other way. Given this — and given that the overall location against Davis shifted this year — it would seem that Davis abandoned aggression for selectivity on pitches away to his benefit. (This likely had a hand in Davis’s walk-rate spike as well.)

By contrast, Braun didn’t stray from his prior approach. As a matter of fact, his swing rate on outside pitches went up:

Moreover, pitchers didn’t avoid Braun any more than they used to. In his case, he simply did more with what they gave him. While it obviously diverged from Davis’s methods, we can’t argue with the results.

Both Braun and Davis became insanely good at cutting down on their swing and pushing the ball the other way. But each accomplished it uniquely, and to different extents as well: Davis’s opposite-field rate fell from 23.4 to 20.1 percent, while Braun pumped his up from 26.3 to 31.0 percent. For 2016 and beyond, the Brewers should have two similar hitters to anchor their lineup, even if they come at the game from opposite ends of the spectrum. It just goes to show that baseball isn’t a one-size-fits-all-game — everyone skins this cat in their own manner.

At times this past year, Khris Davis looked hopelessly terrible; for instance, he batted a sickly .186/.271/.349 over 48 plate appearances in July. He’s this sort of player (one who will sometimes get frigidly cold) can cost his team drastically. But those lower temperatures will often give way to devastating heat, which we saw during the remainder of the season. Derek Harvey (RIP) wrote in August about Davis’s torrid play in that month; he would finish it with a .228/.291/.576 line, which is flawed but somewhat representative of his ceiling.

In September, Davis surpassed everyone’s expectations. That month* saw him demolish baseballs. smashing his way to a .284/.350/.587 slash line — some of the best output in the league. That kind of vintage-Braun play over the course of a whole season would make him one of the best hitters in baseball.

[*As well as the first four days of October.]

By now, we all know that small samples can lead to crooked numbers such as these, and we thus regard them with appropriate skepticism. In Davis’s case, though, the production was truly bizarre — shown only the underlying peripherals, I would have assumed Davis had struggled in September, not dominated.

Let’s start with his batted-ball breakdown. Davis certainly clobbered the ball to conclude the season, making solid contact 35.5 percent of the time. However, that didn’t represent much of an improvement; he posted a 34.4 percent hard-hit rate for 2015 as a whole, in addition to a 34.9 percent mark in August. Plus, he made an unhealthy amount of weak contact — his September soft-hit rate of 22.1 percent easily topped his 17.9 percent clip overall. Someone with as little speed as Davis should need to square up the ball consistently to succeed, yet he managed to do the latter without the former.

The weirdness doesn’t end there. Davis saw his fly ball rate drop to 36.4 percent in the year’s final month, compared to 40.3 percent during the entire season. Because he’s always produced the most on flies — his .570 wOBA in that regard ranks sixth in the National League since 2013 — a decrease here should have doomed him. To make matters (theoretically) worse, his infield fly-ball rate spiked to 14.3 percent in September, nearly double his overall 7.3 percent figure. Despite fewer fly balls and more popups, Davis still maintained his stroke.

What’s more, the defining characteristic of his strong August disappeared. Harvey noted in the aforementioned article that Davis had pulled the ball excessively to fuel his late-summer surge. For whatever reason, however, he went to left field less often in September, at 41.6 percent of the time — more than ten percentage points lower than his 52.4 pull rate from the prior month. To put it simply, Davis abandoned the recipe that had helped him, while maintaining that formula’s top-notch results.

Pitchers gave Davis less to work with in September. In that period, he saw 50.8 percent fastballs, as opposed to 59.9 percent for 2015 as a whole. Davis has always crushed hard pitches, to the tune of 27.9 runs above average for his career. His -0.2 runs on other pitches has generally undermined that, but it didn’t have any effect as 2015 drew to a close. It wasn’t as though Davis suddenly developed a better eye — he whiffed at 19.2 percent of non-fastballs in September, in line with his 2015 whiff rate of 19.5 percent on such offerings. He just somehow changed things up for the better.

While Davis’s zone plot shows a clear trend, it doesn’t seem like one that would have benefited him:

When August ended, Davis started swinging more frequently at pitches down and away. He has always fared the worst in that area:

This held true during September of 2015, when most of Davis’s power (and average) came on pitches up and in. In the end, it makes for a tremendously unusual case.

Interestingly enough, Davis himself didn’t think he played at 100 percent to wrap up the year. On September 30th, he told Tom Hadricourt at the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel that he was “still not mentally all there,” as the lingering effects of his knee injury still inhibited him. Maybe after a full offseason of recovery, a healthy Davis will be able to stave off massive regression. We should certainly hope so, because this iteration of him was nothing more than a ridiculously fluky small-sample mirage.

With Domingo Santana, Brett Phillips and many more on the rise, the Brewers possess plenty of outfielders. If Davis could come anywhere close to replicating his September achievements in a larger sample, he would definitely beat out the competition. Sadly, that likely won’t happen. While Davis certainly has the potential to excel offensively, he didn’t tap into it this September.

• They need a third baseman for the future. In the 2011 offseason, Aramis Ramirez came to Milwaukee, where he manned the hot corner for three-plus years. The club traded him to Pittsburgh this past July, and they’d like to find someone to productively fill his place. GM David Stearns highlighted third base and center field (where Carlos Gomez, also traded in July, used to roam) as his top priority.
• They don’t really have a third baseman for the future. In center, the Brewers can expect Brett Phillips to blossom into a starter by 2017 or 2018. No such internal option exists for third base, where Gilbert Lara — the top prospect at the position entering the season — had a middling season at the rookie level, though it was an aggressive assignment. An 18-year-old, Lara will require at least several seasons to reach his potential, if he ever realizes it. Javier Betancourt, who came to Milwaukee in the K-Rod trade, could make the move to third at some point. He’s played up the middle for his entire career, though, and his bat has a pretty uninspiring ceiling. Overall, the farm doesn’t look like it can provide a starting-caliber third baseman for a foreseeable future.
• They do have plenty of outfielders for the future. Ryan Braun will presumably play right field for the next five years, while Khris Davis seems to have locked down left (barring a trade). Not content with these two, the Brewers have stuffed their system with men who can patrol the outfield. Phillips stands out as the best of the bunch, but Domingo Santana, Tyrone Taylor, Monte Harrison, and Clint Coulter could all develop into solid regulars.

Given this, it seems to me that the Brewers have a logical next move: trade a young outfielder for a young third baseman. It’s the classic instance of dealing from a strength to improve a weakness — and some of the (possibly) available options could really help the team.

Rio Ruiz, Atlanta Braves

Thanks to some recent moves, Atlanta has three third base types in its minor-league system. They include Ruiz, who came to the team in the Evan Gattis trade a year ago; Austin Riley, whom the team drafted in the first round this season; and Hector Olivera, whom the club acquired in the Alex Wood deal in July. This sort of logjam means at least one of them could hit the market. Since the Braves seem to be undergoing a deep rebuild, they’d likely make Ruiz — the most advanced and least exciting of the trio — available first.

Across 1,715 minor-league plate appearances, Ruiz has compiled a solid .263/.353/.399 slash line. An exquisite walk rate of 12.3 percent has helped him reach base often, while an 18.0 percent strikeout rate suggests he should make enough contact to stay relevant. As he ages (he won’t turn 22 until May), he may continue to add some power. He didn’t hit well in 2015, posting a .233/.333/.324 line in 489 trips to the dish at Double-A, but that occurred in a difficult environment for offense.

The biggest doubts about Ruiz’s future lie on the defensive side of the ball. While he owns a high-quality arm, scouts have critiqued his range to this point. BP’s scouting report last offseason stated that he would need to “further improve his footwork and lower-half actions” to stick at the third. If he can progress in this regard, he should pair a respectable glove with a noteworthy-enough bat — a combination that the Brewers would willingly accept.

Jake Lamb, Arizona Diamondbacks

As with Atlanta, Arizona’s farm affiliates possess a few captivating third-base prospects. Brandon Drury, the key piece in the Justin Upton trade three years back, will probably have priority there for the future. Yasmany Tomas and his sizable contract can also play the hot corner, although a corner outfield spot probably suits him better. That could leave Lamb as the odd man out.

As a 24-year-old rookie, Lamb certainly fared well in 2015, batting .254/.318/.382 en route to 2.3 WARP. That didn’t come out of nowhere — he demolished minor-league pitching, with a .321/.408/.552 career slash line. The issue for Lamb has always been strikeouts. A 21.0 percent K-rate below the show gave way to a 24.9 percent mark in his Major League debut. Still, he hits for power and takes walks, which should help his offense remain satisfactory (at least).

In addition to his offense, Lamb excelled this year on defense, where he earned 10.2 FRAA over a mere 782.2 innings. That sort of production will likely regress for the years to come, but Lamb shouldn’t become a negative in the field for some time. With an up-and-coming star banging on the door behind him, Lamb could depart soon; the Brewers wouldn’t hesitate to import his services.

Hunter Dozier, Kansas City Royals

The need here may be even more mutual than in Atlanta or Arizona. Not only does Kansas City have a starting third baseman in Mike Moustakas, they’ll need an outfielder if Alex Gordon signs elsewhere in free agency. Bringing in the 2013 first-rounder could really aid the Brewers.

Dozier has considerably greater potential than his minor-league numbers suggest. While a slash line of .249/.335/.390 won’t suffice in the majors, the raw power behind that hasn’t disappeared. Strikeouts (22.8 percent of his plate appearances) have plagued him to this point, but a healthy serving of bases on balls (10.8 percent) has helped negate those. After a brutal 2015 showing, he’ll look to bounce back in 2016, which would likely function as an in-between year for the Brewers anyway.

Should Dozier improve his hitting as needed, it will presumably become his calling card. This isn’t to say he can’t stick at third — earlier this year, BP complimented his “solid hands” at the position — but the bat will make or break Dozier’s career. At age 24, he clearly doesn’t have a good amount of time. Nevertheless, we could still see him tap into his ability someday, perhaps in the Brewer blue.

***

Ruiz, Lamb, and Dozier will probably never develop into All-Stars. If the Brewers did swing a deal for one of them, they would do so recognizing this. But these players can still succeed in the show, albeit with additional seasoning first. Simply receiving league-average production from the five-hole could help elevate Milwaukee back to contention.

Have another possible third baseman the Brew Crew could target? Drop a comment below or let BP Milwaukee know on Twitter. 

Like many hitters who predicate their success on power, Davis swings at quite a few first pitches. That approach had always paid off for him. Across 2013 and 2014, he banged out a .338/.390/.370 slas line on first pitches, placing 15th in baseball. In 2015, however, we saw him take his game to another echelon, as he slugged a .409/.413/1.091 first-pitch slash line. The resulting 1.504 OPS ranked second in the majors, behind only Davis’s Baltimore doppelganger. Davis has always pounced early in the count, but this season he absolutely dominated.

Compared to past years, Davis didn’t become more aggressive on first pitches. In fact, his swing rate stayed almost exactly the same, going from 32.6 percent in 2013 and 2014 to 32.5 percent in 2015. But a deeper dive reveals that he altered some elements of his approach. As manager Craig Counsell told the Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel last week:

“The first pitch in the at-bat is a very good offensive count. But it’s selecting a good pitch to hit. Khris has been using that first pitch to get a good pitch to hit. That’s what’s important.”

From looking at Davis’s breakdown by pitch type, we can see that he indeed become more selective in his first-pitch swings:

According to FanGraphs’ pitch type linear weights, Davis has excelled against breaking pitches for his career (9.8 runs above average) and has struggled against offspeed stuff (ten runs below average). Swinging at more of the former and fewer of the latter in these situations thus helped him to improve his overall first-pitch output. The fact that pitchers fed him more first-pitch breaking balls in 2015 — he saw one to begin 30.2 percent of his plate appearances, up from 23.8 percent in 2013 and 2014 — helped him further.

But most of Davis’s 2015 early-count production didn’t come off breaking pitches — he clubbed seven of his nine first-pitch homers against fastballs. The selectivity in his approach thus doesn’t end at pitch type; it also involves pitch location. Davis has always hit for the most power on pitches up and in:

On 2015 first pitches, he offered more in this area than ever before:

Even as pitchers targeted him down and away to a greater extent than in prior seasons, Davis refused to budge. Like Counsell observed, Davis only tried to hit off the pitches he knew he could hit. In doing so, he progressed in his first-pitch production, as well as in his production overall.

Davis’s late-season power surge likely won’t carry over into 2015; Davis simply doesn’t possess the talent to consistently hit at an MVP level. With that said, he’s displayed a phenomenal bat in certain scenarios, which has carried him to where he sits currently. As the Brewers look to return to relevance in 2016, they’d certainly have no problem with Davis continuing to do this.