The Pains of Almost Winning

Building a Brewers narrative for 2016, it’s easy for many fans and analysts to focus on the negative. After all, the team was not expected to compete coming into the season, and given the number of second-chance players winning jobs, or roster stopgaps working for the big club, many simply expected the team to be terrible. Since the team was written off before game one, there are obviously not many motivating factors in looking for other storylines. So the recent west coast string, in which the Brewers played an almost absurd number of close games and lost several leads (early, middle, and late in games!), simply serves as evidence that Milwaukee is going nowhere. Even Pythagoras agrees — our beloved Milwaukee Nine sport a 291 RS / 349 RA differential, which is good for a 68 win pace.

It is worth pushing back against this narrative, however, if only to find roster value and judge the club’s future competitive potential. Here, we’re going with BP Milwaukee’s own “competitive” category of approximately 75-80 win baseball; nothing grand, but nothing bad either, and easy to differentiate from “contending.” Many fans seem to conflate the idea of playing competitive baseball with contending, which should not be the case. A bad team may be rebuilding in order to become competitive, and then a competitive team may put the finishing touches on a roster in order to contend. This is obviously way too crisp and clean a definition, but for now it’s a framework. It’s also a great way to emphasize that even though I’m looking for ways to point out the good in the Brewers, I am not saying they’re going to immediately contend; however, the ways in which they are close to competing are quite interesting and have some bearing on how they will eventually contend.

First, I believe it is worth revisiting the early season Brewers, who had quite a different roster than the current Brewers. Perhaps assumptions were made that hurt the ballclub: Taylor Jungmann and Wily Peralta were expected to be rotational fixtures; the bullpen featured a rotating series of waiver claims and replacements; key veterans like Jonathan Lucroy and Aaron Hill started relatively cold; several potential contributors were injured (ex., Matt Garza, Will Smith, Corey Knebel); and, key depth rotations (such as Kirk Nieuwenhuis / Ramon Flores / Keon Broxton) were not yet established. In this vein, seven of the club’s April losses occurred with Wily Peralta or Taylor Jungmann on the mound, which matches their disproportionate contribution to the team’s runs allowed, as well (both pitchers combined for approximately -30 DRA runs prevented, which roughly matches the full club’s current 31-to-34 runs below average performance). The offense is an equal-opportunity contributor to the club’s woes, thanks in large part to that outfield rotation.

Incidentally, between April 29 (after Jungmann’s last start) and June 12 (before awful road trip), the Brewers allowed 173 runs in 42 games (Milwaukee went 22-20). Fans will be quick to cite the club’s strength of schedule during that time, as they should, but that stretch also included strong pitching performances against the Marlins, Mets, and Cubs. This period coincided with Zach Davies’s turnaround, Junior Guerra’s surge on the scene, Chase Anderson’s improvements, and a relatively solidified bullpen cast. From those developments, and even including the terrible road trip, the Brewers have morphed into a pitching staff that now includes nine of their better-than-average DRA pitchers on the current roster. Jimmy Nelson, Chase Anderson, Blaine Boyer, and Michael Blazek are the only remaining outliers, and even in these cases one might be inclined to look for some strategical and mechanical adjustments to bring forward improvements.

Here’s one of the difficulties of rebuilding: the Brewers, in sorting through organizational depth, prospects, and waiver claims, have found a group of pitchers that are approximately 16 runs better than average (according to DRA). Unfortunately, the revolving door of rebuilding, and the necessity to hang on to several other below average pitchers working things out, means that the Brewers’ best pitchers only have worked 45% of the club’s innings pitched thus far. Thankfully, three of these arms are starters, so if Davies, Guerra, and Garza can continually stay around their currently respectable (and better!) performance levels, they give Milwaukee a good chance of staying in games. Hopefully, if the bullpen continues to maintain its current form, their ability to hold leads will match their solid DRA.

In the field and at the plate, the Brewers face a similar issue: if you squint, you can see a number of good players, some even surpassing preseason expectations. After a somewhat rough 2015 campaign that saw a demotion to the minors, Scooter Gennett is building on his second-half 2015 performance with one of his most valuable performances of his career. Aaron Hill also snapped out of his slow start for a torrid May, posting respectable numbers overall. Unfortunately, injuries and rotational issues at CF and RF hurt the Brewers significantly. In terms of median PA, both CF and RF are two of the most “regular” positions in the league, meaning that teams have had no issue handing out 190 PA at those positions. Incidentally, this doubly hurts the Brewers, as RF features the highest TAv in the MLB (.283 on average), and CF features one of the biggest splits between median and aversage TAv (.256 and .266, respectively). Kirk Nieuwenhuis splits that difference (.260 TAv), but the injury-riddled Domingo Santana is below median in RF (.278 TAv).

Unfortunately, here, the old “just wait until the Brewers trade their regulars” line seems to have some credence, as the most talked about Brewers trade chips truly are valuable. Jonathan Lucroy is a loud bat and reliable regular at the position where such players are most scarce in the 2016 MLB. LF has been similarly difficult for MLB teams to fill in 2016, making Braun’s .319 TAv performance appear elite (in 2016, anyway). Should these players leave Milwaukee via trade, the team will still have valuable performers in Jonathan Villar and Scooter Gennett (a top third SS and top half 2B, respectively), but given the issues in CF and RF, it is difficult to see Villar and Gennett holding down the fort.

This difficult batting reality should make calling upon the Brewers’ top prospects for the second half even more important (and, honestly, quite an easy decision). Michael Reed and Brett Phillips fill actual roster needs for the Brewers, while Arcia forcing Villar off shortstop could certainly bolster the infield. These prospects would be able to earn their MLB sealegs in a 100% no-pressure environment, given the impact of the recent roadtrip on Milwaukee’s place in the standings (Milwaukee was a shocking 4.5 games out of the Wild Card on June 12, which prorates to 11 games out over a full season, but still…); there is no sense in which the prospects would be expected to lead a contending team, but they could each be keys to forming a competitive squad.

Milwaukee’s second half will be defined by two divergent team building approaches. On the pitching side, Milwaukee has largely stabilized starting and relief rotations, meaning that those arms can simply work on building experience and improving or solidifying pitching approaches. This is a rather beneficial situation for a rebuilding team, and perhaps the Jungmann / Peralta / Nelson lessons of 2016 will help the front office take less for granted in building the rotation for next season. On the batting and fielding side, the Brewers will almost certainly see a steady roster shift, as the team can benefit from giving plate appearances and defensive innings to their best prospects. If the Brewers do not take this path, it is arguable that they will have lost a great opportunity, for the positions and skillsets of the prospects actually match the big club’s needs. Since some of those positions (like RF and CF) have received below median production thus far, the prospects truly face a no-pressure environment.