On the other side of the deal, only one of the teenagers had made it out of rookie league ball. Maybe they could pitch; maybe they couldn’t. Nobody quite knew.

David Stearns and his team had a hunch though, so they pulled the trigger on a deal that was all the more gutsy for the fact that it came just two months into the young GM’s Milwaukee tenure. Adam Lind took his stick to Seattle, and the youth movement quietly dispersed among the Brewers’ minor league affiliates.

The move garnered mixed reviews. There were the casual fans who liked Lind’s stats and were agog that no member of the return had ever graced an organizational top prospect list. There were the newly-minted Stearns acolytes who preached process over production and saw the move as a bold step towards a brighter, faraway future. Even the BP Milwaukee staff couldn’t quite decide. Jack Moore, while recognizing that the mediocre Lind was “a better baseball player for the spectator than he is for the general manager,” concluded that the trade was “one of those times” that “rebuilding just feels like getting robbed.” JP Breen, meanwhile, viewed the transaction as “an attempt to acquire quantity and quality,” and “a conscious attempt at acquiring high-end prospects—just a year or two before they become high-end prospects.”

That was the fun of this trade. Nobody knew what to make of it at the time, and nobody really would until considerable time had passed.

Two years later, the shadowy shapes of a narrative are starting to emerge.

We’ll start with Lind. In 2016, Lind batted .239 for the Mariners with 20 home runs, a free-falling walk rate, and a .240 TAv. He was worth -0.8 WARP. Suffice it to say that this is not a high bar for Stearns and company to clear. Then again, Stearns’ hurdlers are the kind of prospects who very, very rarely pan out.

Carlos Herrera, the youngest of the group at just over 20, has enjoyed a steady, if unspectacular, climb up the organizational rungs. He pitched the 2016 season in the Arizona League, soaking up 50 innings and plenty of sun en route to a 4.50 ERA / 4.48 DRA campaign. He fanned 49 and walked 12. He started 2017 in Helena, where batters brutalized him to the tune of a 7.49 DRA. But Milwaukee liked his strikeouts (11.1 per nine) and potential, so they bumped him to Appleton mid-season. He recorded a 3.79 ERA for the Timber Rattlers in 38 innings. But somewhere along his journey from Montana, he lost half his strikeouts and doubled his walks, so his 4.97 DRA tells a different story.

Still, Herrera is an interesting arm, if also a slender one. At 6’2” and 150 pounds, he has some trouble filling out his uniform. But he sits in the low-90s, slings the ball from a low, three-quarters slot, and can cut and sink his fastball and spin a decent curve. If he fills out and develops his lagging changeup, he could worm his way into the mid-to-back end of a Milwaukee rotation one day. Failing that, it’s not altogether difficult to envision a home in the bullpen. First, he’ll need to rediscover the command that allowed him to strike out 26 batters and walk only five in Helena. The lanky righty does have a few believers; per BP’s Jeffrey Paternostro, “there’s something about Herrera, man.”

On the opposite end of the age spectrum lies Daniel Missaki, a six-foot righty who turned heads in rookie ball in 2013 and 2014 and held his own in the Midwest League in 2015 before snapping a ligament and succumbing to Tommy John. It’s been a rough road for Missaki since: he missed all of 2016 recovering, and a second Tommy John surgery wiped out last season. He has yet to throw a pitch for a Brewers affiliate. Before the rash of injuries, Missaki drew praise for his strong command, which he complemented with lively fastball and surprising secondaries; his changeup, in particular, turned heads. Missaki still has youth on his side, but the balky elbow seriously clouds his future.

That leaves Freddy Peralta as the goldilocks prospect, at 20 years and five months old. Peralta doesn’t have a conventional starter’s build, standing at 5’11” and tipping the scales at 175 pounds. He also lacks premium velocity on his fastball. But the pitch dances all over the strike zone and pairs well with what could turn into an excellent mid-80s slider. Peralta can go slower, too pulling the string on a decent changeup and trying to spin in a curve every now and then, though the latter pitch trails the former. It’s a decent profile that could easily work in the ‘pen, even if his size keeps him from the starting five.

And then there are the results. Last season, Peralta posterized opposing hitters with rare impunity. He started the year in the Carolina League, where a sorry string of regretful batters struck out 78 times in 56.3 innings. A high helping of walks tempered expectations, but the kid only allowed 6.2 hits per nine innings and was bumped to Biloxi in June after posting a 3.49 DRA. He was even better at AA, tossing 63.7 frames of 2.15 DRA ball with 91 strikeouts and 31 walks (while facing batters that were, on average, three years his senior). Even if he’s never more than a mid-rotation MLB arm, he put on an electrifying show in 2017.

It may still too early to draw firm conclusions about the Adam Lind trade. But we could be calling it the Freddy Peralta trade pretty soon, and Carlos Herrera may not be too far behind. (We can talk about Daniel Missaki whenever he’s next able to throw a pitch.) Right now, David Stearns’s bold move is looking very, very shrewd.

It can feel backwards, because Lind can be a truly special player at times and he will be a key part of Seattle’s lineup next year. Since the beginning of 2013, Lind has hit a ridiculous .316/.389/.523 against right-handed pitching, better than all but 11 hitters to earn at least 900 plate appearances since 2013. The 32-year-old has been better by OPS against right-handed pitching than stars like Andrew McCutchen, Jose Bautista, Robinson Cano and Giancarlo Stanton.

Of course, the flip side is that Lind has been a .193/.245/.279 hitter against fellow southpaws, better than only four Major League players with at least 200 plate appearances against lefties over the past three years: Alexi Amarista, Gregory Polanco, Alex Avila, and Donovan Solano. All those players at least bring something to the table defensively, between versatility and the value of playing tough defensive positions. Lind, however, is a disaster at first base and will likely spend much of his time with Seattle at designated hitter as a result. Combine that with how he requires a right-handed hitting platoon partner and is best used with a position that doesn’t even exist in National League ballparks and you have a potential roster disaster, particularly if a team wants to hold on to a player who is out of options or is already flush with players who are best served in a platoon.

The rub is this: Lind’s offensive performance over the past three years, a .291/.364/.478 line over 1,411 plate appearances with a 130 OPS+, is excellent, but it isn’t ultra-rare. Since 2013, there are 87 players who have taken at least 1,000 plate appearances and recorded a 130 OPS+ or a better, according to the Baseball-Reference Play Index. There are only 15 designated hitter spots in the Major Leagues and 30 first base spots. Talent isn’t evenly distributed, of course — some teams will have multiple hitters who are good enough to earn those spots, some won’t have any, some will be good enough defensively to play other positions — and thus there will always be somebody who needs a hitter like Lind, but the structure of the league gives the team buying Lind or a Lind-esque player significant leverage. That goes double when the player is in a contract year, like Lind will be in 2016.

The idea that the Brewers couldn’t get anything of tangible value back for a player like Lind will never not be disappointing, because the moments when he becomes a transcendant, game-winning player are so obvious — the big home runs, the doubles, the reliable contact against all kinds of right-handed pitchers. But the fact that so many hitters exist who can reproduce his overall performance with significantly better defensive skillsets kills any leverage the Brewers could possibly have in a trade, and the roster gymnastics that have to be performed to get the highest value out of his bat limits the number of realistic suitors even further.

Ultimately, the problem is that Adam Lind is a better baseball player for the spectator than he is for the general manager or the manager, and those players are always going to be the ones who hurt most to trade. The unfeeling market cares not for my appreciation of Lind’s booming home runs or his methodical approach at the plate, and now all we can hope one of those “live arms” they talk so much about actually pans out. Sometimes, unavoidably, rebuilding just feels like getting robbed, and this is one of those times.

With that being said, new general manager David Stearns didn’t necessarily negotiate a poor return for a player who hit .277/.360/.460 in 2015 with 20 homers. The trade is just more difficult to understand because the assets in question are unknown quantities. Hell, even many within the scouting community have never heard of these players or have never seen them in person. As such, the long-term gain is too abstract to evaluate with any sense of certainty.

The Brewers obviously like the three pitchers they received in the deal. Right-hander Carlos Herrera (who just turned 18) spent last season in the Dominican Summer League, posting a 3.26 ERA with a solid strikeout-to-walk ratio (5.62 K/BB). He throws in the high-80s and low-90s with some projectability. A couple scouts told me that he’s the real prize in this deal, even if he’s a bit of a mystery. Daniel Missaki is another right-handed hurler (only 19 years old) who is best known for his time with the Brazilian national team. He’s currently rehabbing from Tommy John surgery, but reportedly has good feel for multiple pitches. Finally, Freddy Peralta (also 19) popped up on the prospect radar in 2014 when his velocity ticked upward into the mid-90s. The heater regressed this past season, though, and his 4.11 ERA won’t capture one’s attention. Still, the 8.38 strikeout-to-walk ratio is tremendous and eases some of the concern about his ugly run prevention.

David Stearns told Tom Haudricourt of the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, “Whenever you acquire players that are farther away, there is more variance….So, in a deal like this, we’re really targeting that variability to find an impact-type pitcher, even if it’s multiple years down the road.” This means that Herrera, Missaki or Peralta could flame out before Double-A or they could become useful Major League arms. And given the fact that we’re perhaps talking about another three-to-five years until the muddled picture becomes somewhat clear, this trade cannot possibly resonate with the vast majority of Brewers fans. It requires patience with absolutely no guarantee of any return on that investment.

That’s why the Adam Lind trade is best understood through its process, what acquiring three no-name teenagers can tell us about David Stearns and his overall strategy for the club.

It appears that Stearns is carrying over a key piece of the Houston Astros’ rebuilding playbook, in which a club cannot be afraid of targeting extremely young pitchers in the low minors — especially in return for non-elite Major League assets. The Astros, for example, got David Paulino for Jose Veras and Francis Martes as the “throw-in” in the Jarred Cosart deal. Both of those formerly no-name prospects are now two of the hottest prospects in the Astros’ farm system. It’s a conscious approach that Evan Drellich of the Houston Chronicle profiled in September. This Lind trade is an example of David Stearns trusting his scouting department, trying to bring unknown prospects into the Brewers’ system before they have a chance to mature and have a breakout season. Because after that hypothetical breakout, the Brewers would no longer be able to afford the asking price. The ultimate buy-low strategy, if you will.

Of course, this type of strategy puts a premium on scouting and player evaluation. They have to get it right enough to make it worthwhile. Fortunately, recent success in drafts leads one to believe that the Brewers’ scouting department has quality members who are capable of getting the job done well. Ray Montgomery and his staff have been aces over the past couple years.

All of this doesn’t mean Stearns and the Brewers will consistently eschew big-league players or guys in the upper minors. This simply indicates that the Brewers will not rely on Doug Melvin’s strategy of targeting players who have already found success in the Double-A level or above. Stearns already has seen this type of strategy work in Houston and appears to be transitioning it over to Milwaukee.

It is also important to recognize that quantity should not be ignored during a rebuilding process. The Milwaukee Brewers must stuff the farm system with as much talent as possible and across the minor-league spectrum. This isn’t just to spread out one’s hypothetical competitive window, nor is it some kind of “throw dozens of prospects at the wall and see who sticks” argument. Instead, I’m acknowledging the fact that Milwaukee needs excess minor-league talent. It’s not enough to have the next core of homegrown players in the minors. An organization must also have the depth necessary to trade for more Major League players. Just as the Chicago Cubs, Houston Astros, and Toronto Blue Jays are all beginning to flex their prospect muscles to maximize their windows of contention (which are of varying sizes), the Milwaukee Brewers must have the prospect depth to both develop a core and supplement it.

In the end, this Adam Lind deal should be understood as an attempt to acquire quantity and quality. The latter is more abstract and won’t pay dividends for perhaps a half-decade, but it is clearly a conscious attempt at acquiring high-end prospects — just a year or two before they become high-end prospects. This is just more evidence that David Stearns and his staff are willing to be creative and patient, a highly desirable combination during a full-scale rebuilding process. Brewers fans should be happy, regardless of how the three young pitchers turn out.

This process is especially applicable to the Brewers because the new front office won’t have any special connection with most of the team’s current players. Often, this phenomenon is described as teams being irrationally high on their own players, but it is actually much subtler than that. The reality is that the team that ends up with a player necessarily thinks more of him than other teams do in the first place. Thus, it is not simply that teams are loathe to trade players they have; instead, it is the fact that they thought highly enough of these players to acquire them in the first place that makes finding trade partners unlikely.

But with David Stearns now in place of Doug Melvin, the Brewers front office isn’t likely to fall victim to that. Where Melvin may have thought more highly of players such as Matt Garza and Francisco Rodriguez than did the rest of the industry, Stearns has no such compunction. He may be irrationally high on other players — as evidenced by the acquisition of his former player, Jonathan Villar — but those people are unlikely to have been with the Brewers before Stearns’ hiring.

The end result of this is that most of the veterans on this team are fair game to be traded, and some will almost certainly be dealt before spring training. Adam Lind, for example, is under contract for only this upcoming season and is therefore a virtual certainty to be traded soon. Ideally, the Brewers would probably prefer to trade him before Opening Day, as at that point he will still be eligible for the qualifying offer with his new team and thus (hopefully) have more trade value.

Milwaukee has three obvious veterans other than Lind, and each is in a different position. Matt Garza is a candidate to be traded at the deadline to a playoff team looking for starting pitching depth, but such a trade is heavily contingent on Garza pitching well enough in the first half of 2015 to have any value at all. After being a competent big leaguer in 2013 and 2014 (1.7 and 2.0 WARP, respectively), his disastrous 2015 that was highlighted by a 5.36 DRA destroyed any possibility of a preseason trade. The Brewers simply would not get enough back for him to make a deal worth their while.

Jonathan Lucroy, though, does have significant trade value. By any WAR metric, he has been one of the best catchers in baseball over the past few years, and he is on an extremely affordable contract: $4 million in 2016 and a $5.25 million team option in 2017. Those numbers would be a bargain for an average starting catcher, but Lucroy is significantly better than that. The problem with trading him, though, is that the Brewers will likely hope to begin competing again in 2017 — and such a hope is not ridiculous given the age of many of their top prospects — and Lucroy can still be on that future team. Additionally, his defensive skills are well-documented, and the Brewers may want him to help develop their young pitching. When that fact is combined with his contract, the team should hold onto him unless they are absolutely blown away by a trade offer.

Ryan Braun is the final veteran to be discussed here, and he is probably the most irrelevant as he is probably mostly untradeable. The 2011 Vernon Wells trade proves that no contract is unmoveable, but it is difficult to imagine finding a team that will want to pay a fading outfielder with no defensive value nearly $100 million for the next five years.

Of the team’s younger players, Jean Segura is undoubtedly the most interesting. Players such as Khris Davis or Scooter Gennett are mostly spare parts and could very well be moved but are unlikely to bring back huge returns (although it should be noted that Davis is more valuable than Gennett). Segura, though, is an average Major League shortstop who is not a free agent until 2019, which makes him valuable. Cost-controlled shortstops are attractive to most teams, not just contending ones, but the presence of Orlando Arcia and Jonathan Villar makes Segura expendable. If the Brewers can get the big offer for him that they undoubtedly expect, a trade makes perfect sense.

The final piece of the Brewers’ offseason trade plan is actually several different players: the bullpen. They do actually have a few good relief pitchers, and those are exactly the players they should look to trade. Relievers are volatile, and it is difficult to predict which will be good more than one year out. Therefore, given the fact that they do not expect to compete this year, they should listen to calls on everyone. Michael Blazek had a promising 2015, and Jeremy Jeffress may very well close in 2016. Will Smith, though, is the key piece. The lefty hasn’t posted a cFIP above 80 (where 100 is league average and lower is better) since 2012, and his 69 cFIP in 2015 was good enough for 17th in all of baseball among pitchers with at least 50 innings. The Brewers may be able to get a truly valuable prospect for such a talented pitcher, although they may have to wait until July.

Overall, this article is attempting to suggest that the Brewers should not be tied to many of the players on their current 25-man roster, and they are in fact unlikely to be very connected. The cornerstones of the next good Brewers team probably spent 2015 in Double-A, so unless the members of the current roster can be of value to those young players (like Lucroy), the Brewers should attempt to move them.

However, this decision is likely going to cost the Brewers in certain areas as well. The most obvious (and, to be honest, least important) is that this will boost their win total and thus give them a worse draft pick. However, this “worry” is unnecessary; this is unlikely to be a very good team regardless of whether or not they have Lind. Additionally, Lind’s presence, along with Ryan Braun and the rest of the veterans on this team, should help create a professional environment for the Brewers’ highly-touted young players to step into when some of them make their debuts in 2016.

More significant is the opportunity cost of this decision. At the very least, Lind will be the strong side of a first base platoon and thus get about two-thirds of the at bats, but he could get even more. In 2015, his first year in Milwaukee, he got 112 plate appearances against left-handed pitching, which was his highest total since his 2011 season with Toronto. If this pattern continues, it will mean that approximately 550 plate appearances are being taken by a veteran unlikely to be on the next good Brewers team when the organization could be using that time to try out younger players who might have a future with the team.

The clearest example of this problem is Jason Rogers. Rogers is in the Khris Davis mold—an older player who appears to be becoming a viable big leaguer later in his career than most do. Realistically, given that he will be 28 on Opening Day and has not yet exhausted his rookie eligibility, it is unlikely he truly becomes anything more than replacement-level. But Lind’s presence makes those odds longer because Rogers simply won’t get the plate appearances necessary to develop, which Craig Counsell confirmed last week when he said that he considers Rogers to be strictly a first baseman.

Lind also impacts the outfield rotation. He is limited to first base defensively, as he has not played an inning in the outfield since 2010. His lack of defensive flexibility essentially takes the possibility of playing Ryan Braun or Khris Davis at first base occasionally off the table unless a lefty is on the mound, not that the organization has outwardly considered this. Being limited to first isn’t automatically a huge negative—plenty of good teams have first-base-only hitters—but the Brewers aren’t in win-now mode where they are simply trying to pencil in the strongest current lineup every day. Instead, they are trying to develop their younger players, which is why Lind’s defensive limitations are more problematic.

Had the Brewers not picked up Lind’s option, they could have used first base to occasionally get extra at bats for someone like Michael Reed, Domingo Santana, or—assuming he comes up sometime in 2016—Brett Phillips by shifting Braun or Davis to the infield. This would probably help those players in the long run by getting them more playing time.

I recognize that the majority of this article has focused on the negatives of this deal. Ultimately, though, those are generally low-risk situations. Jason Rogers is unlikely to be a long-term solution at first base no matter how many chances he gets, and there are probably enough outfield innings to go around for Santana and Reed to get a sufficient number of at bats, especially if Santana plays some center field. And if Phillips forces his way to the big leagues before September, he will clearly be playing well enough to be a bright spot and a welcome addition to the club, and Khris Davis will likely just be shuttled to the bench.

Lind’s talent makes this entire situation worth the trouble for the Brewers. If Lind was not a good hitter, there would be no need to keep him around and this entire discussion would be moot. But he is a good hitter, and there is real value in fielding as good a team as one reasonably can, even at this point on the win curve. Lind costs the team only $8 million and he is not blocking any real first base prospects, and for this small price the Brewers get a veteran in the locker room and a productive hitter on the field.

Milwaukee is likely to be in the 70-win range again next year, and the front office knows this. Given his recent history, he is likely to be a two-win player in 2016, which is unlikely to cause any significant change in draft ranking. But he will be able to be a valuable off-field presence. While I am aware that veteran presence has become overstated and a bit of a punch line in recent years, there is still real value in providing a role model for players making their big league debuts.

Young players such as Santana, Phillips, and Orlando Arcia who the Brewers are hitching their wagons to have never been through a full big league season before, and playing in the majors is different from playing in the minors. Experienced hitters like Lind and Ryan Braun and Jonathan Lucroy can simply demonstrate what being in the big leagues requires. Therefore, given that Lind is not really costing the Brewers any significant development opportunity, keeping him for 2016 is absolutely a positive move.

But, as a famous Disney character reminds us, the past is in the past. What Lind has done doesn’t concern us; we want to know what he will do. If the Brewers deal him, will other clubs think highly of his probable 2016 production? Alternatively, if Milwaukee holds onto him for next season, will he continue to anchor first base for a team that would like to win more than 68 games? Based on some of his background metrics, I don’t know that Lind will replicate the solid output from this year.

A large part of Adam Lind’s 2015 success came from strikeouts, or the lack thereof. He only went down on strikes in 17.5 percent of his plate appearances, a mark that falls significantly below both his career average (18.8 percent) and the 2015 MLB average (20.4 percent). Hitters with Lind’s abilities — i.e., the slow ones — need to put the ball in play as often as they can, and Lind managed to do just that this year.

With that said, his peripherals don’t support such an improvement. Lind swung at 45.2 percent of the pitches he saw in 2015, which combined with a 78.8 percent contact rate to give him a swinging-strike rate of 9.6 percent. Meanwhile, his refusal to offer at hittable pitches led to a 56.5 percent zone-swing rate; even though only 44.7 percent of his pitches fell inside the strike zone’s confines, he still had an expected looking strike rate of 19.4 percent. The latter figure handily topped the MLB average of 17.4 percent, while the former didn’t trail the 9.5 percent mean by much.

To better understand the extent of Lind’s luck, I ran a regression with those two metrics and strikeout rate, for all hitters with 1,000 pitches seen in 2015. That yielded the following equation for expected strikeout rate:

xK% = -0.165 + 1.957 * Whiff% + 0.905 * xLook%

Those 300 players break down graphically like this:

The overall list, which those interested can find here, has some notable names. We obviously care about Lind, who owned an expected strikeout rate of 19.8 percent — much higher than his actual 17.5 percent clip. The percentage-point difference between the two placed 44th in the majors, or the 85th percentile. Unlike Jonathan Lucroy, who suffered from misfortune in 2015, Lind looks to have benefited from good luck.

Of course, looking and swinging strikes alone don’t explain a hitter’s strikeout rate. Some players will consistently rack up both of the former yet manage to avoid the K. For example, Adam Jones — whose 2015 differential ranked 30th — has a history of overperformance in this area. From 2008 to 2014, he posted a strikeout rate of 19.1 percent to accompany an expected strikeout rate of 25.0 percent. Regularly beating this metric may mean that Jones has some additional skill, and his splits support that proposition.

Via research from Chris Teeter at Beyond the Box Score, we know the MLB-wide called strike and whiff rates by strike count:

Across the majors, hitters become more aggressive later in counts. The extent of this differs from player to player, though, and no one illustrates this better than Jones. For his career, he has done pretty poorly early in at-bats but has recovered later.

Jones does most of his whiffing and looking to start the plate appearance. Once he gets to two strikes, he protects the zone and doesn’t give in. In both regards, his discipline improves considerably while the count progresses.

On the other hand, we have hitters like Lind, who have never displayed any such capability. In the aforementioned seven-year span, Lind struck out 18.9 percent of the time (about the same as Jones), whereas he theoretically should have done so 19.0 percent of the time (far below Jones). Unsurprisingly, Lind has always declined as the count works to favor the pitcher:

The two-strike version of Lind somewhat resembles Jones — a higher rate of called strikes and a lower rate of swinging ones, but overall a similar level of strikeout pitches. Early in the count, when all strikes count the same, they clearly diverge. The former fact explains their analogous strikeout rates, and the latter accounts for the massive disparity in expected strikeout rates.

It’s important to note that Jones is the oddball here, not Lind. With an r-squared of .833, this formula generally doesn’t miss. As the league averages show, most hitters will take Lind’s route, with more whiffs and fewer called strikes in two-strike counts. Rather, this tells us that Lind has historically not possessed the kind of overperforming ability that we witnessed in 2015 — meaning that, in 2016, pitchers will likely punch him out more frequently.

None of this diminishes what Lind accomplished in his first Milwaukee season. He provided the club a rare offensive spark when they lacked those, and for that we should thank him. But I wouldn’t expect him to repeat this in year two, unless he cuts down on his looking or swinging strikes. The Brewers will likely try to import some hitters in the offseason; with a more strikeout-prone Lind, they’ll need all the help they can get.

In all probability, it would be a huge surprise if Lind wasn’t traded this offseason. The hire of David Stearns, former Astros assistant general manager, seems to suggest that the Brewers are going all in for the rebuild. The Brewers’ first baseman should have solid trade value, but it might not be as good as one thinks.

LIND’S SEASON IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

First, however, let’s look at Lind in a historical context, comparing his offensive production to other Brewers yearly hitting performances since 1969. (Min 300 PA). The blue dot is Lind.

As one can see, this simple graphic shows that Lind has had a good offensive performance this season when comparing him to other Brewers yearly offensive performances. That being said, the Muncie, Indiana native is a first baseman and first basemen need to provide significantly more offensive production than the average position. For example, this graphic compares Lind to shortstops and catchers, which are positions that focus more on defensive skills than offensive production.

Therefore, in order to get a better representation of Lind’s season, in historical context, we need to compare him to other Brewers first basemen. I created a boxplot to better show Lind’s season as compared to others.

Basically, the boxplot depicts the distribution between the data. As you can tell, Lind is smack dab in the middle. The median of the plot is 119 wRC+, which is the exact same production as Lind brought to the organization this year. Just for some perspective — and it might be hard to tell — the two dots at the top of the boxplot are Prince Fielder’s 2009 and 2011 seasons. In fact, even though Lind had a solid season, Fielder only had one season where he compiled a lower wRC+ than what Lind did in 2015. It’s often hard to appreciate great players when they’re on the team for which one roots. Fielder often got criticized for his weight and defensive ability, but when it came to hitting, no first baseman was better in Brewers history. (The biggest outlier in the group is Yuniesky Betancourt’s awful 2013 campaign at first base where he accumulated a wRC+ of 54 in 409 plate appearances.)

All this, though, isn’t to suggest that Lind had a bad season, but rather that it requires a great hitter to perform at an above-average level at the first base position.

LIND’S CURRENT POSITIONAL STANDING

This production comparison above, though, is limited to Brewers players. It is also somewhat outdated since many of the players are no longer active. Thus, it doesn’t necessarily give us a good sense of Lind’s current positional standing in the game.

Here is Lind’s offensive production as compared to the remainder of the league in 2015.

This year Lind had the 16th best offensive production among the 39 first basemen who accumulated at least 300 PA. He’s in the upper quartile of the boxplot. It’s, therefore, pretty evident that Lind proved to be an above-average first baseman this past year, at least with the bat.

When it comes to his defense, he’s shown that he can play an adequate first base this year. He’ll never win a gold glove award, but at the same time, he’s no Hanley Ramirez. He’s not going to kill you out in the field. He’s going to provide solid, yet not great, production which helps his overall value.

With that being said, there is still one major flaw in Lind’s game.

LIND & PLATOON SPLITS

If you’ve seen Lind play this year, you’ve probably seen him do this against righties.

You’ve probably also seen Lind do this against lefties.

Yes, Adam Lind has been distinctively poor against lefties all year. Just how poor? Well, let’s take a look.

In 2015, Lind is an upper tier hitter against right-handed pitchers, but against left-handed pitchers, he’s the third worst first baseman in all of baseball. Lind has also hit 20 home runs this year, which is pretty good, but none of those home runs came against lefties.

The biggest problem is that this isn’t a one-year aberration. The 32-year-old has never had success against left-handed pitchers, to the point where in 2014 the Blue Jays only gave Lind 37 plate appearances against southpaws.

This, consequently, hurts what the Brewers could get in a trade for Lind. The hypothetical team acquiring him would also be securing him on a one-year deal, and, therefore, would almost certainly need to have playoff aspirations. The good news is that there won’t be a lot of quality first baseman’s on the free agent market this winter. The biggest name will be Chris Davis, and Lind will almost certainly be the cheaper option.

There should also be a real market for Lind. Going under the assumption that the Rays, Mariners, Nationals, and Pirates will try to be contenders next year, they could all use Lind’s bat at first base. None of them have a viable option at first base. The Nationals have Ryan Zimmerman, but he’s often injured and at this point is only successful against left-handed pitchers. Lind could, therefore, provide a good platoon split for the Nationals. But at the core that illustrates the problem with Lind’s overall value.

He’s a cheap first baseman that should be used in a platoon role. Granted, we’re talking right-handed platoon, which is obviously better than a left-handed platoon, but at the end of the day it’s still a platoon role. If people are expecting the Brewers to get a top-tier prospect or a big haul for Lind, that’s probably not going to happen. The Brewers will likely end up with a solid second-tier prospect at best if the tables align right.

Adam Lind is a good player, but he’s a fill-in piece on a contending team. He’s not a star or a franchise-altering player. He’ll provide a useful left-handed bat, which has value — but not a ton of it, especially considering that he’s limited to playing first base or DH.

Jonathan Lucroy and Jean Segura are both emitting the unmistakable stench of cratered trade value. Kyle Lohse, Matt Garza, and Aramis Ramirez did nothing or worse, while drawing a combined salary approximately level with the GDP of Tuvalu. The pitching staff was 27th-best in baseball by measure of runs allowed — Garza and Lohse were both among the worst starting pitchers in the league by BP’s DRA metric before getting shut down in turn. Evan if Milwaukee manages to edge the Cincinnati Reds and avoid the basement of the National League Central, the 2015 campaign has been a sputtering failure on a big-picture level.

But six months is a long time, and 162 games offer plenty of room for variance. It was pretty bad, but it wasn’t all bad! There were a few moments to celebrate, and even a few that actually inspired legitimate hope. So, in the interest of minimizing the number of fans who succumb to alcohol poisoning this offseason, let’s remember the good instead of dwelling on the bad.

6. The Adam Lind Trade

For three consecutive seasons following the departure of Prince Fielder, first base has been a significant weakness for the Brewers. Seeking to contend in 2015, and with painfully little talent in the developmental pipeline with which to part, the team needed a creative answer.

Adam Lind was hailed as a future star once upon a time, when he hit .300 with 35 home runs as a 25-year-old in 2009. But back problems limited his availability/effectiveness, and in 2014 he hit six home runs in 318 plate appearances. The Brewers, though, were enticed by Lind’s uncharacteristically low home run rate in 2014 — with even a regression to his normal career rate, he had the potential to provide actual value at the position. It was a gamble, but a gamble with good mathematical sense to it.

As it happens, 15 percent of Lind’s fly balls in 2015 have left the yard — exactly in line with his career average. He didn’t quite hit 35 home runs, but 20 is a much better-looking number than anything with only one digit. Plus, his True Average and OBP are both in line with his 2011 numbers; he’s slugging just a hair off of that pace, but otherwise this is the same guy that burst onto the scene six years ago. If you score it by WAR, 2015 was Lind’s best season since that ’09 campaign. And if you score it by WARP, Lind was the second-most valuable Brewer this past year after Ryan Braun.

At thirty-two years old, and due to make a relatively affordable $8 million this coming season, Lind likely represents another Gerardo Parra situation for the Brewers — he’ll be flipped at approximately the one-year mark. And like with Parra, the Brewers should be able to generate a nice little profit on the flip. If this sounds familiar, that’s because the Indians followed this playbook to the letter with Brandon Moss — a slugger with a similar statistical profile to Lind — turning him into top pitching prospect Rob Kaminsky at the trade deadline. Don’t be surprised if the Brewers ask for something similar, and don’t be surprised if someone is willing to meet the asking price.

The plan was for Lind to power the offense up just enough to make the playoffs. That didn’t work out, but the acquisition has been a successful one all the same.

5. The Winning Streak

I confess: I am painfully aware of the meaning of the phrase “small sample size.” And I can read a full-season standings page — in fact, I can comprehend it, too. However, despite all of this, I’m still going to unashamedly celebrate the fact that, from June 28 through July 5, the Milwaukee Brewers went a pristine 8-0.

Were four of those wins against the hapless Phillies, on pace to finish out as baseball’s only 100-loss team? Yes. Shut up. Were the other three wins against the Reds, who might be run by the first manager in history to reach “embattled” status less than two months into the season? Yes. Shut up. Did Milwaukee then proceed to drop two of three to the bottom-of-the-barrel Braves, the cold boot of reality kicking them squarely in the teeth? Sigh, yes. Shut up.

Still, for that eight-game stretch, the team clicked and gave the fanbase a brief glimpse at the kind of thing they had come into the season expecting. It was tons of fun — but it was also a valuable showcase for offensive pieces like Aramis Ramirez and Gerardo Parra. Less than a month later, both would be exported for valuable building materials. And the winning streak roughly coincided with the launch of BP Milwaukee, which was pretty fun.

The #Brewers are 10-2 since @BPMilwaukee launched on June 22

— Seth Victor (@sh_vic) July 5, 2015

4. The Emergence of Taylor Jungmann

Much has been written about Milwaukee’s rookie starter this summer, and the debate still rages as to whether his unique brand of pitching success is sustainable or unsustainable. He could be the pitching version of Ryan Braun, a rookie phenom who turned into a long-tenured superstar. Or, he could be the pitching version of Pat Listasch — one generation down the line, and he’s nothing more than an answer to a trivia question. Regardless of how his story plays out long-term, however, what Jungmann has done in 2015 is truly impressive.

Just two years ago, the Baseball Prospectus Annual had this to say about Jungmann:

“Milwaukee’s first pick in the 2011 draft, Jungmann has ideal size, a smooth delivery, and decent velocity, but didn’t miss many bats in his minor-league debut. He was effective but far from dominant in the pitcher-friendly Florida State League, working his low-90s fastball down in the zone to generate plenty of groundballs, few home runs, and not many strikeouts. Jungmann’s slurvy breaking pitch and changeup are works in progress, but he throws strikes and doesn’t beat himself. It’s early, but so far, Jungmann profiles as more of an innings-eater than an ace.”

I mean, the words “he sucks” aren’t explicitly printed… but what other way is there to interpret it when a 23-year-old gets the “innings-eater” tag foisted upon him?

Fast-forward to 2015 and Jungmann is the most valuable pitcher currently on Milwaukee’s big-league roster. Coming up through the farm system, Jungmann’s numbers were never eye-popping and scouting reports generally sounded unimpressed in their qualitative assessments. So what gives? How did this precociously bland “innings-eater” grow into an inexplicably effective big-league pitcher?

Well, that “slurvy breaking pitch” that was a “work in progress” back in the day has grown up into a devastatingly effective curveballs. In 2013, just months after the above Annual was published, he switched up his grip, and after two years of refinement, the results have been incredibly positive.

Opponents are hitting just .152 against Jungmann’s curve, and generating a meager .051 points of isolated power against it. Furthermore, they’re whiffing on the pitch almost 18 percent of the time and only putting 10 percent of curveballs into play. If the knock on Jungmann was that he lacked a true out pitch, well, he’s taught himself how to throw one now — and it’s allowing him to punch far above his weight class. Plus, his mental approach to pitching shows a maturity far beyond his years. It should allow him to adapt and survive at the Major League level, where stasis is a terminal diagnosis.

Jungmann, his mental approach, and his devastating hammer remind me just a bit of a young Barry Zito. Both Jungmann and Zito were first-round picks who were seen as safe, low-upside investments that their respective teams had to settle for due to financial constraints. The two pitchers both managed to avoid prospect hype thanks in large part to the unimpressed chorus of “mehs” coming from the scouting community as they labored their way through the farm system and flashier pitchers got the accolades. And both overcame their nothing-special four-seam fastballs to build an effective repetoire around a devastating curveball.

If Jungmann can follow a similar path of development, even if he never reaches Zito’s Cy Young prime, Brewers fans will forget about this season’s failure over time. Instead, it will be remembered as the year that the next generation started to stake its claim to the starting rotation.

3. The Trade Deadline

When a front office is working with very little in the way of dealable assets, as Milwaukee’s was this summer, there is no margin for error. Each mistake hurts that much more because you don’t have the strategic flexibility to work around it. Working within this frame of mind, Doug Melvin’s swan song was an opus of transcendent beauty.

Despite his advancing age and mediocre start to the season, Aramis Ramirez was successfully turned into a young piece that could matter down the road. Jonathan Broxton’s time in Milwaukee was inconsistent — but he, too, netted a return against all odds. And the mega-deal with Houston has brought back a sturdy foundation to build upon.

I’ve already gotten into the up-and-coming talents of Brett Phillips and Josh Hader, who will both be extremely valuable parts for the franchise in the near future. And the third piece in the deal, Domingo Santana, has already posted his first Win Above Replacement in his short time as a Brewer. The small sample size warning must be issued here, and his 31 percent strikeout rate as a Brewer still inspires very little confidence. But he’s posted a drool-inspiring OPS so far in Milwaukee, and historical trends indicate that Santana’s .385 BABIP since the trade isn’t exactly an outlier, either. When you’re athletically gifted and prone to mash the ball, you make fewer outs. Santana is a talented young player, and he’s eased the short-term sting of losing Carlos Gomez considerably.

Each move the Brewers made this July was a good value move. Furthermore, Lind could still be dealt, as could either Jean Segura or Scooter Gennett if the team determines that Orlando Arcia is ready for The Show in 2016. The team improved for the future — and significantly, this July — but didn’t jump for any subpar offers, or sacrifice any strategic flexibility by overextending and leaving the big club a barren mess. All in all, there is a lot with which to be happy.

2. The New GM

The Houston Astros were a natural comparison for Brewer fans to draw, even before their former second-in-command was tapped to head up the new front office. The team’s July trades clearly show a desire to follow the same rebuilding path that the Astros took under Jeff Luhnow, and that’s not even factoring in that the biggest of them brought over three Houston prospects in return.

That was all before David Stearns, the Astros’ former assistant general manager, was named GM earlier this week. Stearns is younger than Adam Lind, and comes from an Ivy League finance background. His previous employers — the Indians and Astros — speak very highly of him. Plus, prior to working in front office positions, he worked on baseball’s CBA in MLB’s labor relations division. That kind of diverse, dynamic resume doesn’t guarantee success–but it indicates a high chance of it.

Milwaukee fans will recall that, once upon a time, Jack Zduriencik was their own second-in-command whom the Seattle Mariners lured away to run their front office. Zduriencik, of course, was fired by Seattle earlier this year, less than a month before Stearns ascended to his position.

Zduriencik serves as a prime example of the Peter Principle personified in sports. Major League Baseball’s first non-general-manager Executive of the Year proved to be wholly unfit as an actual general manager. It certainly is within the realm of possibilities that Stearns will follow this path as well. Milwaukee-area sports fans will note that the Bucks have gone with two different “youthful” general managers during this decade, with mixed results. Jason Kidd has been an unmitigated success, but the city might never forgive Larry Harris for the depths to which he sunk the franchise.

Two days into his tenure, we can’t know for certain which extreme Stearns will fill out — or if he’ll fall somewhere in between the two. All we can know is that he represents everything Mark Attanasio wanted to hire — young and analytically gifted — and will be in a very good position to succeed going forward. Again, in drawing lessons from the Bucks over the past few years: sometimes just having a sense of direction is half the battle for a franchise.

1. The Building Blocks in the Bullpen

Last week for Sports Illustrated’s The Cauldron, I posed a hypothesis that elite relief pitchers are heavily undervalued in today’s game, both in terms of sabermetric wins and in the salaries they draw. Many of the statistically-modeled preseason projections have been wildly off-base in 2015, and there’s been one noticeable constant across them — the teams with elite bullpens have largely outperformed expectations, while the teams with mediocre bullpens have failed to live up to the hype.

And even though Milwaukee’s starting rotation was a pretty rough-looking outfit beyond the aforementioned Jungmann, the Brewers’ bullpen is a capable unit that should provide plenty of outsized value at cost control for the forseeable future.

-Will Smith has less than three years of MLB service time accumulated. He struck out almost 13 batters per 9 and opponents hit .163 against his slider, as he led the bullpen in WAR. Smith is the Brewers’ comparison to Kansas City’s Wade Davis, a one-time prospect as a starter who flamed out, then turned into a lights-out late-inning reliever.

-Jeremy Jeffress was sent to Kansas City as part of the package for Zack Greinke what seems like forever ago. After that, he struggled to establish himself in the big leagues — even though he made his debut in 2010 he, too, has less than three years of MLB service time. For several years he struggled with subpar command — in 2011 he led all of baseball in wild pitches thrown — but he seems to have put that behind him. He has walked fewer than a batter every three innings during his return to Milwaukee, and that improved command has turned him into a whole new pitcher.

-Michael Blazek was acquired for John Axford two years back. He’s on the disabled list, but before that, he posted walk, strikeout, and home run ratios almost exactly in line with Jeffress. He still qualified as a rookie this year, so he’s going to be an affordable piece for an even longer stretch

-Corey Knebel struggled to keep the ball in the park, but he’s not even 24 years old yet and he’s flashed the ability to dominate major-league hitters. The former first-round draft pick is a superb option when you get this deep into the ‘pen.

(That’s not even factoring in Francisco Rodriguez, either. K-Rod will be 34 on Opening Day of next year, but from all indications he enjoys plying his trade in Milwaukee. Mariano Rivera just got done with maintaining effectiveness into his forties. It’s hardly a stretch of the imagination to say that Francisco might have a little left in the tank by the time Milwaukee is putting a contender onto the field.)

Ideally, you want your starting pitchers working deep into ballgames. But it’s insane to build your team around the premise that your starters will perform to ideal specifications 162 times with consistency. Sometimes, it’s just not that guy’s night. Having a deeply stocked bullpen gives you far more flexibility in those times of crisis — plus, it gives you more options for the last couple of innings and lets you rotate guys to keep anyone from breaking down. In 2015, this line of thinking won out pretty conclusively.

*****

As the season winds to a close, it will be hard-pressed to find a Brewer fan who is not turning, at least temporarily, into a Houston Astros fan. The team employs two beloved former Milwaukee players, and also represents the best-case scenario for the optimististic fan — that, after just a couple years of retooling and rebuilding, the team will be making a playoff run.

Meanwhile, it will be just as hard to find a Brewer fan who isn’t following the Chicago Cubs with a little too much intensity, as well. The Cubs — led into the playoffs by the youth movement of Kris Bryant, Kyle Schwarber, Addison Russell, and Jorge Soler — look like they’ll inevitably pose a conundrum for the Brewers who have their long-term sights set on the same division title. It’s too easy to contrast their recent success with Milwaukee’s struggles, a brutal comparison.

But there’s still a few cold brews of optimism hidden amongst those struggles. All’s well that ends well, and despite the overall run of things during the 2015 season, the pieces are all there for the Brewers to locate that light at the end of the tunnel.

Since then, they have presumably expected him to give a bit more. From June 23rd until this past Saturday, Lind appeared in 30 games, hitting a meager .250/.319/.337 in those contests. His walk rate and BABIP have each declined slightly, but his power has betrayed him completely. He’s put up an ISO of only .087. This kind of output at the plate, for someone who doesn’t excel anywhere else, will not suffice, so a trend such as this may make the Brewers second-guess starting Lind as often as they have been.

It should be noted that 162 games is a long time; over a full season, any hitter will have his slumps. History can provide us with whether this sort of poor stretch for Lind has any precedent — that is, has his power ever shriveled up this much, for this long? A 30-game rolling average of his career ISO shows that it has, but not very often.

On a few occasions in the past, Lind’s power has dropped below the .100 mark; the most recent sustained dip in performance came in the second half of last year with the Toronto Blue Jays. Nevertheless, this still hasn’t occurred very often over the course of his career, and Lind’s age (he turned 32 in July) and injury history may make it harder for him to bounce back.

Lind’s peripherals certainly back up such a decline. Before entering this slump, he had hit his fly balls an average of 292.4 feet, which is in line with his career level of 290.8 feet (prior to 2015). That’s plummeted to 272.5 during his cold spell. Plus, according to his batted-ball data, Lind has put the ball in the air less often — his 2015 fly ball rates have fallen from 37.3 percent to 27.3 percent. This, of course, only amplifies the effect of his shorter fly-ball distance.

Pitchers haven’t targeted Lind in the same manner as of late. They’ve always thrown more of their pitches outside against him and had maintained that in the early part of the 2015 season; however, opposing hurlers have begun to target him more up and in, perhaps causing him to struggle.

Historically, high pitches have fooled Lind, and even though he hasn’t struck out as much, the poorer contact he’s made on his swings has hamstrung his power production.

It’s worth noting that a back injury kept Lind out of the lineup briefly at the beginning of this stint. This certainly could have a hand in his shortcomings. Then again, he suffered from the same ailment in Spring Training, and it didn’t deter him then or at the start of the year. It’s unclear if significant differences in the severity of the injuries exist, though, which clouds the picture. If back issues have affected him, though, the team should expect them to continue to do so going forward. Given his poor track record health-wise, it wouldn’t be smart to count on Lind to remain 100 percent from here on out.

Because crazy things happen in baseball and we’re inherently working with small sample sizes, this entire development could dissipate immediately. Maybe Lind will crush a few long balls in his next game back and make everyone forget that he had ever cooled off. But if this poor stretch of form stretches into September and it depresses his season statistics enough, Milwaukee will notice. Lind has underwhelmed in the past — he finished with a negative WARP from 2010 to 2012 — so it shouldn’t surprise anyone if he reverted to those ways.

The Brewers didn’t trade Lind at the deadline. They could feel as though they may find themselves to be contenders next year, and as such, they could use the talents that a hitter with Lind’s pedigree provides. Or perhaps they’re waiting for an expanded market this winter. Either way, aging will take its toll on him, as it does on every hitter. If what has developed over the past two months carries into next season, the Brew Crew will wish they had dealt him when his value was highest.

The Brewers will also make a handful of promotions from the minors in September, though likely not immediately. The organization does not wish to interfere with Double-A Biloxi’s postseason run or deplete the ranks at Triple-A Colorado Springs; however, Zach Davies could eventually slide into the rotation and Luis Sardinas should see his fair share of playing time. Still, it’s unlikely that prized prospects Brett Phillips or Orlando Arcia get anything more than a token call-up, as they’d have to be added to the 40-man roster and don’t project to begin the 2016 season with the big-league club. That could leave the September call-up season a bit unfulfilling for many Brewers fans, who are desperate to glimpse the purported future of the franchise.

Attention could quickly turn to the winter trading season. Multiple media sources suggest that the Brewers will be active in the offseason, seeking to further build for a potential run at contention in as early as 2o17. In other words, fans should expect additional departures from the current major-league squad. The club is still unlikely to engage in a firesale — though the uncertainty at General Manager makes it difficult to say this with too much confidence — but multiple sources have indicated that Milwaukee would like to move another piece or two this winter.

Here are the five players that I consider to have the highest probability of being traded this offseason:

(1) SS Jean Segura

Although his trade value has fallen from its April and May levels, the 25-year-old shortstop still carries value and is most likely to be moved this winter. He’s failed to deliver consistency at the plate and has routinely slid back into bad habits as seasons progress; however, the Brewers should benefit from the overall paucity of talent at the shortstop position. Despite his struggles, Segura has the 14th-highest WARP in the majors. Guys like Alexei Ramirez (.240/.268/.345), Jimmy Rollins (.220/.274/.361), Marcus Semien (.252/.296/.391), Jordy Mercer (.243/.290/.313), Erick Aybar (.275/.310/.333), Alexi Amarista (.213/.265/.309), Starlin Castro (.242/.274/.317), J.J. Hardy (.222/.253/.315), and Didi Gregorius (.260/.306/.357) all have received at least 300 plate appearances. That isn’t the exhaustive list, either.

This comes on the heels of an offseason that saw Gregorius move to New York in a deal that included Shane Greene — pre-dumpster-fire version — and Robbie Ray. The 24-year-old Marcus Semien headlined the return for Jeff Samardizja over the winter. Hell, even Luis Sardinas (a potential utility infielder or second-division starter) was the core of the return for right-hander Yovani Gallardo. The idea that Jean Segura is not valuable or won’t have a market this winter seems off the mark, if one considers the most recent offseason.

Segura becomes expendable for several reasons: (1) it’s becoming less and less clear that he’s going to reach his offensive potential, which makes him, at best, a second-division shortstop; (2) Luis Sardinas hit .283/.321/.367 in Triple-A and should be able to handle the starting role for a season or two during a rebuilding stretch; (3) the future at the position is not Segura, but rather Orlando Arcia. These three factors should help convince the organization that he should be moved during the offseason. It wouldn’t be wise to expect a huge prospect package in return, though, unless the new GM brings a vastly different philosophy to the front office and wishes to put his stamp on the club. The Brewers have long prioritized players in the high minors or the majors, and with Melvin still in an advisory role and Attanasio still at the helm, it seems more likely that Milwaukee swaps Segura for a mid-tier young player in Double-A or Triple-A.

(2) OF Khris Davis

Davis clobbered 10 homers in the month of August, firmly asserting his ability to hit for power at the major-league level. He remains an unheralded offensive asset. His .276 TAv is above the league’s average, and his 112 wRC+ indicates that his production at the plate is 12 percent better than average. Davis owns a career 116 wRC+, too, so it’s hardly convincing to suggest that he’s only been decent over the past month. He’s a player with holes in his game; however, in an depressed offensive environment around Major League Baseball, players like Khris Davis carry more value than we’re perhaps predisposed to think.

He’s only 27 years old and won’t be arbitration eligible until the 2017 season. These things are attractive to both the Brewers and other major-league clubs, yet the presence of Domingo Santana should present the organization an opportunity to capitalize on Davis’s trade value without creating a black hole in left field. The front office can shop Davis to both NL and AL clubs with the comfort that they have a very similar player in the wings. Granted, Santana has more swing-and-miss issues than Davis and may experience some growing pains in his first full season, but he’s the one who best profiles to play left field for Milwaukee during their next competitive window.

(3) RHP Matt Garza

It’s no secret that Milwaukee desperately wants to unload the remaining two years of Garza’s four-year, $50M contract. With a 5.56 ERA over 24 starts, that won’t be an easy task, but expect the front office to explore a myriad of ways to move the right-hander this winter. Perhaps it will be a bad-contract swap, with a couple teams taking a chance on change-of-scenery candidates, or a big-market team like the Dodgers could offer a no-name prospect or two in return for simply eating the contract. More likely than not, though, the Brewers will hope that the 31-year-old can begin the 2016 on a high note and move him as quickly as possible.

Some of the underlying numbers suggest Garza could bounce back next year. He didn’t experience any velocity decrease and didn’t have any wild fluctuations in his ground-ball rate. His .317 BABIP is also roughly 30 points higher than his career average, which could mean that he’s due for positive regression. Of course, I’d also argue that Garza’s BABIP and home-run rates are at or near career highs because his command has been dreadful, causing him to issue too many free passes and get obliterated when missing inside the zone. As the offseason approaches, it’s likely that the Brewers’ front office and the fan base will focus on the positive rather than the negative, as they seek to paint the rosiest picture possible — and I find it hard to blame anyone for that.

(4) 1B Adam Lind

The Brewers haven’t had a quality first baseman since Prince Fielder departed following the 2011 season, and with no ready-made replacement in the farm system, it’s understandable why the organization has been hesitant to trade Lind. He’s hitting .282/.362/.470 with a 122 wRC+ and has been solid defensively. At only $8M in 2016, the 32-year-old slugger continues to be attractive to any small-market club, the Brewers notwithstanding.

Still, he’s an aging slugger with perennial back problems and only one year remaining on his contract. At least the St. Louis Cardinals and Pittsburgh Pirates expressed interest over the summer, and more clubs could be in the market for an above-average first baseman over the winter. It’s unclear what the Brewers’ asking price has been or what it projects to be this offseason, but one figures that a two-win first baseman on a team-friendly contract should bring back a better return than what the Brewers had to pay prior to 2015 (Marco Estrada).

The question is whether Milwaukee has any desire to move Lind without any replacement lined up — and it should be noted that Jason Rogers doesn’t profile as an everyday option at first — remains to be seen. I am skeptical that the club would be willing to make such a move. As with all of this speculation, though, the uncertainty at General Manager makes such skepticism partially unfounded. Mostly, such an opinion is based off the presence of Mark Attanasio. His ultimate acquiescence of trading Mike Fiers alleviates my concerns a bit; however, the emergence of Taylor Jungmann as a legitimate major-league pitcher likely softened the blow and made him more receptive to such a move. Any trade of Adam Lind — barring any subsequent trade or free-agent signing — would mean Attanasio agreed to trade a cost-friendly player without any recognizable replacement in the wings. I’m not sure he has agreed to do that before as the Brewers’ owner and I’m not ready to assume he’ll do it now.

(5) RHP Francisco Rodriguez

This is complicated. Rodriguez is 33 years old and has at least $7.5 million guaranteed over the next two years — $5.5 million next year and a $2 million buy-out in 2017. He’s a highly productive reliever who has posted a 2.53 ERA with a 2.88 FIP. He has saved 31 games with only four “meltdowns” this season. He continues to transform himself as a pitcher, as he now throws his fastball just 45.9 percent of the time and has a 14.2 percent whiff rate, which is his highest mark since 2003. Although he prefers to close, the right-hander would be a quality addition to any bullpen, especially in an era in which organizations are beginning to assemble elite bullpens in an effort to lessen the negative impact of a mediocre starting rotation.

Despite all of this, K-Rod remains in Milwaukee. For four-consecutive offseasons, he has had the opportunity to sign with any major-league team, yet he’s ultimately returned to the state of Wisconsin. Part of this is surely tied to the fact that he’s always had a clear shot at the closer’s role with the Brewers, but that doesn’t seem to fully explain it. Plenty of teams across the majors have needed help in the ninth inning over the last four years. So why always Milwaukee? Part of this could be his history of domestic violence, something that has been somewhat of a non-issue — likely because the fan base has somewhat accepted, overlooked, or forgotten his history — but something that will absolutely rear its head in a new location, as members of the media would write their human-interest profiles over the winter.

It could also be that Milwaukee appreciates the way he works with their younger pitchers, as he’s a Spanish-speaking veteran who can help mentor younger Latin American pitchers in the ins and outs of big-league life. As the club promotes a greater number of young, homegrown arms, perhaps that carries greater weight with the organization. Yovani Gallardo could have carried out that role in previous years, but as he’s no longer with the club, it could be argued that K-Rod is one of the only veteran Spanish-speaking mentors the Brewers have on the roster. Although it’s unclear if that’s the ultimate reasoning, I could certainly understand the line of argument, as the behind-the-scenes portion of player development is often overlooked and poorly understood.

Whatever the reason, though, Francisco Rodriguez continues to don a Brewers uniform year after year. On paper, he appears to be an obvious trade candidate for the club. At this point, it’s clear that something unrelated to his performance, good or bad, is keeping him in Milwaukee.

[Note: To answer this question before it’s raised in the comment’s section, I do not consider it likely for Jonathan Lucroy to be traded this winter. The organization has repeatedly informed teams that he’s unavailable. A large reason for this probably has to do with his team-friendly contract and the club’s belief that they can push for contention as soon as 2017 — a time frame in which Lucroy could still be in position to add value to the club’s postseason chances. The pending GM change makes this a bit cloudier, to be fair, but with the information that we currently have available, it does not appear that Milwaukee has any intentions to trade Jonathan Lucroy prior to the 2016 season.]